Contents:

How Physics and Neuroscience Dictate Your "Free" Will

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The philosophic problem of free will and determinism arises because this seems to undercut moral responsibility: How can we reasonably be held responsible for something whose causes we couldn't control? Genetic Determinism in Philosophy of Biology. There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior.

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Words and Silences: Aboriginal Women, Politics and Land.
Free Will and Science - Bibliography - PhilPapers?
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Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic. Genes in Philosophy of Biology. Popular and scientific accounts of the U. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility.

However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in Whether it does depends on the extent to which the genetic basis for behavior turns on behavioral incapacities.

Genome Project in Philosophy of Biology. We are discovering more and more about the human genotypes and about the connections between genotype and behaviour. Do these advances in genetic information threaten our free will? Free Will and Physics in Philosophy of Action. Free Will and Psychology in Philosophy of Action. Theories of Free Will in Philosophy of Action. There is an explicit belief — evident in jurisprudential literature — that developments in behavioural genetics in the very near future will necessitate a dramatic revolution in common law criminal justice systems.

This paper considers what is truly shown by behavioural genetics in relation to free will, and the effect of such conclusions on criminal justice systems which rely upon the concept of free will as a foundation element. This paper ultimately concludes that it is unlikely that criminal justice systems Three major arguments are employed: Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law. In this volume a group of leading philosophers address some of the basic conceptual, methodological and ethical issues raised by genetic research into criminal behavior. The essays explore the complexities of tracing any genetic influence on criminal, violent or antisocial behavior; the varieties of interpretations to which evidence of such influences is subject; and the relevance of such influences to the moral and legal appraisal of criminal conduct.

The distinctive features of this collection are: The volume will be of particular value to philosophers concerned with applied ethics, behavioral geneticists, psychologists, legal theorists, and criminologists. Genetics in Philosophy of Biology. This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility.

In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Alternative Possibilities in Philosophy of Action. Autonomy in Applied Ethics in Applied Ethics. Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action. Psychiatric Ethics in Applied Ethics. Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent.

I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense. Free Will, Misc in Philosophy of Action. Autonomy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy. Neurophilosophy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Compatibilism in Philosophy of Action.

The question of whether humans have free will, like the question of the meaning of life, is one whose answer depends on how the question itself is interpreted. In his recent book Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy, Henrik Walter examines whether free will is possible in a deterministic natural world, and he concludes that the answer is "It depends" xi.

He rejects a libertarian account of free will as internally inconsistent, but argues Walter covers a lot of ground in this book. He debunks dualism, examines classical and modern physics, critiques radical constructivism, and utilizes chaos theory, and he refers to figures from St. This book could be seen as encompassing two distinct projects. The first project is a defense of what Walter calls "neurophilosophy" as a methodology for answering traditional philosophical questions. This methodology is more commonly known as "cognitive science," and Walter accepts the naturalistic premises that underlie most of the work being done by cognitive scientists today.

How Physics and Neuroscience Dictate Your "Free" Will

The second project is an application of the neurophilosophical methodology to the traditional question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. The defense of a neurophilosophical methodology is concentrated in the second section of the book, whereas the first and third sections focus on the issue of free will.

In the first section Walter presents a thorough overview of the free will debate.

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It is the final third of the book that warrants the most attention, for this is where the original work is concentrated. Before we examine Walter's contribution to the free will debate, let us briefly look at his historical analysis and the neurophilosophical method that he advocates.. Free Will and Responsibility in Philosophy of Action. This chapter analyzes the different ways to describe brain behaviour with the goal to provide a basis for an informed discussion of the nature of decisions and actions that humans perform in their lives. The chapter is organized as follows.

Section 2 outlines a number of concepts exhibiting how many subtle details and distinctions lie behind the broad notions of determinacy and stochasticity. These details are necessary for a discussion, in Section 3, of particular aspects relevant for the characterization of The descriptions of brain behaviour currently provided by neuroscience depend on the level and context of the descriptions. There is no clear-cut evidence for ultimately determinate or ultimately stochastic brain behaviour.

As a consequence, there is no solid neurobiological basis to argue either in favour of or against any fundamental determination or openness of human decisions and actions. Determinism in Philosophy of Action. A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it. In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.

In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Finally, he argues that because there is no good evidence as to whether or not the relevant neural events are undetermined in the way that's required, the question of whether human beings possess libertarian free will is a wide-open empirical question.

Metaphysics, Misc in Metaphysics. Theories of Freedom in Social and Political Philosophy. A seminal experiment found that the reported time of a decision to perform a simple action was at least ms after the onset of brain activity that normally preceded the action. In Experiment 1, we presented deceptive feedback an auditory beep 5 to 60 ms after the action to signify a movement time later than the actual movement.

The reported time of decision moved forward in time linearly with the delay in feedback, and came after the muscular initiation of In Experiment 2, participants viewed their hand with and without a ms video delay, and gave a time of decision 44 ms later with than without the delay. We conclude that participants' report of their decision time is largely inferred from the apparent time of response.

The perception of a hypothetical brain event prior to the response could have, at most, a small influence. Psychology in Cognitive Sciences. There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation.

In this paper, an alternative interpretation of these studies is offered; one which is in accordance both with the empirical evidence and also with the phenomenology of the will, demonstrating that the two opposing views of agency — both the ones that deny the reality of free will and the ones that affirm it — are equally compatible with the outcomes of these two experiments.

On this basis, it is shown that the claim that the results on the timing of readiness potential tip the scales in favour of one or the other view cannot be justified - neither from a neurological, nor from a philosophical perspective. Consciousness and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Interactionism in Philosophy of Mind. Other Psychophysical Relations in Philosophy of Mind. Qualia, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do.

Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will Strawson this volume. Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. According to an increasingly influential line of thought, our common-sense commitment to the existence of free will is threatened in unique ways by what we are learning from the sciences of human agency. Free will sans metaphysics?

However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened.

From Genius to Madness

The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in On this basis, it is shown that the claim that the results on the timing of readiness potential tip the scales in favour of one or the other view cannot be justified - neither from a neurological, nor from a philosophical perspective. Examples of several such theories are given. Whether or not free will exists, psychology and neuroscience are beginning to explain why we feel as if we can influence our destiny. Two forms of independent action by consciousness have been proposed by various researchers — free will and holistic processing. He found that such stimulation can trigger the urge to move a limb.

I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. Chris Frith's target chapters contain a wealth of interesting experiments and striking theoretical claims. In these comments I begin by drawing out some of the key themes in his discussion of action and the sense of agency.

Frith's central claim about conscious action is that what we are primarily conscious of in acting is our own agency. I will review some of the experimental evidence that he interprets in support of this claim and then explore the following three questions about Should we locate the phenomena that Frith describes as awareness of agency at the personal level or at the subpersonal level?

If we are indeed operating at the personal level, then should we think about awareness of agency as something we experience, or as something that we believe? In what follows I argue that awareness of agency should be located at the personal level, and that we should think of it as something we experience. Neuroscientist might also illuminate how the powers required for free will - rational reflection and decision-making, centrally - are implemented.

Key works Benjamin Libet's [ Libet ] claims about the timing of conscious states has been a central focus of work on this topic. Jobs in this area. Options 1 filter applied. Using PhilPapers from home? Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server. Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: Add an entry to this list: Autonomy in Applied Ethics in Applied Ethics.

Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action. Psychiatric Ethics in Applied Ethics. Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense. Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action. Free Will, Misc in Philosophy of Action. Neurophilosophy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science.

Autonomy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy. Compatibilism in Philosophy of Action. The question of whether humans have free will, like the question of the meaning of life, is one whose answer depends on how the question itself is interpreted. In his recent book Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy, Henrik Walter examines whether free will is possible in a deterministic natural world, and he concludes that the answer is "It depends" xi. He rejects a libertarian account of free will as internally inconsistent, but argues Walter covers a lot of ground in this book.

He debunks dualism, examines classical and modern physics, critiques radical constructivism, and utilizes chaos theory, and he refers to figures from St. This book could be seen as encompassing two distinct projects. The first project is a defense of what Walter calls "neurophilosophy" as a methodology for answering traditional philosophical questions. This methodology is more commonly known as "cognitive science," and Walter accepts the naturalistic premises that underlie most of the work being done by cognitive scientists today.

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In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between From Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology . Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology. The Life and Laws, Mind, and Free Will Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology .

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a number of concepts exhibiting how many subtle details and distinctions lie behind the broad notions of determinacy and stochasticity. These details are necessary for a discussion, in Section 3, of particular aspects relevant for the characterization of The descriptions of brain behaviour currently provided by neuroscience depend on the level and context of the descriptions.

There is no clear-cut evidence for ultimately determinate or ultimately stochastic brain behaviour. As a consequence, there is no solid neurobiological basis to argue either in favour of or against any fundamental determination or openness of human decisions and actions. Determinism in Philosophy of Action. A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it. In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.

The Extended Mind Life and Mind Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology

Psychology in Cognitive Sciences. There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. In this paper, an alternative interpretation of these studies is offered; one which is in accordance both with the empirical evidence and also with the phenomenology of the will, demonstrating that the two opposing views of agency — both the ones that deny the reality of free will and the ones that affirm it — are equally compatible with the outcomes of these two experiments.

Free Will and Psychology in Philosophy of Action. Consciousness and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Interactionism in Philosophy of Mind. Other Psychophysical Relations in Philosophy of Mind. Qualia, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do.

Free will sans metaphysics? However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. Chris Frith's target chapters contain a wealth of interesting experiments and striking theoretical claims. In these comments I begin by drawing out some of the key themes in his discussion of action and the sense of agency. Frith's central claim about conscious action is that what we are primarily conscious of in acting is our own agency.

I will review some of the experimental evidence that he interprets in support of this claim and then explore the following three questions about Should we locate the phenomena that Frith describes as awareness of agency at the personal level or at the subpersonal level?

Are We Free?

If we are indeed operating at the personal level, then should we think about awareness of agency as something we experience, or as something that we believe? In what follows I argue that awareness of agency should be located at the personal level, and that we should think of it as something we experience. But I will reject the claim that there is a distinctive sense of agency. Agency in Philosophy of Action. In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter.

The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Unfortunately, their gates appear I review the multidisciplinary approach of Eccles to the study of the brain and mind, especially through his relationship with Mariano Artigas. Finally, I propose that interdisciplinary research may be improved by a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue with, and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.