Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: Joint Publication 1

---

To compensate, it relies on deterrence , including through a presumed nuclear weapons arsenal.

It tries to overcome its quantitative disadvantage by staying qualitatively superior. Israel maintains a heightened state of readiness, advanced early warning systems, and a robust military intelligence capability to ensure attackers cannot take advantage of Israel's lack of strategic depth.

Customer reviews

Israel's emphasis on operational offense was espoused by its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion , as early as during Israel's war of Independence:. If [the Arabs] attack us as they did this time, we shall transfer the war to the gates of their country.

We do not intend to conduct If they attack us again, in the future, we want the war to be waged not in our country, but in the enemy's country, and we want to be not on the defensive but on the attack. The basic philosophy of Israel was not to initiate war, unless an act of war was carried out against us. We then lived within the lines prior to the Six-Day War, lines that gave no depth to Israel—and therefore, Israel was in a need, whenever there would be a war, to go immediately on the offensive —to carry the war to the enemy's land.

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

IDF command has been decentralized since the early days of the state, with junior commanders receiving broad authority within the context of mission-type orders. The Soviet meaning of military doctrine was very different from U. Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Grechko defined it in as "a system of views on the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and army for war, officially adopted in a given state and its armed forces.

In Soviet times, theorists emphasised both the political and "military-technical" sides of military doctrine, while from the Soviet point of view, Westerners ignored the political side. However, the political side of Soviet military doctrine, Western commentators Harriet F Scott and William Scott said, "best explained Soviet moves in the international arena". Soviet and contemporary Russian doctrine emphasizes combined-arms warfare as well as operational warfare. It emphasizes the initiation of military hostilities at a time, date, and location of its choosing on terms of its choosing and the extensive preparation of the battlespace for operations.

The Soviet response to problems of nuclear strategy began with classified publications. However, by , with the publication in the Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Sokolovsky 's volume, Military Strategy , the Soviets laid out their officially endorsed thoughts on the matter, and their ideas on how to cope with nuclear conflict. In the s and early s, the Moderate Party —led governments transformed the Swedish Armed Forces from a Cold War posture of defence to one of participation in international operations. The assumption was that Sweden's homeland would face minimal external threats.

For some years the British Army achieved considerable success without having any formal 'Military Doctrine', although a huge number of publications dealing with tactics, operations and administration had been produced. NATO underpins the defence of the UK and its Allies, while also providing deployable expeditionary capabilities to support and defend UK interests further afield.

However, the British Army had formal publications for a long time, and these amounted to its doctrine. They required each arm and service to produce their own specific publications to give effect to FSR.

After the Second World War FSR were replaced by various series of manuals, again with specific training pamphlets for each arm and service. These deal with operational and tactical matters. The current capstone publication for the army is Army Doctrine Publication Operations alongside maritime and air-power equivalents and joint warfare publications all under the umbrella of BDD.

The four layers constituting "land doctrine" are summarised as:. BDD is divided into two parts: Defence Context deals with two matters. First, the relationship between Defence policy and military strategy, and—while highlighting the utility of force — emphasizes the importance of addressing security issues through a comprehensive, rather than an exclusively military, approach. Second it expounds the Nature of and the Principles of War , the three Levels of Warfare Strategic, Operational and Tactical and its evolving character.

The part deals with three matters. First it describes the likely employment of the British Armed Forces in pursuit of Defence policy aims and objectives. Next it explains the three components of fighting power conceptual, physical and moral components and the criticality of the operating context to its effective application. Finally it describes the British approach to the conduct of military operations—"the British way of war".

This includes mission command, the manoeuvrist approach and a warfighting ethos that requires accepting risks. The United States Constitution invests Congress with the powers to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States and to raise and support armies. Title 10 of the United States Code states what Congress expects the Army, in conjunction with the other Services, to accomplish.

Preserve the peace and security and provide for the defense of the United States, its territories and possessions, and any areas it occupies; Support national policies; Implement national objectives; Overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. Most modern US doctrine is based around the concept of full spectrum operations , which combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint or combined force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment.

Offensive operations defeat and destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted abroad to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Civil support operations are support tasks and missions to homeland civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. This includes operations dealing with the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the homeland.

Under President Lyndon Johnson it was stated that the US armed forces should be able to fight two —at one point, two-and-a-half—wars at the same time. This was defined to mean a war in Europe against the Soviet Union, a war in Asia against China or North Korea, and a "half-war" as well—in other words, a "small" war in the Third World. When Richard Nixon took office in , he altered the formula to state that the United States should be able to fight one-and-a-half wars simultaneously.

This doctrine remained in place until —90, when President George H. Bush ordered the "Base Force" study which forecast a substantial cut in the military budget, an end to the Soviet Union's global threat, and the possible beginning of new regional threats. In , President Bill Clinton ordered a "Bottom-Up Review," based on which a strategy called "win-hold-win" was declared—enough forces to win one war while holding off the enemy in another conflict, then moving on to win it after the first war is over.

The final draft was changed to read that the United States must be able to win two "major regional conflicts" simultaneously. The first 1 refers to defending the US homeland. The 4 refers to deterring hostilities in four key regions of the world. The 2 means the US armed forces must have the strength to win swiftly in two near-simultaneous conflicts in those regions.

The final 1 means that the US forces must win one of those conflicts "decisively". The general policy objectives are to 1 assure allies and friends; 2 dissuade future military competition, 3 deter threats and coercion against U. The Department of Defense publishes Joint Publications which state all-services doctrine. Currently the basic Air Force doctrinal documents are the series of Air Force publications.

Currently the basic unclassified naval doctrinal documents are Naval Doctrine Publications 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. It was inspired by the Yugoslav People's Liberation War against the fascist occupiers and their collaborators in the Second World War , and was designed to allow Yugoslavia to maintain or eventually reestablish its independent and non-aligned status should an invasion occur.

According to it, any citizen who resists an aggressor is a member of the armed forces , thus the whole population could be turned into a monolithic resistance army. Starting from the elementary school education, over high schools , universities , organizations and companies, the authorities prepared the entire population to contest an eventual occupation of the country and finally to liberate it.

For this purpose, the Territorial Defense Forces TO would be formed to mobilize the population in case of an aggression. The combat readiness of the TO meant that the steps of organization and training could be bypassed after the start of hostilities. The TO would supplement the regular Yugoslav People's Army , giving it greater defensive depth and an armed local population ready to support combat actions. Large numbers of armed civilians would increase the cost of an invasion to a potential aggressor.

In such a situation, Yugoslavia would remain non-aligned, and it would not accept foreign troops of either alliance on its territory. The doctrine recognized the likelihood that one side or the other might try to seize Yugoslav territory as a forward staging area , to ensure lines of communication or simply to deny the territory to enemy forces. Such action would be considered aggression and would be resisted. Regardless of ideology, the occupiers would be considered Yugoslavia's enemy. They chad able-bodied civilian males and females.

Between 1 and 3 million Yugoslavs between the ages of 15 and 65 would fight under TO command as irregular or guerrilla forces in wartime. In peacetime, however, about , TO troops were involved in military training and other activities.

Navigation menu

The TO concept focused on small, lightly armed infantry units fighting defensive actions on a familiar local terrain. A typical unit was a company -sized detachment. More than communes, factories, and other enterprises organized such units, which would fight in their home areas, maintaining local defense production essential to the overall war effort. The TO also included some larger, more heavily equipped units with wider operational responsibilities. The TO battalions and regiments operated in regional areas with artillery and antiaircraft guns and some armoured vehicles.

Using their mobility and tactical initiative, these units would attempt to alleviate the pressure of enemy armored columns and air strikes on smaller TO units. In the coastal regions, TO units had naval missions.

They operated some gunboats in support of navy operations. They were organized to defend strategic coastal areas and naval facilities against enemy amphibious landings and raids. They also trained some divers for use in sabotage and other special operations.

Military doctrine

The TO was helped by the fact that most of its citizen- soldiers were one-time JNA conscripts who had completed their term of compulsory military service. JP and JP authors collaborated to ensure continuity between these keystone JPs during each revision cycle. JP is the proponent publication for operational art, while JP is the proponent for operational design and the joint planning process. While focused at the operational level, content in both JPs addresses strategic and tactical issues. For example, the introduction of theater campaign planning in JP resulted in related changes in JP to ensure continuity and consistency in language.

Both JPs modified their discussions of phasing joint operations for the same purpose. JP eliminates the figure that depicts phasing. JP retains a figure that shows notional phases on an operation, but the associated text clarifies that it represents only one alternative. The objective of ensuring doctrinal continuity and consistency also applies to the relationship between JP and JP 1, which is currently in revision and scheduled for publication in fourth quarter The JP revision was informed by the latest information available from joint community feedback; various lessons learned and best practices from current operations; and relevant, validated constructs identified during assessment of approved joint concepts.

The revision focused on achieving continuity and appropriate balance across JPs of related topics such as security cooperation and joint planning. Achievement of that objective ensures that the revised keystone joint operations publication will remain a relevant and current doctrinal foundation for all other JPs. The Joint Staff, January Skip to main content Press Enter.

• Insider’s Review of China’s Real Estate (2010-9)
• Trees
• ReViewing Chess: Kings Indian, Classical, Main Line, Vol. 82.1
• Nine New Novellas
• Healing Prayer and Medical Care