St. Augustine: On the Profit of Believing

---

Home Contact Us Help Free delivery worldwide. Roman Catholicism, Roman Catholic Church. On the Profit of Believing. Description Augustine, the man with upturned eye, with pen in the left hand, and a burning heart in the right as he is usually represented , is a philosophical and theological genius of the first order, towering like a pyramid above his age, and looking down commandingly upon succeeding centuries.

He had a mind uncommonly fertile and deep, bold and soaring; and with it, what is better, a heart full of Christian love and humility. He stands of right by the side of the greatest philosophers of antiquity and of modern times. We meet him alike on the broad highways and the narrow footpaths, on the giddy Alpine heights and in the awful depths of speculation, wherever philosophical thinkers before him or after him have trod. As a theologian he is facile princeps, at least surpassed by no church father, schoolman, or reformer.

With royal munificence he scattered ideas in passing, which have set in mighty motion other lands and later times. He combined the creative power of Tertullian with the churchly spirit of Cyprian, the speculative intellect of the Greek church with the practical tact of the Latin. He was a Christian philosopher and a philosophical theologian to the full. Product details Format Paperback 52 pages Dimensions Ignatius Catholic Study Bible: New Testament Scott W. Transforming Mission David J. Wrestling With God Ronald Rolheiser. Hail, Holy Queen Scott Hahn. For if a suspicious man is in fault, in that he suspects things not ascertained; how much more a credulous man, who herein differs from a suspicious man, that the one allows some doubt , the other none, in matters which he knows not.

In the mean while I accept this opinion and distinction. But you know that we are not wont to call a person even curious without some reproach; but we call him studious even with praise. Wherefore observe, if you please, what seems to you to be the difference between these two. This surely, you answer, that, although both be led by great desire to know , yet the curious man seeks after things that no way pertain to him, but the studious man, on the contrary, seeks after what pertain to him. But, because we deny not that a man's wife and children, and their health, pertain unto him; if any one, being settled abroad, were to be careful to ask all comers, how his wife and children are and fare, he is surely led by great desire to know , and yet we call not this man studious, who both exceedingly wishes to know , and that in matters which very greatly pertain unto him.

Wherefore you now understand that the definition of a studious person falters in this point, that every studious person wishes to know what pertain to himself, and yet not every one, who makes this his business, is to be called studious; but he who with all earnestness seeks those things which pertain unto the liberal culture and adornment of the mind. Yet we rightly call him one who studies, especially if we add what he studies to hear.

For we may call him even studious of his own family if he love only his own family , we do not however, without some addition, think him worthy of the common name of the studious. But one who was desirous to hear how his family were I should not call studious of hearing, unless taking pleasure in the good report, he should wish to hear it again and again: Now return to the curious person, and tell me, if any one should be willing to listen to some tale, such as would no way profit him, that is, of matters that pertain not to him: Wherefore the definition of a curious person also must be corrected by the same rule as that of a studious person: Consider therefore whether the former statements also do not need to be corrected.

For why should not both he, who at some time suspects something, be unworthy the name of a suspicious person; and he who at some time believes something, of a credulous person? Thus as there is very great difference between one who studies any matter, and the absolutely studious; and again between him who has a care and the curious; so is there between him who believes and the credulous. But you will say, consider now whether we ought to believe in religion.

For, although we grant that it is one thing to believe , another to be credulous, it does not follow that it is no fault to believe in matters of religion. For what if it be a fault both to believe and to be credulous, as it is both to be drunk and to be a drunkard? Now he who thinks this certain, it seems to me can have no friend; for, if it is base to believe any thing, either he acts basely who believes a friend, or in nothing believing a friend I see not how he can call either him or himself a friend. Here perhaps you may say, I grant that we must believe something at some time; now make plain, how in the case of religion it be not base to believe before one knows.

I will do so, if I can.

Wherefore I ask of you, which you esteem the graver fault, to deliver religion to one unworthy, or to believe what is said by them who deliver it. If you understand not whom I call unworthy, I call him, who approaches with feigned breast. You grant, as I suppose, that it is more blameable to unfold unto such an one whatever holy secrets there are, than to believe religious men affirming any thing on the matter of religion itself.

For it would be unbecoming you to make any other answer. Wherefore now suppose him present, who is about to deliver to you a religion, in what way shall you assure him, that you approach with a true mind , and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is in you no fraud or feigning?

You will say, your own good conscience that you are no way feigning, asserting this with words as strong as you can, but yet with words. For you cannot lay open man to man the hiding places of your soul , so that you may be thoroughly known. But if he shall say, Lo, I believe you, but is it not more fair that you also believe me, when, if I hold any truth , you are about to receive, I about to give, a benefit?

What will you answer, save that you must believe.

See a Problem?

But you say, Were it not better that you should give me a reason, that, wherever, that shall lead me, I may follow without any rashness? Few I think, you say. Do you believe that you are in the number of these? It is not for me, you say, to answer this. Therefore you think it is for him to believe you in this also: But suppose that it is so, and that you approach with a true mind to receive religion, and that you are one of few men in such sense as to be able to take in the reasons by which the Divine Power is brought into certain knowledge ; what? Do you think that other men, who are not endued with so serene a disposition, are to be denied religion?

Or do you think that they are to be led gradually by certain steps unto those highest inner recesses? You see clearly which is the more religious. For you cannot think that any one whatever in a case where he desires so great a thing, ought by any means to be abandoned or rejected.

But do you not think, that, unless he do first believe that he shall attain unto that which he purposes; and do yield his mind as a suppliant; and, submitting to certain great and necessary precepts, do by a certain course of life thoroughly cleanse it, that he will not otherwise attain the things that are purely true? Certainly you think so. What, then, is the case of those, of whom I already believe you to be one, who are able most easily to receive divine secrets by sure reason, will it, I ask, be to them any hindrance at all, if they so come as they who at the first believe?

But yet, you say, what need to delay them? Because although they will in no way harm themselves by what is done, yet they will harm the rest by the precedent. For there is hardly one who has a just notion of his own power: And this is easily done, if even they, who are able to fly, that they be not alluring the occasion of any into danger, are forced for a short time to walk where the rest also may walk with safety.

This is the forethought of true religion: And whoever do this, not even if what they wish be granted to them are they able to arrive at the point at which they aim. For whatever kind of excellent genius they have, unless God be present, they creep on the ground. But He is then present, if they, who are aiming at God , have a regard for their fellow men. Than which step there can be found nothing more sure Heavenward.

Top Authors

I for my part cannot resist this reasoning, for how can I say that we are to believe nothing without certain knowledge? Whereas both there can be no friendship at all, unless there be believed something which cannot be proved by some reason, and often stewards, who are slaves, are trusted by their masters without any fault on their part. But in religion what can there be more unfair than that the ministers of God believe us when we promise an unfeigned mind , and we are unwilling to believe them when they enjoin us any thing.

Kindle Feature Spotlight

Lastly, what way can there be more healthful, than for a man to become fitted to receive the truth by believing those things, which have been appointed by God to serve for the previous culture and treatment of the mind? Or, if you be already altogether fitted, rather to make some little circuit where it is safest to tread, than both to cause yourself danger, and to be a precedent for rashness to other men?

Wherefore it now remains to consider, in what manner we ought not to follow these, who profess that they will lead by reason. For how we may without fault follow those who bid us to believe , has been already said: For there are two classes of persons , praiseworthy in religion; one of those who have already found, whom also we must needs judge most blessed; another of those who are seeking with all earnestness and in the right way. The first, therefore, are already in very possession, the other on the way, yet on that way whereby they are most sure to arrive.

There are three other kinds of men altogether to be disapproved of and detested. One is of those who hold an opinion, that is, of those who think that they know what they know not.

Another is of those who are indeed aware that they know not, but do not so seek as to be able to find. A third is of those who neither think that they know , nor wish to seek. There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing; understanding, belief, opinion. And, if these be considered by themselves, the first is always without fault, the second sometimes with fault, the third never without fault. For the understanding of matters great, and honorable , and even divine, is most blessed.

But the understanding of things unnecessary is no injury; but perhaps the learning was an injury, in that it took up the time of necessary matters. But on the matters themselves that are injurious, it is not the understanding, but the doing or suffering them, that is wretched. For not, in case any understand how an enemy may be slain without danger to himself, is he guilty from the mere understanding, not the wish; and, if the wish be absent, what can be called more innocent?

But belief is then worthy of blame, when either any thing is believed of God which is unworthy of Him, or any thing is over easily believed of man. But in all other matters if any believe anything, provided he understand that he knows it not, there is no fault. For I believe that very wicked conspirators were formerly put to death by the virtue of Cicero; but this I not only know not, but also I know for certain that I can by no means know.

But opinion is on two accounts very base; in that both he who has persuaded himself that he already knows , cannot learn; provided only it may be learned; and in itself rashness is a sign of a mind not well disposed. For even if any suppose that he know what I said of Cicero, although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any knowledge ; yet, in that he understands not that there is a great difference, whether any thing be grasped by sure reason of mind , which we call understanding, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it, he assuredly errs , and no error is without what is base.

What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe , to authority; what we have an opinion on, to error. But every one who understands also believes, and also every one who has an opinion believes; not every one who believes understands, no one who has an opinion understands. Therefore if these three things be referred unto the five kinds of men , which we mentioned a little above; that is, two kinds to be approved, which we set first, and three that remain faulty; we find that the first kind, that of the blessed, believe the truth itself; but the second kind, that of such as are earnest after, and lovers of, the truth , believe authority.

In which kinds, of the two, the act of belief is praiseworthy. But in the first of the faulty kinds, that is, of those who have an opinion that they know what they know not, there is an altogether faulty credulity. The other two kinds that are to be disapproved believe nothing, both they who seek the truth despairing of finding it, and they who seek it not at all.

And this only in matters which pertain unto any system of teaching. For in the other business of life, I am utterly ignorant by what means a man can believe nothing. Although in the case of those also they who say that in practical matters they follow probabilities, would seem rather to be unable to know than unable to believe. For who believes not what he approves?

About this page

Wherefore there may be two kinds of such as oppose the truth: These things have been said, in order that we might understand, that, in retaining faith , even of those things which as yet we comprehend not, we are set free from the rashness of such as have an opinion. For they, who say that we are to believe nothing but what we know , are on their guard against that one name opining, which must be confessed to be base and very wretched, but, if they consider carefully that there is a very great difference, whether one think that he knows , or moved by some authority believe that which he understands that he knows not, surely he will escape the charge of error , and inhumanity, and pride.

For I ask, if what is not known must not be believed , in what way may children do service to their parents , and love with mutual affection those whom they believe not to be their parents? For it cannot, by any means, be known by reason. But the authority of the mother comes in, that it be believed of the father; but of the mother it is usually not the mother that is believed , but midwives, nurses, servants.

For she, from whom a son may be stolen and another put in his place, may she not being deceived deceive? Yet we believe , and believe without any doubt , what we confess we cannot know. For who but must see, that unless it be so, filial affection, the most sacred bond of the human race , is violated by extreme pride of wickedness? For what madman even would think him to be blamed who discharged the duties that were due to those whom he believed to be his parents , although they were not so?

Who, on the other hand, would not judge him to deserve banishment, who failed to love those who were perhaps his true parents , through fear lest he should love pretended. Many things may be alleged, whereby to show that nothing at all of human society remains safe, if we shall determine to believe nothing, which we cannot grasp by full apprehension. But now hear, what I trust I shall by this time more easily persuade you of. In a matter of religion, that is, of the worship and knowledge of God , they are less to be followed, who forbid us to believe , making most ready professions of reason.

For no one doubts that all men are either fools or wise. But now I call wise, not clever and gifted men, but those, in whom there is, so much as may be in man, the knowledge of man himself and of God most surely received, and a life and manners suitable to that knowledge ; but all others, whatever be their skill or want of skill, whatever their manner of life, whether to be approved or disapproved, I would account in the number of fools.

And, this being so, who of moderate understanding but will clearly see, that it is more useful and more healthful for fools to obey the precepts of the wise, than to live by their own judgment? For everything that is done, if it be not rightly done, is a sin , nor can that any how be rightly done which proceeds not from right reason. Further, right reason is very virtue.

But to whom of men is virtue at hand, save to the mind of the wise? Therefore the wise man alone sins not. Therefore every fool sins , save in those actions, in which he has obeyed a wise man: Wherefore, if it be better for all men not to sin than to sin ; assuredly all fools would live better, if they could be slaves of the wise. And, if no one doubts that this is better in lesser matters, as in buying and selling, and cultivating the ground, in taking a wife, in undertaking and bringing up children, lastly, in the management of household property, much more in religion.

For both human matters are more easy to distinguish between, than divine; and in all matters of greater sacredness and excellence, the greater obedience and service we owe them, the more wicked and the more dangerous is it to sin. Therefore you see henceforth that nothing else is left us, so long as we are fools, if our heart be set on an excellent and religious life, but to seek wise men, by obeying whom we may be enabled both to lessen the great feeling of the rule of folly, while it is in us, and at the last to escape from it.

Here again arises a very difficult question. For in what way shall we fools be able to find a wise man, whereas this name, although hardly any one dare openly, yet most men lay claim to indirectly: But when the fool enquires, who is that wise man? I do not at all see, in what way he can be distinguished and perceived.

For by no signs whatever can one recognize any thing, unless he shall have known that thing, whereof these are signs. But the fool is ignorant of wisdom.

On the Profit of Believing (De utilitate credendi)

For not, as, in the case of gold and silver and other things of that kind, it is allowed both to know them when you see them and not to have them, thus may wisdom be seen by the mind's eye of him who has it not. For whatever things we come into contact with by bodily sense, are presented to us from without; and therefore we may perceive by the eyes what belong to others, when we ourselves possess not any of them or of that kind. But what is perceived by the understanding is within in the mind , and to have it is nothing else than to see.

But the fool is void of wisdom, therefore he knows not wisdom. For he could not see it with the eyes: Therefore he knows it not, and, so long as he knows it not, he cannot recognize it in another place. No one, so long as he is a fool, can by most sure knowledge find out a wise man, by obeying whom he may be set free from so great evil of folly. Therefore this so vast difficulty, since our enquiry is about religion, God alone can remedy: For what I ask do we with so great endeavor desire to search out?

What do we wish to attain unto? Whither do we long to arrive?

On the Profit of Believing

Is it at that which we believe not exists or pertains to us? Nothing is more perverse than such a state of mind. Then, when you would not dare to ask of me a kindness, or at any rate would be shameless in daring, come you to demand the discovery of religion, when you think that God neither exists, nor, if He exist, has any care for us? What, if it be so great a matter, as that it cannot be found out, unless it be sought carefully and with all our might?

What, if the very extreme difficulty of discovery be an exercise for the mind of the inquirer, in order to receive what shall be discovered? For what more pleasant and familiar to our eyes than this light? And yet men are unable after long darkness to hear and endure it. What more suited to the body exhausted by sickness than meat and drink?

And yet we see that persons who are recovering are restrained and checked, lest they dare to commit themselves to the fullness of persons in health, and so bring to pass by means of their very food their return to that disease which used to reject it. I speak of persons who are recovering.

What, the very sick, do we not urge them to take something? Wherein assuredly they would not with so great discomfort obey us, if they believed not that they would recover from that disease. When then will you give yourself up to a search very full of pains and labor? When will you have the heart to impose upon yourself so great care and trouble as the matter deserves, when you believe not in the existence of that which you are in search of? Rightly therefore has it been ordained by the majesty of the Catholic system of teaching, that they who approach unto religion be before all things persuaded to have faith.

Wherefore that heretic , inasmuch as our discourse is of those who wish to be called Christians , I ask you, what reason he alleges to me? What is there whereby for him to call me back from believing, as if from rashness? If he bid me believe nothing; I believe not that this very true religion has any existence in human affairs; and what I believe not to exist, I seek not. But He, as I suppose, will show it to me seeking it: Therefore I should not come unto him, who forbids me to believe , unless I believed something. Is there any greater madness , than that I should displease him by faith alone, which is founded on no knowledge , which faith alone led me to him?

What, that all heretics exhort us to believe in Christ? Can they possibly be more opposed to themselves? And in this matter they are to be pressed in a twofold way. In the first place we must ask of them, where is the reason which they used to promise, where the reproof of rashness, where the assumption of knowledge? For, if it be disgraceful to believe any without reason, what do you wait for, what are you busied about, that I believe some one without reason, in order that I may the more easily be led by your reason? What, will your reason raise any firm superstructure on the foundation of rashness?

I speak after their manner, whom we displease by believing. For I not only judge it most healthful to believe before reason, when you are not qualified to receive reason, and by the very act of faith thoroughly to cultivate the mind to receive the seeds of truth , but altogether a thing of such sort as that without it health cannot return to sick souls. And in that this seems to them matter for mockery and full of rashness, surely they are shameless in making it their business that we believe in Christ.

CHURCH FATHERS: On the Profit of Believing (St. Augustine)

Next, I confess that I have already believed in Christ , and have convinced myself that what He has said is true , although it be supported by no reason; is this, heretic , what you will teach me in the first place? Allow me to consider a little with myself, since I have not seen Christ Himself, as He willed to appear unto men, Who is said to have been seen by them, even by common eyes, who they are that I have believed concerning Him, in order that I may approach you already furnished beforehand with such a faith.

I see that there are none that I have believed , save the confirmed opinion and widely extended report of peoples and nations: Why therefore shall I not of these, in preference to others, inquire with all care, what Christ commanded, by whose authority I have been moved already to believe that Christ has commanded something that is profitable? Are you likely to be a better expounder to me of what He said, Whose past or present existence I should not believe , if by you I were to be recommended to believe thus?

This therefore I have believed , as I said, trusting to report strengthened by numbers, agreement, antiquity. But you, who are both so few, and so turbulent, and so new, no one doubts that you bring forward nothing worthy of authority. What then is that so great madness? Believe them, that you are to believe in Christ , and learn from us what He said. Why, I pray you?

For were they to fail and to be unable to teach me any thing with much greater ease could I persuade my self, that I am not to believe in Christ , than that I am to learn any thing concerning Him, save from those through whom I had believed in Him. On the Profit of Believing. Augustine, the man with upturned eye, with pen in the left hand, and a burning heart in the right as he is usually represented , is a philosophical and theological genius of the first order, towering like a pyramid above his age, and looking down commandingly upon succeeding centuries.

He had a mind uncommonly fertile and deep, bold and soaring; and with it, what is better, a heart full of Christian love and humility. He stands of right by the side of the greatest philosophers of antiquity and of modern times. We meet him alike on the broad highways and the narrow footpaths, on the giddy Alpine heights and in the awful depths of speculation, wherever philosophical thinkers before him or after him have trod.

As a theologian he is facile princeps, at least surpassed by no church father, schoolman, or reformer. With royal munificence he scattered ideas in passing, which have set in mighty motion other lands and later times. He combined the creative power of Tertullian with the churchly spirit of Cyprian, the speculative intellect of the Greek church with the practical tact of the Latin.

• Triple Sec (The Liqueur Sextet II)
• New-and-Improved Ukrainian Immigration Rules
• On the Internet (Thinking in Action)
• Introduction to Astronomy
• Saltsea
• Stories of New Jersey