Yemen: Profile with Comprehensive Information, History, and Analysis - Politics, Economy, Military -

Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base

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Crisis Group interview, May This prioritisation, much to the U. Wilayat Aden, September In preparation for expected later confrontations with UAE troops and allied forces, IS was also able to acquire UAE-supplied armoured vehicles for suicide bombings against coalition forces. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, two field commanders of anti-Huthi resistance forces and colonel commanding the Decisive Salman Brigade, Aden, July and August AQAP said that twelve of their fighters were killed at a checkpoint on the edge of AQAP-controlled territory some km outside Mukalla , but that no lives were lost in the withdrawal from the city.

Crisis Group consultant multimedia interview in former capacity, April A commander of Hadrami soldiers taking part in the offensive said they killed around twenty AQAP militants at the checkpoint marking the northern entry to their territory and no fighting took place inside the city. Crisis Group consultant phone interviews in former capacity, April Saudi-led coalition statements that fighting the group is a top priority and announcements of military victories against AQAP in the south are belied by events.

Indeed, three Hadi associates have appeared on a U. Department of the Treasury, 19 May ; and U. Hide Footnote The focus on the Huthis in some ways makes short-term sense for Saudi Arabia, where the threat of Iranian encirclement resonates widely domestically, as opposed to the threat from Sunni extremists, which is a more complicated sell, given local pockets of sympathy and support.

Yet, AQAP also seeks to topple the Saudi monarchy, which it views as corrupt and tied to the West, a threat that grows as the organisation gains ground in Yemen. Moreover, lack of a unified southern leadership or plan to address security and governance challenges in chronically neglected and impoverished governorates like Abyan and Shebwa continues to provide a receptive environment for violent jihadist groups.

According to a resident of Jaar:. A successful strategy for combating al-Qaeda should focus on governance and service provision. In Jaar, however, many young people have joined Ansar Sharia because they are poor, have little education and see no future for themselves. Ansar provides these young people with an income and a purpose. As long as the war, infighting among southern elites and chronic governance challenges continue, the much publicised military initiatives against AQAP and IS will probably not amount to more than temporary victories.

During the evolving conflict, the group has expanded its war chest by raiding banks and controlling seaports and smuggling routes. Crisis Group consultant interview in former capacity, former security official, Mukalla, March Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Mukalla, April Hide Footnote It also imposed import levies at the Mukalla and Ash-Shihr seaports, collecting a fee for every litre of fuel and every cargo container offloaded.

Hide Footnote Yet, the effects of controlling Mukalla for over a year will not fade quickly. It already offered its fighters in a salary higher than that of government soldiers, and its new financial resources can exercise an even more significant pull on impoverished young men. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Abyan, May Beginning in November , a nascent IS branch put itself on the Yemen conflict map through spectacular attacks against a variety of protagonists, including both the Huthis and the Hadi government.

More than AQAP, however, IS is also a product of growing sectarianism and extreme levels of violence, which have radicalised young men and made them susceptible to its recruitment. Most importantly, its appearance in Yemen is tied to its successes in Iraq and Syria. A handful of young men posted pictures on social media purportedly declaring an unverified eighth local branch in Mahra governorate in September Crisis Group consultant interview in former capacity, October Hide Footnote This trend was helped by a number of U.

While al-Wuhayshi was not a theologian, he was a very popular, astute and much-respected figurehead of the group. Crisis Group consultant multimedia interviews in former capacity, Shebwa tribal leaders, July, August The senior ideologues were also veteran AQ members with experience garnered in Bosnia, Afghanistan and the Philippines. This old guard appears to still hold significance to AQAP. IS also took advantage of the battle for Aden.

Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Aden, August These recruits continued to carry out high-profile attacks, including a suicide bombing against a government military recruitment centre in the port city on 29 August that killed over The same official later killed in a U. Crisis Group consultant multimedia interviews in former capacity, November , March Hide Footnote Later, AQAP leaders publicly criticised IS, denouncing its attacks on mosques, which they contrasted with their own reputed sensitivity to local norms.

They also engaged in a broader media campaign, ridiculing IS and al-Baghdadi, its self-proclaimed caliph. AQAP video release, 1 November They rise up when the group moves in from the outside to jointly take control of a place. Their brutal tactics, including mass killings and mosque bombings, and their relatively autocratic style, are at odds with societal and tribal norms. In December , IS faced an internal mutiny when fifteen senior figures and 55 fighters accused their leader, the governor wali of Yemen province, of violating Sharia.

Hide Footnote Rejecting the letter, all 70 members left the group. On 24 December, an additional 31, including three senior figures, released a statement joining the rebellion and renouncing the IS leader in Yemen. IS continues to carry out suicide bombings in the government-controlled cities of Aden and Mukalla and also engages in assassinations of local security and intelligence personnel that have a significant impact. This and repeated IS suicide bombings of military recruitment centres and mass gatherings of soldiers collecting salaries have led many southerners to view IS as part of a historical pattern in which northern political elites use violent jihadists as a tool in asymmetric warfare against the south.

Crisis Group consultant observations in former capacity; and interviews, Hiraak activists, Aden and Mukalla, August December Its longstanding presence and well-established networks across the country have given it a clear upper hand. Fault lines between groups are increasingly unclear and many have no visible structure.

Individuals and fighting factions often assume tribal, political and religious identities simultaneously. Attempts at simplification are often misleading while making any future reintegration of armed groups problematic. The label Salafi is similarly vulnerable to these errors and underlines the need for disaggregation. Increasing fragmentation throughout the civil war has resulted in open conflict between Salafi strands.

Hide Footnote Yemen has long housed a variety of Salafi groups. Quietist, scholastic or missionary Salafis are apolitical, reject parliamentary politics and, in theory, give allegiance to existing authority. Salafi-jihadists advocate violence against religious and political enemies. And activist Salafis are more inclined to challenging authorities through the political process.

Crisis Group consultant phone interview, Laurent Bonnefoy, July See Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity London, Hide Footnote Prior to the war, most were non-political and non-violent. Some, like the al-Rashad party, embraced politics and were closely associated with Islah. As the Huthis expanded southward, however, many took up arms against them. The earliest indications of this were in , when the Huthis fought Salafis from the Dar al-Hadith religious institute in Dammaj, Saada. Salafi proselytising there, itself arguably a product of socio-economic grievances against advantages given to Zaydi elites, particularly Hashemites descendants of the Prophet , is a core grievance that sparked Zaydi revivalism in the s and later gave impetus to the Huthi movement.

Defusing the Saada Time Bomb , 27 May Hide Footnote Although the Huthis emerged victorious in January , fighters from Dammaj and another religious institute in Kitaf, Saada, regrouped and are now fighting the Huthis on a number of fronts. Opportunistic alliances forged by the Saudi-led coalition have propelled Salafis to prominence. In Aden, they act with UAE support as state-sponsored, irregular security forces. In , the al-Mehdhar Brigade, based in Sheikh Othman and Mansoura districts, acted as a local security force. In October , the group joined other Saudi-supported Yemeni forces in crossing the Saudi-Yemeni border in an attempt to push into Saada, the Huthi stronghold.

Another group, the Security Belt forces, a UAE-supported militia established by presidential decree in May to help secure Aden and led by Nabil Mashwashi, a former South Yemen army commander, appears to have a significant Salafi component. Crisis Group interview, September Hide Footnote As in Aden, Salafis are at the forefront of Saudi-led coalition-sponsored efforts to repel Huthi advances. Crisis Group interviews, Taiz politician, August ; prominent Sheikh from the Hashid tribal confederation, September Crisis Group consultant phone interviews in former capacity, Taizi activists, journalist, September Hide Footnote Since December , Salafi and other resistance militias have nominally been integrated into the Yemeni army while remaining separate in reality.

It is unclear how relationships between AQAP and various Salafi groups will develop and what, if any, political ambitions the latter have beyond defeating the Huthis. Their growth into a pivotal player in the civil war elevates the need for their representation in any political resolution, especially if they are to play a role as an alternative, among religious conservatives, to AQAP or IS. The UAE complicates this picture: Crisis Group consultant phone interviews in former capacity, Islah-aligned, pro-unity Mukalla residents, October Hide Footnote Islah, like Islamist groups actively engaged in politics across the Arab world, can play an essential role as firewall against radicalisation in Yemen.

While the UAE officially supports its inclusion in any political settlement, its intolerance of Islah in practice risks pushing young men who might have chosen politics into the arms of the very violent jihadist groups the UAE wants to quash. At a regional level, the undertow of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry drives sectarianism and incites radicalisation on both sides of the war. Without de-escalation between them, it risks becoming an extension of a wider competition between, on one side, Iran and its allies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon — with Russia also playing a role — and the predominantly Sunni powers of the Saudi-led coalition, backed by Western states, including Israel.

Dialling back this regional enmity is a vital priority.

Within Yemen, achieving a sustainable ceasefire and nationwide political settlement should be the priority. To reverse the growth of AQAP and IS will require a political settlement that is truly inclusive, provides a mechanism for addressing demands for local autonomy and outlines interim security arrangements that are accepted by local communities while operating under the umbrella of the state. Including a range of Sunni Islamists, particularly Islah and Salafi groups prepared to engage in politics, in power-sharing arrangements would give them a stake in national politics and a viable political outlet as opposed to marginalising them and potentially pushing some toward violent jihadism.

Overcoming zero-sum perspectives requires, as a first step, a compromise in which each side can be part of the government and security apparatus. Addressing demands for regional autonomy would also be crucial to rolling back AQAP. This local view of AQAP greatly contributed to the success of efforts by intelligence agencies in routing members who went into hiding after the April offensive. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Hiraak activists, Mukalla, March Three of them, who were listed by the Hadi government as wanted AQ members, acknowledged they were fighting alongside AAS but denied being members.

They cited corruption and cronyism as primary grievances against the government. The jihadists were eventually pushed out, with some leaving through negotiations. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Aden, March Clear interim security arrangements are a critical part of any effective settlement. This issue has been a sticking point in UN-led negotiations. Yet, their continued presence in contested areas and dominance in the north, to the exclusion of other constituencies, exacerbates communal tensions that radical groups could also take advantage of.

In the short term, Yemen needs clear interim security arrangements that are tailored to local political realities. Areas like Taiz will be most difficult to tackle, as warring forces are positioned in close quarters on the battlefield and can each claim acceptance from certain parts of the local community. Bringing together locally accepted combatants under the umbrella of local authorities acting on behalf the state would be ideal, at least until the overarching issues of military-security reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration can be addressed nationally.

Even if the UN is able to broker a deal, it is unlikely to result in a quick end to this multifaceted conflict with regional dimensions. Addressing state orchestration of jihadist groups. Improving governance in areas previously under, or vulnerable to, militant control. It has prioritised providing security, basic services and a judicial system able to resolve grievances, such as long-running land disputes, showing itself as a viable, better alternative to the state.

As a priority, this includes quick and non-corrupt dispute resolution, security provision rather than predatory score-settling and basic services such as electricity and water.

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Aden stands out in many ways as an example of what not to do. Tensions are high between them and forces aligned with Hadi and his interior minister, Hussein al-Arab. The Security Belt forces technically fall under the interior minister, though the degree to which he controls them is questionable. All factions are competing for Emirati patronage and support. Overlaying the competition is a historical division from the civil war in which a group from the current governorates of Dalia and Lahi won over their adversaries, mainly from Abyan and Shebwa.

Hadi and al-Arab are associated with the latter, while the Aden governor and his security chief are associated with the former. Crisis Group consultant interviews, more than a half a dozen Aden residents, the Aden governor and Aden security chief, Aden, January The experience in Abyan is a cautionary tale of how working through local militias without a clear plan for incorporating them into the state security forces or deploying them to help stabilise areas retaken from jihadists can backfire.

Local militias known as popular committees were central to the U. Their use yielded the short-term gain of driving AQAP out, but as the only force in charge of security they contributed to local tensions, entrenched exclusionary patronage networks and were vulnerable to infiltration by violent jihadists, who used them as a cover to establish networks for future resurgence. Crisis Group consultant interview in former capacity, Aden, June There were exceptions, notably in northern Abyan areas such as Lawder, where local militias were well-liked and more representative of local communities.

Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, local residents, Lawder, May According to a resident of Jaar, the UAE and its local partners, most of which seek southern separation, had some success in pushing AQAP into the neighbouring governorate of al-Bayda in , but there are still far too few government-provided services and an unmet desire for governance. Mukalla appears to show improvement. Some Hadramis say that the population is now working with the UAE and local security forces to identify and apprehend remaining AQAP supporters in the city and that services, such as water and electricity, are working well.

Hide Footnote Still, the success was almost immediately followed by accusations of corruption, cronyism, arbitrary detention and torture by the new authorities and security forces. Non-secessionist residents and those politically aligned to Islah continue to complain of unlawful arrests, torture and disappearances at the hands of the new Elite security forces a group similar to the Security Belt in Aden that is composed of local fighters trained by the UAE and UAE troops.

Disaggregating rather than conflating Sunni Islamist groups. AQAP is an internally diverse organisation with varying layers of support among the local population and shifting alliances. Its efforts to blend in with the larger Sunni community and to ease affiliation requirements especially the loyalty oath expand its influence even as they leave it vulnerable to efforts to peel off supporters motivated less by its global agenda than by local political or economic grievances. Protagonists on both sides of the war have at times been quick to label a wide range of Sunni Islamists — from Islah to various Salafi and other fighting groups — as AQAP, instead of acknowledging clear differences between them.

We are not al-Qaeda but joined with them to fight [Security Director] Shalal because we have no choice.

We fought and died for our city for six months and they offered us nothing in return. They gave positions to their friends and families, stole money meant for us and treated us like garbage to be thrown away or burnt. As a politician from Abyan noted:. Ansar al-Sharia was born of al-Qaeda but is different. Most Ansar followers in Abyan are local. Many are young men who are very poor with no prospects. You can strike agreements with them and pull them away from al-Qaeda. After al-Qaeda was removed from Abyan, Ansar supporters stayed behind.

It is important to give them [political and economic] opportunities. Understanding who can be negotiated with and convinced to peacefully participate in political and social life is tricky and a shifting target that requires buy-in and expertise from local communities. Using military tools judiciously. A tactic that has proved more effective is the threat of force combined with local negotiations with militants to encourage core AQAP supporters to leave areas, particularly cities, thereby sparing population centres widespread destruction and taking the fight against combatants unwilling to negotiate to less-populated areas.

For the most part, this happened in Mukalla, and with considerable success. In Yemen, foreign troops, particularly Western ones, and even fighters from a different region of the country, risk antagonising local populations that view them as invaders. Even when local fighters are used, they can become part of the problem if they are operating outside of a clear legal framework. Drones, too, should be used judiciously and in coordination with Yemeni authorities so as not to violate sovereignty.

While the Hadi government and the civil war have given the U. Their use raises the additional risk of replacements becoming increasingly hard-line. This is especially the case with U. The first military actions by the Trump administration in Yemen bode poorly for the prospect of smartly and effectively countering AQAP. A 29 January U. Special Forces raid in al-Bayda governorate, a critical battleground between pro- and anti-Huthi forces, killed a U. Hide Footnote The use of U. They are part of a regional trend of religiously-justified violence that is making conflict resolution evermore elusive.

Instead, this multifaceted struggle looks set to deepen confessional divides — not previously a focal point of conflict — to the benefit of AQAP and IS and detriment of the country, its people and global security. The attacks represent an alarming escalation for Burkina Faso in terms of organisation, lethality of armaments and length of engagement.

Operations were carried out by two groups of at least four to five assailants each. While the incidents were confined to the city center, they hit two symbolic targets at the heart of power in the country: The official death toll is sixteen, including nine assailants. Reliable sources indicated more than 30 dead. The number of wounded is around At the army headquarters, it seems up to five men in a vehicle either used a grenade or rocket-propelled grenade to blast their way through the entrance gate, where they then shot at soldiers in the courtyard and detonated a vehicle full of explosives by the main building.

At the French Embassy, a group of at least four men tried to force their way into the embassy. Shooting continued for several hours.

A French military source told Crisis Group: Even so, compared to the previous two attacks in Ouagadougou in and , the response time and organisation of the reaction seem slightly improved. Violence in the Sahel long seemed to spare Burkina Faso. How has Ouagadougou become a target? It is not only Ouagadougou that has become a target; so has the north of the country. Since January , the country has experienced several deadly attacks from regional and international terrorist networks. Nineteen people were killed and 25 others injured when suspected jihadists opened fire on a Turkish restaurant in central Ouagadougou on 13 August Since , northern Burkina Faso, which borders troubled Mali, has also experienced 80 attacks that are increasingly frequent and lethal.

These attacks are mostly done by Ansarul Islam, a group founded in December that is locally rooted, albeit with ties to other groups in Mali.

Intelligence gathering appears to be weak, judging by the failure to detect or disrupt the major attacks that happened on Friday. Two teams totaling at least eight men were able to cross the city center carrying heavy weapons and driving a car full of explosives without being spotted. Those individuals have left. It is taking time to rebuild efficient institutions in their wake. Is the attack in Ouagadougou a purely domestic affair, or linked to broader violence in the Sahel region? This evolved with the Malian crisis. Where do the Ouagadougou attacks fit into the context of jihadist violence in the Sahel, and the regional response to it?

Amidst ongoing efforts by demonstrators and rebel forces to wrest control of Tripoli from the Jamahiriya , the opposition set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 's rule. On 17 March, United Nations Security Council Resolution was adopted, authorising a no-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.

Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces.

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A coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervention. The forces were driven back from the outskirts of Benghazi, and the rebels mounted an offensive , capturing scores of towns across the coast of Libya. The offensive stalled however, and a counter-offensive by the government retook most of the towns, until a stalemate was formed between Brega and Ajdabiya , the former being held by the government and the latter in the hands of the rebels.

Focus then shifted to the west of the country, where bitter fighting continued. After a three-month-long battle , a loyalist siege of rebel-held Misrata , the third largest city in Libya, was broken in large part due to coalition air strikes. The four major fronts of combat were generally considered to be the Nafusa Mountains , the Tripolitanian coast, the Gulf of Sidra , [] and the southern Libyan Desert.

In late August, anti-Gaddafi fighters captured Tripoli , scattering Gaddafi's government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many institutions of the government, including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped in Sirte , which Gaddafi declared to be Libya's new capital. Protests occurred in many towns in both the north and south of Yemen starting in mid-January Demonstrators initially protested against governmental proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen , unemployment and economic conditions, [] and corruption, [] but their demands soon included a call for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh , [] [] [] who had been facing internal opposition from his closest advisors since A major demonstration of over 16, protesters took place in Sana'a on 27 January , [] and soon thereafter human rights activist and politician Tawakel Karman called for a "Day of Rage" on 3 February.

On 3 February, 20, protesters demonstrated against the government in Sana'a, [] [] others participated in a "Day of Rage" in Aden [] that was called for by Tawakel Karman , [] while soldiers, armed members of the General People's Congress , and many protestors held a pro-government rally in Sana'a. Protests continued over the following months, especially in the three major cities, and briefly intensified in late May into urban warfare between Hashid tribesmen and army defectors allied with the opposition on one side and security forces and militias loyal to Saleh on the other.

After Saleh pretended to accept a Gulf Cooperation Council -brokered plan allowing him to cede power in exchange for immunity from prosecution only to back away before signing three separate times, [] [] an assassination attempt on 3 June left him and several other high-ranking Yemeni officials injured by a blast in the presidential compound's mosque.

The protesters joining the "Mansouron Friday" were calling for establishment of "a new Yemen". On 23 September, three months since the assassination attempt, Saleh returned to Yemen abruptly, defying all earlier expectations. Protests in Syria started on 26 January , when a police officer assaulted a man in public at "Al-Hareeka Street" in old Damascus. The man was arrested right after the assault.

As a result, protesters called for the freedom of the arrested man. Soon a "day of rage" was set for 4—5 February, but it was uneventful. Soon protests erupted over the arrest and abuse of the children. Daraa was to be the first city to protest against the Ba'athist government, which has been ruling Syria since Thousands of protesters gathered in Damascus , Aleppo , al-Hasakah , Daraa , Deir ez-Zor , and Hama on 15 March, [] [] [] with recently released politician Suhair Atassi becoming an unofficial spokesperson for the "Syrian revolution".

Protests continued through July , the government responding with harsh security clampdowns and military operations in several districts, especially in the north. At least people were killed, the highest death toll in any day since the start of the uprising. By late December, the battles between the government's security forces and the rebel Free Syrian Army intensified in Idlib Governorate. Cities in Idlib and neighborhoods in Homs and Hama began falling into the control of the opposition, during this time military operations in Homs and Hama stopped. By late January, the Free Syrian Army launched a full-scale attack against the government in Rif Dimashq , where they took over Saqba , Hamoreya, Harasta and other cities in Damascus's Eastern suburbs.

Fighting broke out near Damascus international airport, but by the next day the Syrian government deployed the Republican Guards. The military gained the upper hand and regained all land the opposition gained in Rif Dimashq by early February. On 4 February, the Syrian Army launched a massive bombardment on Homs and committed a huge massacre, killing civilians in one night in Homs.

In late February, Army forces entered Baba Amr after a big military operation and heavy fighting. Following this, the opposition forces began losing neighborhoods in Homs to the Syrian Army including al-Inshaat, Jobr, Karm el-Zaytoon and only Homs's old neighborhood's, including Al-Khalidiya, Homs al-Khalidiya, remained in opposition hands.

By March , the government began military operations against the opposition in Idlib Governorate including the city of Idlib , which fell to the Army by mid-March. Saraqib and Sarmin were also recaptured by the government during the month. Still, at this time, the opposition managed to capture al-Qusayr and Rastan. Heavy fighting also continued in several neighborhoods in Homs and in the city of Hama.

The FSA also started to conduct hit-and-run attacks in the pro-Assad Aleppo Governorate , which they were not able to do before. Heavy-to-sporadic fighting was also continuing in the Daraa and Deir ez-Zor Governorates. By late April , despite a cease-fire being declared in the whole country, sporadic fighting continued, with heavy clashes specifically in Al-Qusayr, where rebel forces controlled the northern part of the city, while the military held the southern part.

FSA forces were holding onto Al-Qusayr, due to it being the last major transit point toward the Lebanese border. A rebel commander from the Farouq Brigade in the town reported that 2, Farouq fighters had been killed in Homs province since August At this point, there were talks among the rebels in Al-Qusayr, where many of the retreating rebels from Homs city's Baba Amr district had gone, of Homs being abandoned completely. On 12 June , the UN peacekeeping chief in Syria stated that, in his view, Syria has entered a period of civil war.

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The protests in Bahrain started on 14 February , and were initially aimed at achieving greater political freedom and respect for human rights ; they were not intended to directly threaten the monarchy. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared a three-month state of emergency on 15 March and asked the military to reassert its control as clashes spread across the country.

The police response has been described as a "brutal" crackdown on peaceful and unarmed protestors, including doctors and bloggers. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in various countries, there was a wave of violence and instability commonly known as the Arab Winter [] or Islamist Winter.

Although the long-term effects of the Arab Spring have yet to be shown, its short-term consequences varied greatly across the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the existing regimes were ousted and replaced through a process of free and fair election, the revolutions were considered short-term successes. Elsewhere, most notably in the monarchies of Morocco and the Persian Gulf , existing regimes co-opted the Arab Spring movement and managed to maintain order without significant social change.

Social scientists have endeavored to understand the circumstances that led to this variation in outcome.

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A variety of causal factors have been highlighted, most of which hinge on the relationship between the strength of the state and the strength of civil society. Countries with stronger civil society networks in various forms underwent more successful reforms during the Arab Spring; these findings are also consistent with more general social science theories such as those espoused by Robert D. Putnam and Joel S. One of the primary influences that have been highlighted in the analysis of the Arab Spring is the relative strength or weakness of a society's formal and informal institutions prior to the revolts.

When the Arab Spring began, Tunisia had an established infrastructure and a lower level of petty corruption than did other states, such as Libya. Also crucial was the degree of state censorship over print, broadcast, and social media in different countries. Television coverage by channels like Al Jazeera and BBC News provided worldwide exposure and prevented mass violence by the Egyptian government in Tahrir Square, contributing to the success of the Egyptian Revolution. In other countries, such as Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, such international press coverage was not present to the same degree, and the governments of these countries were able to act more freely in suppressing the protests.

Morocco is a case in point, as its broadcast media at the time of the revolts was owned and operated almost exclusively by political elites with ties to the monarchy. Countries with greater access to social media, such as Tunisia and Egypt, proved more effective in mobilizing large groups of people, and appear to have been more successful overall than those with greater state control over media.

Without the use of street level organization social activists would not have been as effective. There are still many grievances taking place today. Due to tourism coming to a halt and other factors during the revolution and Arab Spring movement, the budget deficit has grown and unemployment has risen since Still to this day, in countries affected by the Arab Spring, there is great division amongst those who prefer the status quo and those who want democratic change.

As these regions dive ever deeper into political conflict time will show if new ideas can be established or if old institutions will still stand strong. It is speculated that many of the changes brought on by the Arab Spring will lead to a shifting of regional power in the Middle East and a quickly changing structure of power.

The support, even if tacit, of national military forces during protests has also been correlated to the success of the Arab Spring movement in different countries. Countries like Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, exhibited a strong mobilization of military force against protesters, effectively ending the revolts in their territories; others, including Libya and Syria, failed to stop the protests entirely and instead ended up in civil war.

In Saudi Arabia and Syria, where the ruling elite was closely linked with ethnic or religious subdivisions of society, the military sided with the existing regime and took on the ostensible role of protector to minority populations. The apparent exception to this trend is Egypt, which has a sizable Coptic minority. The presence of a strong, educated middle class has been noted as a correlate to the success of the Arab Spring in different countries.

The strength of the middle class is, in turn, directly connected to the existing political, economic, and educational institutions in a country, and the middle class itself may be considered an informal institution. Finally, "Still, youth across the region continue to struggle with the more personal fight to build an economic future as they enter adulthood. For many young people, this struggle has only become more acute in the difficult macroeconomic environment faced by many of the countries in the region.

Finding real solutions to the economic constraints that shape the transition to adulthood in the Middle East remains as vital today as before the Arab Uprisings, when youth brought their economic frustrations to streets and squares around the region. Indeed, finding such solutions is perhaps the lynchpin for bringing stability back to the Middle East and building a more prosperous economic future for all of the people of the region. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about the demonstrations and revolts in the Arab world in early s. For other Arab revolts, see Arab Revolt disambiguation.

Social media and the Arab Spring. Timeline of the Arab Spring. Arab Spring concurrent incidents.

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