Confronting Al-Qaeda: New Strategies to Combat Terrorism

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The tactics used by the different agencies — government departments, the military, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency services and any other groups situated within society are essentially in response to a need to impose order and regain sovereignty. In the Western world the range of counter-terrorist measures have been embedded within a wider criminal justice framework.

However, the post era saw the UK, Europe and the wider world increasingly challenged by insurgency and terrorist activities which necessitated a common approach. Twenty-first-century counter-terrorist strategies adopted by the UK have become subsumed within a US global War on Terror. In essence the UK has had to learn how to operate within a multi-agency and multinational environment and to build the necessary relationships. This remains an important issue, argues French, and not simply in relation to historical enquiry but in relation to the misunderstandings that have surrounded British counter-insurgency which has continued to inform British military doctrine and practice even to this day.

Whether it could be judged successful, as far as the British were concerned, hinged upon the extent to which this concept was replicated in other parts of the empire and beyond. In doing so this British way may have failed to fully balance the needs of different communities alongside the ability to detect exactly who was that enemy of the state. In Palestine, for example, French notes how the British faced difficulties in addressing the very different needs of the Jewish and Arab communities.

In both cases the British were hard put to balance the political and military aspirations of the individual parties and often misdirected reappraisals, clamping down on the local population. Here the British approach was to maintain the outward appearance of legality: These emergency powers were then combined with local legislation to frame emergency regulations within a specific colonial environment. This could include the use of collective punishment fines, curfews and so on , mass-arrests, and detention without trial, deportation and resettlement.

This too, argues French, had a flip side. Much of it is outside HTS control: Even JFS is heterogeneous, comprising a core of al-Qaeda and fighters with local motives. No present option against al-Qaeda in Syria is good. Attacks that kill civilians, as those in al-Jina, near Aleppo, on 16 March appear to have done, bolster local support for al-Qaeda and undercut non-jihadist groups that portray the U. Local media, activists and human rights groups estimated some 50 civilians were killed and dozens injured, with many more possibly trapped under rubble.

Turkey can shape rebel dynamics in the areas held by Euphrates Shield forces east of Aleppo, where it intervened directly in part to prevent the YPG from connecting the non-contiguous cantons it controls. It has less interest in doing so within and adjacent to HTS strongholds in north-western Idlib province, which, with no Kurdish presence, have less strategic value and where an intervention could provoke an al-Qaeda backlash in Turkey. An assault by the regime and its allies around Idlib is no solution either.

Overall, the regime is no counter-terrorism partner in Syria. Even with Russian and Iranian support, it cannot secure the whole country, as shown by its inability to control Palmyra while simultaneously fighting to retake Aleppo. More importantly, its methods of prosecuting the war use of indiscriminate weapons and targeting of civilians, hospitals and doctors, among others bolsters the appeal of jihadists it claims to be fighting.

While the Assad regime, Iran and Hizbollah seem inclined to press their advantage, Russia appears to recognise that it and its allies cannot destroy all rebel forces. Shifting the balance in the north west away from HTS would require strengthening more pragmatic rebels and, where possible, peeling fighters with national goals away from al-Qaeda-linked groups.

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In other words, progress toward settlement, or at least sustained de-escalation, would require deeper U. Though this seems remote for now, the Syrian war drives radicalisation across the region, and abandoning efforts to end it would leave a big gap in U.

In Yemen, as in Syria, al-Qaeda has been a main beneficiary of the war. Expanding the Base , 2 February In the aftermath of the Yemeni uprising, it established Ansar al-Sharia, parallel but aligned militias, to popularise the movement and lower the bar of entry for recruits. It governed Mukalla via a council of local elders, placing less emphasis on enforcing its variant of Sharia Islamic law and more on providing water, electricity, dispute resolution and security.

Conditions in Mukalla under AQAP rule were better than in many other Yemeni towns, helped by the fact that it was among the few the Saudi-led coalition did not bomb. Control of the port and emptying banks during its tenure in Mukalla have fed its coffers. While an Emirati-led, U. The recent uptick in U. This approach carries risks. However many al-Qaeda members are killed and whatever intelligence is captured, harming civilians and deploying U.

Regional and local allies may also try to exploit U. A few steps could help. Narrowing the range of targets to known AQAP leaders rather than local Ansar al-Sharia fighters and training camps, ensuring that each attack complies with domestic and international law and making further efforts to avoid harm to civilians would reduce chances of local backlash. In this respect, for the U.

A last option would be to simply scrap the PPG and the associated executive order on pre- and post-drone strike procedures, including annual Pentagon reporting of strikes and civilian casualties outside AAH, and devise new policy. Most important, though, is not to abandon diplomatic efforts to end the war. Prospects in Yemen are better than in Syria, given U. Steps likely to prolong the war, by contrast, should be avoided. That would lead both sides toward greater escalation, with Iran upping support for the Huthis, dragging Saudi Arabia into a deepening quagmire, while feeding the illusion that the Saudis and their Emirati allies could end the conflict by heightening pressure on the Huthis.

In Libya, jihadist groups are dangerous but for now less potent than in the Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni war zones. Ansar al-Sharia groups, with loose ties to transnational jihadists, emerged after the war and ouster of Muammar al-Qadhafi; some members later joined ISIS, others joined militias that fought ISIS. Between August and December , militias from the western town of Misrata ousted ISIS from a km coastal stretch it controlled around Sirte, killing many foreign fighters and scattering others, while locals mostly melted back into communities.

The extent to which militants have drifted south to groups in the Sahel or southern Libya is unclear. Critical in Libya is to resist the idea, promoted in part by Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi and the Emiratis, that General Khalifa Haftar can eradicate radical groups. While Haftar enjoys considerable support in eastern Libya, he — like the various forces in Syria and Yemen — cannot conquer the whole country, even with international backing. His opponents are too powerful and his support base too narrow. His forces did rout Ansar al-Sharia groups from Benghazi and inflicted a blow on ISIS militants there, but he alienated many non-jihadists in the process.

Like his Egyptian and Emirati backers, Haftar tends to portray all Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups as terrorists, even though he aligns in some areas with more conservative Salafi militias. Given the strength of his rivals and the support they enjoy from their own external backers, particularly Qatar and Turkey, it would escalate conflict, further destabilise the country and potentially open new opportunities for ISIS and al-Qaeda-linked groups that for now are largely contained. Most dangerous is the Saudi-Iran rivalry, which has fed sectarianism and extremism on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide.

Iranian leaders, their perspective shaped by the traumatic war with Iraq in the s — in which almost all Arab states and the U. Yet, what Tehran portrays as defensive appears as anything but to rivals. Major Sunni Arab states see Iran as a revolutionary power and reject the regional role to which Iran aspires and the influence it now wields, thanks largely to the U. It has also incurred high costs for Tehran, by deepening regionwide Sunni animosity toward Iran, its allies and its proxies. Gulf powers and Turkey, too, bear much responsibility. Sunni militants of all stripes — not just jihadists — have committed their own atrocities against Shiites.

Sectarian rhetoric has been far too common. Exclusionary and repressive policies in Bahrain inevitably have also exacerbated sectarian tensions. Ultimately, all prioritise enemies other than jihadists: Providing extra hardware would carry drawbacks, given the weapons proliferation in the region, the economic challenges faced by Gulf monarchies in a time of lower oil prices and the often indiscriminate conduct of the Yemen campaign. Any more confrontational stance would also risk an asymmetrical Iranian response through non-state allies across the Middle East and Afghanistan, a dangerous dynamic that could provoke a military conflagration.

That the Trump administration would seek to shore up alliances with traditional Gulf partners in the wake of relative estrangement under Obama is reasonable. But backing should neither be unconditional nor enable a Saudi quagmire in Yemen or a risky escalation with Iran, both of which could further destabilise the region.

An alternative would be to use the leverage of improved relations, first, to ensure the Saudi-led coalition prosecutes the war in compliance with international law and, secondly, to press for de-escalation of Iranian-Saudi hostility, in particular through a Yemeni settlement, lessening of sectarian rhetoric, a more inclusive approach in Bahrain and resumption of dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is stronger than at any point since its ouster in Internal UN estimates suggest it controls more than half the countryside. Hide Footnote In summer , it briefly captured Kunduz, a provincial capital in the north east.

As weather warms, it will again threaten that town and other provincial capitals. It mounts sophisticated offensives, deploys mobile columns across front lines in Humvees and confronts Afghan army and police units directly. Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and U. Hide Footnote Senior Taliban leaders, however, have distanced themselves from global jihadism in dealings with the U.

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Their focus is on regaining power in Afghanistan. A local ISIS branch operates in remote eastern districts. It is deeply anti-Shiite, conducts attacks that kill many civilians and comprises mostly former Pakistani tribal militants, with some local recruits. Since its establishment in , its growth has largely been checked by Taliban operations and U. Afghan-Pakistani relations are badly strained: President Ashraf Ghani initially tried to strengthen ties to Pakistani leaders hoping they would bring the Taliban to peace talks but now accuses Islamabad of conducting war in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has built ties to other governments, too. Iran bitterly opposed its rule in Afghanistan in the s but more recently has backed Taliban insurgents, initially to pressure U. Troop increases requested in February by the U. Nicholson, would help the Afghan army hold the line against insurgents but not decisively tip the balance. The Taliban has weathered far larger numbers of U. Here, too, diplomacy is as vital as military support. Nor can the U. Though recent Russian-brokered talks brought together neighbours and the Afghan government, serious progress is unlikely without a U.

Pakistan poses further dilemmas. Not only does peace in Afghanistan hinge on its military establishment helping bring the Taliban to the table; the country also faces its own multipronged threat from tribal, sectarian and anti-India jihadists, some with old al-Qaeda ties. Opportunities and Pitfalls , 22 July The military has in recent years cracked down on militants that attack the Pakistani state. Operations in the tribal areas along the north-west border with Afghanistan have dispersed disparate tribal militants and foreign jihadists sheltering there since fleeing Afghanistan in Offensives have often been brutal and displaced the problem rather than resolved it; militants have already begun to regroup and resume attacks countrywide, claiming hundreds of lives in Introducing civilian governance and policing is the only way to stabilise the tribal areas.

Together with years of U. The two main anti-India groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, enjoy considerable operating space, with their relief wings distributing aid, madrasas functioning and leaders preaching openly. Though neither has formal links to al-Qaeda, their fighters rub shoulders with other militants and global jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The gravest danger they pose for Pakistan and the U. But it would be difficult to show restraint in the event of an attack like that which killed large numbers of civilians in Mumbai in That Afghan Taliban leaders who talk to the U.

The main challenge for the U. Inducements to military leaders, including strategic dialogue and extra aid in the early years of the Obama administration, did not shift its strategic calculation. Wielding a larger stick, for which there is some support in Congress, would be a new tactic, though U. Blank checks in the past, however, have produced at best selective counter-terrorism cooperation.

Pressing and persuading Pakistan to do more against its militant proxies also requires U. Beijing fears jihadism as much as the U. The web of trade routes it funds across South and Central Asia could be a geopolitical game changer for the region.

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Without its support, the U. A last question for the new administration is whom to fight. Where will it draw the line on which Islamists are the enemy? McMaster in the past have been pragmatic, particularly in Iraq, where they dealt with diverse politicians, including Islamists. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, on the other hand, has argued that defeating the Muslim Brotherhood is as much a priority as defeating al-Qaeda.

Defining the enemy applies first on the battlefield, particularly where jihadists fight beside other militias, whether in Libya, Syria or Yemen. These alliances tend to be tactical: They rarely signal wider support for aims to strike the West or establish a caliphate.

Ideally this would involve de-escalating the conflicts that motivate those alliances, but even without that, there may be ways to pull groups with national goals and a willingness to coexist with rivals away from transnational jihadists. Outreach to such groups by the U. Fighters with links, however loose, to jihadists pervade armed groups of all stripes. Few powerful militia leaders champion liberal values or tolerance, even where they espouse national goals or accept power sharing.

The perceived failure, over past decades, of secular ideologies and the flow of Gulf funding, combined with severe violence and repression, have empowered few moderates. But the Trump administration should be realistic. Many militants have now rubbed shoulders with al-Qaeda; many espouse anti-U. A sensible position on mainstream Islamists is especially critical.

Designating the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist, for example, would backfire. The movement espouses some illiberal and intolerant ideas. Overall, however, the Brotherhood has explicitly distanced itself over past decades from the thinkers that inspire al-Qaeda and ISIS.

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There are other challenges, too. Members of Muslim Brotherhood offshoots sit in the cabinets and parliaments of staunch U. Elsewhere — in Syria and Yemen, for example — militias linked to the Brotherhood fight beside U.

Other allies, like Turkey and Qatar, host exiled leaders. Designating the movement would also play dangerously into rivalries between Turkey and Qatar, which are sympathetic to it, and the UAE and Egypt, which view it as a threat. Where those rivalries play out through proxies, designation would pick a side, encouraging anti-Islamist forces, like those of Haftar in Libya, to double down.

While little suggests the new administration has either the leverage or the inclination to shift the Egyptian or Emirati line on the movement, it should at least not buy into the same logic. Picking a fight with the Muslim Brotherhood makes no strategic sense for the U. But for the last decade and a half, too great a focus on counter-terrorism has often distorted U. Some early signs are particularly troubling. Loosening procedures that protect against civilian casualties during targeted killings would be a serious mistake.

Such killings in any case have a mixed record: Hide Footnote Invariably they are counterproductive, and potentially illegal, if they kill civilians and, with that, anger local communities as well as partners and allies. Even small numbers of civilian casualties can complicate the fight against jihadists.

So, too, could an escalation against Iran. Especially troubling is the apparent neglect of diplomacy, which is critical for navigating the rivalries among states in parts of the world most affected and forging solutions to the wars jihadists feed off. Agency for International Development USAID , which plays a vital role in preventing and mitigating violence and helping communities recover; and maintaining both their budgets are critical to U.

Cutting support to the UN would hinder efforts against jihadists, potentially undermining its critical peace-making and peacekeeping, coordination of reconstruction funds in places like Iraq, humanitarian support to sustain communities in war zones and its forum for counter-terrorism coordination. In the words of the U. Counterinsurgency Field Manual that Secretary Mattis co-authored: Senate, 5 March , p. The Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda AQ is stronger than it has ever been.

Reversing this trend requires ending the conflict that set it in motion. With at most several hundred members, it had limited local appeal and was both sustained and constrained by complex and sometimes contradictory relationships with the governing authorities and tribes. A primary security concern for the West and especially the U.

It was far less threatening to state stability than growing regime infighting, southern separatist sentiment or Huthi militancy in northern areas. AQAP and, later and to a much lesser extent, a new outcrop of IS, emerged arguably as the biggest winners of the failed political transition and civil war that followed. AQAP adapted to the rapidly shifting political terrain, morphing into an insurgent movement capable of controlling territory and challenging state authority.

Its main success derives from its demonstrated pragmatism: IS, with its more brutal tactics, has been less successful in gaining recruits or capturing territory, but war has opened space for it to operate in places that have experienced sectarian-tinged violence, such as the southern port city of Aden. The United Arab Emirates dislodged AQAP from its Mukalla stronghold in April , but such successes are fragile and could easily be reversed in the absence of more effective and inclusive governance.

The evolution of AQAP into an insurgent force with the ambition and capacity to govern territory, showing pragmatism and sensitivity to local concerns, does not negate the international risk posed by the group. Countering its gains poses a complex long-term challenge and will require an urgent yet measured response, focused on bringing the civil war to a negotiated end. To states and groups operating in areas previously under or vulnerable to violent jihadist control, especially, but not limited to, the Hadi government, government-linked militias and the United Arab Emirates: Many Muslims find its use in the context of political violence imprecise and offensive.

It reduces a complex religious concept, which over centuries has taken many, often peaceful forms, to war-making. It is hard, however, to escape the term. As in Syria, Iraq and Libya, growing enmity between regional states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Iran, has fuelled sectarian tensions and led them to prioritise traditional rivals over violent jihadists, in some cases leveraging the latter as proxies. A record of regime co-optation of and collaboration with jihadist groups means that AQAP in particular is already intertwined with political actors and integrated into the economy.

This creates obstacles in suppressing the group in that these actors may have incentives to use it to advance their own political and economic interests. Yet as AQAP is a Yemeni organisation with legitimate local demands — justice provision, services, jobs — efforts could be made to co-opt it and weaken its transnationally focused leadership by addressing these local grievances.

Devising effective policy options for countering AQAP — or IS — cannot be based on a cookie-cutter approach but requires attention to both regional factors and local idiosyncrasies, lest the problem be aggravated, not overcome.

Yemen has long grabbed headlines as a hotbed for al-Qaeda AQ activity, and indeed it holds a special place in jihadist eschatology. Musnad Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal hadith collection, vol. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Hide Footnote Yemenis, by contrast, view domestic political dynamics as fundamental to understanding and countering AQ and similar jihadist groups.

The spread of ideas from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the s and s, and from Saudi Arabia through support for religious schools in the s and the return of Yemeni migrant workers in the early s, allegedly formed an ideological foundation for groups such as AQAP. The second factor is poverty.

Most important for many interlocutors is state orchestration of jihadist groups for political and financial gain. Crisis Group interviews, Yemeni politicians, journalists and analysts, September August The history of AQ and related movements in Yemen is tied to both domestic politics and shifting trends in global jihadism. Those who subsequently travelled to Yemen included non-Yemenis as well as returning nationals.

Hide Footnote While most Arab states were turning against Islamists, Sanaa continued to align with them. Bin Laden later took credit for the failed bombing. Al-Nahdi was arrested but escaped from prison. Prior to the north-south civil war, Afghan Arabs allegedly killed YSP cadres with the help of northern-linked security services.

Following a quick and decisive northern victory, some IJM members were given positions in the GPC and security services. Johnsen, The Last Refuge , p. It pledged support to Osama bin Laden and engaged in international messaging. The attack propelled Yemen into the spotlight as a critical state in the U.

That year, the U. Hide Footnote The event once again focused U. In , funding from the U. Government Accountability Office, February Hide Footnote Yet, between and , Sanaa and Washington were distracted by, respectively, the conflict with the Huthis and the war in Iraq, allowing a new generation of AQ leaders under al-Wuhayshi to rebuild the organisation from scratch. AQAP launched high-profile attacks against Western interests and the Yemeni security and intelligence forces, especially in the south.

Hide Footnote Saleh walked a fine line: The Yemeni government claimed responsibility, but photographs of remnants of U. Hide Footnote AQAP was a relatively small component of the domestic balance of power, used by the state to win financial and military support from the U. While a top priority for the West, AQAP was far less important for the state and most Yemenis than the growing strength of the Huthis a revivalist movement in the north based on Zaydism, a version of Shiite Islam , separatist sentiment in the south and an increasingly brittle regime in Sanaa. Its expansion has roughly occurred in two phases: During the uprising, AQAP evolved from a primarily internationally focused jihadist organisation to one with a significant local insurgency component, seeking to strike deeper roots into Yemeni society and establish territorial control.

Recorded 18 April , posted on YouTube 25 April , https: This structure, along with creating a consultative mechanism, allows it to better absorb the impact of assassinations. Mid-level leaders are province wilaya commanders, known as emirs, along with district and city commanders under provincial command. AQAP propaganda regularly refers to these commanders, who are not limited in movement and operations as their title might suggest, as AAS. According to a U.

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Crisis Group email interview, January This local backing and territorial control — with the aim of creating multiple emirates that should ultimately lead to the creation of a caliphate — would subsequently offer potential for AQAP to launch attacks outside Yemen. AQ groups in Syria, most notably Jabhat al-Nusra, have pursued such tactics. Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War , 9 September In May , a combination of Yemeni security services and local militias, known as Popular Committees, ousted AQAP from Abyan, ending its first experiment with governance.

By , Huthis used the same name for their militias. Hide Footnote Reeling from its defeat, it switched back to asymmetrical attacks, which became more sophisticated and larger in scale than before Hide Footnote The interim president also gave the U. Yet, military moves against AQAP proved woefully inadequate in the face of expanding political opportunities. The national dialogue conference, a transition cornerstone aimed at constitutional reform, failed to resolve pivotal issues, including the future state structure.

In this environment, the biggest winners were the Huthis, a Shiite movement and militia that had previously fought six rounds of conflict with the Saleh regime They presented themselves as political outsiders opposed to the GCC initiative, which had divided power between established political parties.

Over the course of the transition, the Huthis upended the military power balance in the north by defeating Sunni Islamist and tribal opponents, including an alliance of Salafi fighters, Islah members, Ali Mohsen-aligned military forces and the powerful al-Ahmar clan no relation to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar from the Hashid tribal confederation, in a series of battles in and From Saada to Sanaa , 10 June By February , a dispute over the constitution prompted them to oust the Hadi government. AQAP declared war against the Huthis in early , but then rarely acted on its strong rhetoric, carrying out only a handful of attacks.

Hide Footnote This changed in , as Huthi forces broke out of their Saada stronghold. By mid-December , AQAP had claimed responsibility for attacks against the Huthis in fourteen governorates in less than 90 days. It made its Yemen debut on 20 March in four coordinated suicide attacks against mosques frequented by Huthis in Sanaa, a day after fighting broke out between Saleh loyalists and Hadi-aligned fighters in Aden. The IS bombings provided justification for the Huthi push into Aden as a necessary fight against the growing security void, which the Huthis viewed as intentionally created by their political rival, President Hadi, and filled by AQ and other violent jihadists.

Only a week after the Saudi-led coalition began attacking Huthi-Saleh forces from the air, AQAP moved once again to capture territory, this time in the eastern governorate of Hadramout. However, local residents and the international community regarded Mukalla as an AQ-controlled city from April to April This report refers to AQAP as having seized the city, which it then controlled through local administrative bodies, some of which included non-AQAP members. The name AAS is not referred to in this context, as it was used by neither residents nor the militants to describe themselves during this period.

Hide Footnote There, it exhibited improved governance skills by applying lessons learned from its previous experience in Abyan. Its numbers, while difficult to assess, have swelled, reaching approximately 4, by according to U. Hide Footnote Equally importantly, its staying power has grown through a vast war chest. It also has acquired a wide range of new weaponry, including heavy weapons from Yemeni military camps or acquired indirectly from the Saudi-led coalition, which has been supplying arms to a range of anti-Huthi fighters.

Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Mukalla, March It continues to exercise on-again, off-again control of areas in Abyan and neighbouring Shebwa. IS has not seized territory, and its following remains small. State Department official estimated IS numbers in Yemen at around Crisis Group interview, Washington, May Crisis Group consultant phone interview in former capacity, friend of the suicide bomber, 27 June Hide Footnote Yet, it has found fertile ground in cities such as Aden, which suffered sectarian-tinged violence in the aftermath of the Huthi takeover and subsequent removal.

IS has taken credit for a number of high-profile attacks against both Huthi forces and the Hadi government and its allies in the south. In the past, the Yemeni state at times lent tacit support to violent jihadist groups for political or financial gain. The group never, for example, held or governed territory. This changed in when state security services split, one side remaining loyal to Saleh and the other, led by Ali Mohsen, joining protests against him.

This fracturing accelerated during the war. In this environment, not only is there no unified effort to put AQAP on a leash, but the group can step into local political and security vacuums. This was the case, for example, on 29 May when militants took over Zinjibar, Abyan, and later five more towns across Abyan and Shebwa provinces. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Aden, Jaar and Zinjibar, 30 and 31 May , 22 and 23 May and 13 and 14 June Quotes in al-Hayat , June Hide Footnote Whatever the reasons for the swift takeover of southern cities, security services failed to act and thus AQAP became the major beneficiary.

Local residents reported that they failed to put up a fight when the group entered the town and even prevented tribal fighters from stopping it. When local tribal fighters attempted to enter the city to fight AQAP, they were blocked by the military, who preferred negotiating their safe withdrawal; clashes ensued between soldiers and tribal fighters. The military commanders of Zone-2 and the 27th mechanised brigade were Hadi appointees. Yet, many of the troops in the area are affiliated with Saleh or Ali Mohsen.

AQAP allowed the soldiers to leave as long as they deposited all but their personal weapons; it provided transport and cash handouts to them; and it encouraged them to continue to collect their government salaries in Mahra, a neighbouring province, and northern Hadramout, but made them pledge not to fight AQAP or AAS in the future.

In Abyan between May and , AAS provided services such as water and electricity, as well as education and an efficient justice system based on Sharia Islamic law , and went as far as compensating families which had lost their homes to U. After being evicted from Abyan, the group applied lessons from its experience there to Mukalla. It further softened its approach by socialising with residents and refraining from draconian rules.

This included tips on the implementation of Islamic punishments. Hide Footnote As part of this effort, it put in place a local ruling council — the Hadramout National Council HNC — rather than instituting direct rule.

Crisis Group interview, April ; consultant interview in former capacity , Mukalla, March It also launched infrastructure projects, provided social services, such as food distribution for families in need and medical supplies and equipment for hospitals, and staged community events and street festivals. These efforts extended to areas under its control in Abyan and Shebwa. This may have been an attempt to avoid drawing U. Hide Footnote According to a Mukalla resident in We view the [Hadramout National] Council positively, because it has managed to continue to pay government salaries ….

It has kept public services at a much better level than what is available in the rest of the county ….

Many prominent cases that had lingered for years were resolved in a single day. AQAP also avoided a bloody fight to hold territory once it became clear that Saudi-led forces, especially the UAE, were determined in May to drive the group out. Its experience in Abyan in had taught it that defending territory in a conventional conflict against foreign-backed forces was costly and risked alienating local populations it had spent months winning over. Crisis Group interviews, August, September However, AQAP officials said they received ample advance warning of the coming offensive and the fact that it would be preceded by airstrikes, and began sending their fighters out a month in advance.

Arguably, AQAP has most benefited from a combination of Huthi military expansion and growing sectarianism, as these have opened new opportunities for forging local alliances. In the south, the name specifically denotes the armed separatist movement Hiraak. The southern resistance consists of local residents taking up arms to defend their homes, as well as former soldiers of the PDRY. Hide Footnote This happened on key battle fronts such as Taiz, Marib and al-Bayda, all provinces of the former north Yemen.

In the south, fighters are predominantly separatists, often leftist in orientation. In response, southern security forces, with the help of the UAE, have launched a number of military operations against them. In the past, even AQAP acted pragmatically in light of these social constraints by avoiding direct confrontation with the larger Zaydi community and instead focusing its critique on Twelver Shiites, predominant in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.

The Huthis and their opponents share responsibility for the growth in sectarian sentiment. Crisis Group phone interviews, Huthi supporters, May-June As conflict spread, however, mosques began to segregate along Shafai versus Zaydi lines. Crisis Group consultant interview in former capacity, Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi, Sanaa, 11 November Hide Footnote Sectarian language is common among anti-Huthi fighters.

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