Contents:
Relation between the 2nd and 3rd section of the 1st part Reason and language Reflective awareness and language inner word Reflective awareness and mark Wanting to know The "as" and the "for" Language as "medium of our spiritual self-feeling and consciousness" Aping and imitating The question of the origin as question of the essence The one and the other project of the essence of language The experience of the word.
Alfred Franz 2nd Class: Georg Schmiege 3rd Class: Heinz Maeder 4th Class: Elisabeth Schmidt 5th Class: Wolfgang Ritzel 7th Class: Otto Rasper 8th Class: Hans Hermann Groothoff 9th Class: Irmgard Mylius 10th Class: Karl Ulmer 11th Class: This important early Heidegger text sheds new light on his later focus on language. This English translation of Vom Wesen der Sprache, volume 85 of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, contains fascinating discussions of language that are important both for those interested in Heidegger's thought and for those who wish to think through the nature of language.
The guiding theme of these reflections on language is found in Heidegger's lecture notes for a seminar that focused on J. Herder's treatise On the Origin of Language. This course, given just after the completion of his Contributions to Philosophy, sheds new light on the force of language in Heidegger's thought and shows the first openings to his later, better-known works dedicated to the topic of language.
The result of this project is to outline how it is that thinking the being of the word moves out of metaphysics into the poetic word and its relation to history. A crucial work, this course brings the reader close to a decisive moment in Heidegger's thought, letting us see how he struggled forward to new ways of thinking how it is that "language as language" can be thought.
In these lectures, Heidegger traces a detour around the German Idealist approach to language as a medium for expressing conceptual thought, in order to arrive at a more primordial origin for evoking meaning through the emergence of speech from silence. As a result, Herder appears as a key historical figure, too easily forgotten in the wake of Schelling and Hegel, who points to a radical retrieval of the essence of language through the dynamics of its enactment.
From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith "Provides a glimpse into the workings of a Heidegger seminar while also presenting one of the most significant historical encounters from which Heidegger's later reflections on language emerged. On the "Monadology" II. Individual considerations and conceptual determinations III. On the essence of language V.
The other beginning VII. Being as such is thus unconcealed owing to Time.
Thus Time points to unconcealedness, i. But the Time of which we should think here is not experienced through the changeful career of beings. Time is evidently of an altogether different nature which neither has been recalled by way of the time concept of metaphysics nor ever can be recalled in this way. Thus Time becomes the first name, which is yet to be heeded, of the truth of Being, which is yet to be experienced. A concealed hint of Time speaks not only out of the earliest metaphysical names of Being but also out of its last name, which is "the eternal recurrence of the same events.
To this Time, space is neither co-ordinated nor merely subordinated. Suppose one attempts to make a transition from the representation of beings as such to recalling the truth of Being:. This relation, which comes out of metaphysics and tries to enter into the involvement of the truth of Being in human nature, is called understanding. But here understanding is viewed, at the same time, from the point of view of the unconcealedness of Being.
Understanding is a project thrust forth and ecstatic, which means that it stands in the sphere of the open. The sphere which opens up as we project, in order that something Being in this case may prove itself as something in this case, Being as itself in its unconcealedness , is called the sense. Let us suppose that Time belongs to the truth of Being in a way that is still concealed: The preface to Being and Time , on the first page of the treatise, ends with these sentences: The interpretation of Time as the horizon of every possible attempt to understand Being is its provisional goal.
All philosophy has fallen into the oblivion of Being which has, at the same time, become and remained the fateful demand on thought in B. What is at stake here is, therefore, not a series of misunderstandings of a book but our abandonment by Being. Metaphysics states what beings are as beings. It offers a logos statement about the outa beings. The later title "ontology" characterises its nature, provided, of course, that we understand it in accordance with its true significance and not through its narrow scholastic meaning.
Metaphysics moves in the sphere of the on i on: In this manner, metaphysics always represents beings as such in their totality; it deals with the beingness of beings the ousia of the on. But metaphysics represents the beingness of beings [ die Seiendheit des Seienden ] in a twofold manner: In the metaphysics of Aristotle, the unconcealedness of beings as such has specifically developed in this twofold manner. Because metaphysics represents beings as beings, it is, two-in-one, the truth of beings in their universality and in the highest being.
According to its nature, it is at the same time ontology in the narrower sense and theology. This ontotheological nature of philosophy proper proti psilosopsia is, no doubt, due to the way in which the on opens up in it, namely as 8v. Thus the theological character of ontology is not merely due to the fact that Greek metaphysics was later taken up and transformed by the ecclesiastic theology of Christianity. Rather it is due to the manner in which beings as beings have from the very beginning disconcealed themselves.
It was this unconcealedness of beings that provided the possibility for Christian theology to take possession of Greek philosophy- whether for better or for worse may be decided by the theologians, on the basis of their experience of what is Christian; only they should keep in mind what is written in the First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians: Aristotle even calls the proti psilosopsia philosophy proper quite specifically zitoumeni - what is sought.
Will Christian theology make up its mind one day to take seriously the word of the apostle and thus also the conception of philosophy as foolishness? As the truth of beings as such, metaphysics has a twofold character.
The reason for this two-foldness, however, let alone its origin, remains unknown to metaphysics; and this is no accident, nor due to mere neglect. Metaphysics has this twofold character because it is what it is: Metaphysics has no choice. Being metaphysics, it is by its very nature excluded from the experience of Being; for it always represents beings on only with an eye to what of Being has already manifested itself as beings i on. But metaphysics never pays attention to what has concealed itself in this very on insofar as it became unconcealed. Thus the time came when it became necessary to make a fresh attempt to grasp by thought what precisely is said when we speak of on or use the word "being" [ seiend ].
Accordingly, the question concerning the on was reintroduced into human thinking. But this reintroduction is no mere repetition of the Platonic-Aristotelian question; instead it asks about that which conceals itself in the on. Metaphysics is founded upon that which conceals itself here as long as metaphysics studies the on i on.
The attempt to inquire back into what conceals itself here seeks, from the point of view of metaphysics, the fundament of ontology.
Therefore this attempt is called, in Being and Time page l3 "fundamental ontology" [ Fundamentalontologie ]. Yet this title, like any title, is soon seen to be inappropriate. From the point of view of metaphysics, to be sure, it says something that is correct; but precisely for that reason it is misleading, for what matters is success in the transition from metaphysics to recalling the truth of Being.
As long as this thinking calls itself "fundamental ontology" it blocks and obscures its own way with this title. For what the title "fundamental ontology" suggests is, of course, that the attempt to recall the truth of Being-and not, like all ontology, the truth of beings-is itself seeing that it is called "fundamental ontology" still a kind of ontology. In fact, the attempt to recall the truth of Being sets out on the way back into the ground of metaphysics, and with its first step it immediately leaves the realm of all ontology.
On the other hand, every philosophy which revolves around an indirect or direct conception of "transcendence" remains of necessity essentially an ontology, whether it achieves a new foundation of ontology or whether it assures us that it repudiates ontology as a conceptual freezing of experience. Coming from the ancient custom of representing beings as such, the very thinking that attempted to recall the truth of Being became entangled in these customary conceptions.
Under these circumstances it would seem that both for a preliminary orientation and in order to prepare the transition from representational thinking to a new kind of thinking recalls [ das andenkende Denken ], that nothing could be more necessary than the question: The unfolding of this question in the following Picture culminates in another question. This is called the basic question of metaphysics: Why is there any being at all and not rather Nothing? Meanwhile [since this lecture was first published in ], to be sure, people have talked back and forth a great deal about dread and the Nothing, both of which are spoken of in this lecture.
But one has never yet deigned to ask oneself why a lecture which moves from thinking of the truth of Being to the Nothing, and then tries from there to think into the nature of metaphysics, should claim that this question is the basic question of metaphysics. How can an attentive reader help feeling on the tip of his tongue an objection which is far more weighty than all protests against dread and the Nothing?
The final question provokes the objection that an inquiry which attempts to recall Being by way of the Nothing returns in the end to a question concerning beings. On top of that, the question even proceeds in the customary manner of metaphysics by beginning with a causal "Why? And to make matters still worse, the final question is obviously the question which the metaphysician Leibniz posed in his Principes de la nature et de la grace: Does the lecture, then fall short of its intention? After all, this would be quite possible in view of the difficulty of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking.
Does the lecture end up by asking Leibniz' metaphysical question about the supreme cause of all things that have being?
Why, then, is Leibniz' name not mentioned, as decency would seem to require? Or is the question asked in an altogether different sense? If it does not concern itself with beings and inquire about their first cause among all beings, then the question must begin from that which is not a being. And this is precisely what the question names, and it capitalises the word: This is the sole topic of the lecture.
The demand seems obvious that the end of the lecture should be thought through, for once, in its own perspective which determines the whole lecture. What has been called the basic question of metaphysics would then have to be understood and asked in terms of fundamental ontology as the question that comes out of the ground of metaphysics and as the question about this ground. But if we grant this lecture that in the end it thinks in tho direction of its own distinctive concern, how are we to under- n stand this question?
Suppose that we do not remain within metaphysics to ask metaphysically in the customary manner; suppose we recall the truth of Being out of the nature and the truth of metaphysics; then this might be asked as well: How did it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every "is" while that which is not a being is understood as Nothing, though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten? How did it come about that with Being It really is nothing and that the Nothing really is not?
Is it perhaps from this that the as yet unshaken presumption has entered into all metaphysics that "Being" may simply be taken for granted and that Nothing is therefore made more easily than beings? That is indeed the situation regarding Being and Nothing. It means turning oneself into being in its disclosing withdrawal. Heidegger never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics. Nevertheless, there are certainly some political implications of his thought. He perceives the metaphysical culture of the West as a continuity.
It begins with Plato and ends with modernity, and the dominance of science and technology. He turns to the Presocratics in order to retrieve a pre-metaphysical mode of thought that would serve as a starting point for a new beginning. However, his grand vision of the essential history of the West and of western nihilism can be questioned.
Modernity, whose development involves not only a technological but also a social revolution, which sets individuals loose from religious and ethnic communities, from parishes and family bonds, and which affirms materialistic values, can be regarded as a radical departure from earlier classical and Christian traditions.
Christianity challenges the classical world, while assimilating some aspects of it, and is in turn challenged by modernity. Modernity overturns the ideas and values of the traditional Christian and classical culture of the West, and, once it becomes global, leads to the erosion of nonwestern traditional cultures.
Under the cover of immense speculative depth and rich ontological vocabulary full of intricate wordplay both which make his writings extremely hard to follow Heidegger expresses a simple political vision. He wants to overturn the traditional culture of the West and build it anew on the basis of earlier traditions in the name of being. Like other thinkers of modernity, he adopts a Eurocentric perspective and sees the revival of German society as a condition for the revival of Europe or the West , and that of Europe as a condition for the revival of for the whole world; like them, while rejecting God as an end, he attempts to set up fabricated ends for human beings.
Ultimately, in the famous interview with Der Spiegel , he expresses his disillusionment with his project and says: The greatness of what is to be thought is too great. He invokes the concept of the ancient polis. The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the poems of Hesiod, and the tragedies of Sophocles, as well as the other ancient Greek texts, including the monumental political work of Thucydides, the History of the Peloponnesian War , express concerns with ethical behavior at both the individual and community levels.
Furthermore, the strength of Western civilization, insofar as its roots can be traced to ancient Greece, is that from its beginning it was based on rationality, understood as free debate, and the affirmation of fundamental moral values. Whenever it turned to irrationality and moral relativism, as in Nazism and Communism, that civilization was in decline. Therefore, Heidegger is likely to be mistaken in his diagnosis of the ills of the contemporary society, and his solution to those ills seems to be wrong.
Asking the question of being and, drawing our attention to this question is certainly his significant contribution is an important addition to, but never a replacement for asking moral questions in the spirit of rationality and freedom. The human being is the unique being whose being has the character of openness toward Being.
But men and women can also turn away from being, forget their true selves, and thus deprive themselves of their humanity. At the beginning of the tradition of Western philosophy, the human being was defined as animal rationale , the animal endowed with reason. Since then, reason has become an absolute value which through education brings about a gradual transformation of all spheres of human life.
It is not more reason in the modern sense of calculative thinking, Heidegger believes, that we need today, but more openness toward and more reflection on that which is nearest to us—being. The Gesamtausgabe , which is not yet complete and projected to fill about one hundred volumes, is published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main. The series consists of four divisions: Below there is a list of the collected works of Martin Heidegger. English translations and publishers are cited with each work translated into English.
Martin Heidegger — Martin Heidegger is widely acknowledged to be one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20 th century, while remaining one of the most controversial. The Quest for the Meaning of Being Throughout his long academic career, Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the meaning of being. Every age, every human epoch, no matter however different they may be— Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole.
From the First Beginning to the New Beginning Many scholars perceive something unique in the Greek beginning of philosophy. From Philosophy to Political Theory Heidegger never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics. Sein und Zeit Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik Indiana University Press, Krell and Frank A. I, Nietzsche I Translated as Nietzsche I: II, Nietzsche II Krell in Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Capuzzi in Early Greek Thinking. Translated as What Is Called Thinking?
Glenn Gray New York: Edited by William McNeill Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Der Satz vom Grund Unterwegs zur Sprache Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens Zur Sache des Denkens Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges Lectures from Marburg and Freiburg, Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie winter semester, Rhetorik summer semester, Sophistes winter semester, Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs summer semester, Die frage nach der Wahrheit winter semester Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie summer semester Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v.
Aquin bis Kant winter semester Einleitung in die Philosophie winter semester Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit winter semester, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie summer semester, Metaphysik IX summer semester, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Sein und Wahrheit winter semester, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache summer semester, Yale University Press, Die Frage nach dem Ding. Translated as What Is a Thing by W. Henry Regnery Company, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit summer semester, Ohio University Press, Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst winter semester, Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen summer semester, Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis summer semester, Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus.
Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende first trimester, Einleitung in die Philosopie - Denken und Dichten Grundbegriffe summer semester, Parmenides winter semester, Heraklits Lehre vom Logos summer semester, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie Phaenomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks.
Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung summer semester, Translated as Contributions to Philosophy: Das Wesen des Nihilismus. Die Geschichte des Seyns Das Ereignis Wahrheitsfrage als Vorfrage. Die Erinnerung in den ersten Anfang; Entmachtung der Ousis Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes