America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain (Contemporary Securit
Following the general logic of realism, we find that two aspects of this focus are particularly important. Stated succinctly, they cannot afford to base their foreign policy entirely on ideology or culture, as doing so would put their survival at risk. The international realm is therefore dominated by power politics.
The second aspect is that states typically face a collective action problem. Every state takes care of itself, but none is interested in producing collective goods, e. This problem is not specific to international relations; it is a general problem in large groups. As explained by economist Mancur Olson, [i]n a really large group, the typical individual receives only a miniscule share of the benefit of an action he or she takes in the group interest.
This miniscule share does not typically motivate individuals in a large group to voluntary act in a way that is consistent with the common interest of the group. The condition of anarchy also renders states cost-sensitive.
Thus, even though states do not optimize behaviour with perfect knowledge and the ability Explaining security strategy: Each state then faces a fundamental strategic choice between balancing and bandwagoning when confronted with a potentially threatening power Walt ; Waltz Realists generally agree that an anarchic structure gives states a powerful incentive to balance power. The states that are not poles tend to flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them.
On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.
In contrast, bandwagoning denotes a strategy for foreign policy behaviour aimed at supporting opposing power concentrations or threats under the conditions of anarchy cf. Balancing and bandwagoning may be general or issuespecific, concentrating on changing particular aspects of a security order. Balancing and bandwagoning are two very broad policy choices covering a number of different sub-strategies. Soft bandwagoning covers limited, tacit or indirect bandwagoning strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining short of formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances in order to support the most powerful or threatening state.
This study addresses two fundamental points of criticism raised against the concept of soft balancing. This helps identify the content of soft balancing and how this content is distinguished from the content of rival strategies. We also specify when and how we expect states to engage in soft balancing as well as its strategic alternatives. We intend this study to contribute to a better understanding of soft balancing through detailed empirical investigation of soft balancing and bandwagoning in Europe, Russia and the Middle East.
Our study documents important empirical examples of soft balancing in the current unipolar world order and explains why soft balancing occurred and how it was distinguished from alternative strategies. It thereby adds to the already-existing literature documenting its importance e. Art ; Walt while simultaneously revealing the continued relevance of its strategic alternatives.
Hard balancing, soft balancing, hard bandwagoning and soft bandwagoning may be used to further the security interests of a state. From anarchy alone, however, we cannot say when a state will opt for one strategy over the other. In order to move one step closer to answering this question, we must understand the dynamics of the particular power configuration in question. The next section therefore discusses the implications of unipolarity for the choice of strategy.
Evans and Newnham Three aspects of the structural realist conception of power are worth stressing here. First, relative — not absolute — power is decisive. In an anarchic system, it is the power of the state as compared to the power of other states which matters the most, because this is what decides the ability of the state to pursue both defensive aims e. For instance, John Mearsheimer distinguishes between two types of state power: Kenneth Waltz makes no such distinction between latent and military power, though he does stress the importance of material power.
According to Waltz, in order to be a pole, an actor must achieve a high score across a number of different categories measuring its power capabilities: Thus, an actor cannot constitute a pole in the economic sector alone without also being a pole in the military sector: Third, in the modern international system, states are the most powerful actors; therefore, only the most powerful states can become poles. No other type of actor is able to achieve sufficient capabilities to challenge the strongest states Gilpin Power politics play out differently, depending on the distribution of power between states in the international system Waltz Polarity is characterized as multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar, depending on the number of poles in the international system.
Each type of polarity has different implications for state strategy. Structural realists argue that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems, but also that the two types of structure entail different dangers. In a multipolar world, miscalculation represents the greatest danger to international security, and the probability of conflict is impossible to calculate.
No state is strong enough to balance the others by internal means. Accordingly, all must rely on external means of balancing, i. Dangers may emerge from multiple sources, not easily discernible in advance. By contrast, the two great powers in a bipolar world are mostly self-reliant. Compared to multipolarity, uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation are reduced in a bipolar world, because each great power can concentrate its efforts on focusing on its primary adversary.
The literature on the strategic implications of unipolarity is more ambiguous than the literature on bi- and multipolarity. At least two positions consistent with structural realism can be discerned from this body of literature, as epitomized in the contrasting views forwarded by Waltz , that unipolarity is inherently bound to be balanced out and that multipolarity is already on the horizon, and Hansen a , that unipolarity is basically robust, although not necessarily durable. Realist representatives of the first position argue that unipolarity will inevitably lead to balancing and ultimately transform the system to multipolarity Layne , a, b; Waltz This position is consistent with structural realist balance of power theory and argues that it is most exhausting to be a superpower in a unipolar system, because other states attempt to balance the excessive power.
They do so by external means, i. Thus, the relatively faster growth of the power of other states and unipolar exhaustion gradually leads to a multipolar world. This will happen no matter whether the great unipolar power employs a benevolent or an aggressive foreign policy.
It is the fact of the massive strength of the great unipolar power that makes other states perceive the unipole as a threat, not how it conducts its foreign policy or its national identity. In contrast, representatives of the second realist position on unipolarity do not view balancing and multipolarity as inevitable effects of a unipolar distribution of power.
This position can be divided into three analytically distinguishable but often practically overlapping arguments cf. The first argument focuses on geopolitics: In international relations, power and incentive tends to wane with distance from the home base Boulding Mearsheimer ; Mouritzen This is particularly true for those states that are not poles; unlike the poles, they can do little to change their threat environment by military conquest or strategies of political and economic dominance Mouritzen and Wivel Thus, many of the states that are not poles will be excessively concerned with their immediate vicinity to engage in systemic balancing.
In the present unipolar order, the only superpower — the United States — is sur- Explaining security strategy: The difficulties involved in projecting military power across oceans and over long distances means that potential challengers to the unipolar world order are less threatened by the power of the United States than they would otherwise be.
The second argument focuses on the costs and benefits ensuing from attempting to balance the unipole. Balancing is always difficult because of the collective action problem in anarchy mentioned above: In regard to systemic unipolarity, this problem is exacerbated because the overwhelming power of the unipole makes the costs of balancing high and the potential benefits doubtful.
This is particularly important in the current era of unipolarity because of the strength of America: Defending the status quo by countering a rising power which may one day become a unipole may be possible only if buck-passing can be avoided cf. Christensen and Snyder However, overturning a unipolar status quo is even more difficult than preventing it. Finally, the third argument focuses on the combination of power and how it is used. All things equal, the overwhelming power of a unipole tends to provoke and worry other states.
However, the unipole may manipulate the dynamics and duration of unipolarity by signalling its intentions Mastanduno ; Walt a; Walt A unipole may prolong the period of unipolarity considerably by signalling its benign and non-threatening 16 Explaining security strategy: In contrast, if the superpower is perceived as aggressive, a coalition will form to balance it within a relatively short period of time.
Thus, it is the exercise of power, not power itself, which plays a decisive role in the respective decisions of other states to ally with or against the unipole. In the current world order, the United States has successfully signalled to most states that it is not interested in conquering their territory. We build on this argument in order to explain state strategy during unipolarity, emphasizing the dual importance of both power and how it is used.
On balance, the asymmetric distribution of power provides a powerful incentive for states to balance, though just as powerful a restriction on their ability to do so. As noted by Stephen Walt in a discussion of the current world order, [b]y itself, therefore, the effects of power are probably indeterminate. By itself, therefore, power does not determine what other states are likely to do. Thus, we do not know when, how or why states choose to balance or bandwagon.
We deal with these questions in the next section by discussing the effect of relative security on state strategy. Relative security State strategy in an anarchic international system is influenced not only by relative power, but also by relative security, i. They attempt to keep costs as low as possible and adjust their strategies according to the probability of conflict, i. States face very different probabilities of conflict depending on their geopolitical location and adjust their strategies accordingly.
This constitutes a modification of the original structural realist theory. Relative security affects the propensity of states to balance or bandwagon in three ways. First, a high probability of conflict creates an incentive to balance, whereas a low probability of conflict creates an incentive to bandwagon. A high probability of conflict provides states with an incentive to focus narrowly on their short-term security and survival because of the self-help nature of the system. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer [. Neorealists expect the structural incentives to balance to be the same across the international system cf.
However, the probability of conflict varies in different parts of the system. Furthermore, when the probability of conflict is low, the anarchic structure of the system induces states to opt for less costly bandwagoning strategies over more costly balancing strategies. As the probability of conflict reduces, rational states will shift their focus from the short-term to the long-term cf.
Bandwagoning is the logical choice in this process, because it allows the state to obtain gains that can be used for strengthening future capabilities. The presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon [] Thus, whereas the aim of balancing is to protect the immediate security interests of the state, the aim of bandwagoning is to obtain values, which may be used for maintaining security in the future. Second, the role played by the unipole in the probability of conflict is important.
The unipole may play one of three different roles. In order to maintain its security benefits, it will have a strong incentive to pursue a strategy of general bandwagoning with the unipole. Second the unipole may increase the probability of conflict for a state by promoting a world or regional order against the interests of the state and attempting to coerce it to comply with key elements of this order. In this case, the state has a strong incentive to balance the unipole, although the state may choose to bandwagon in order to appease the superpower if hostility develops into a direct threat of invasion from the unipole.
Third, the unipole may play a passive role in the security of a state, leaving it relatively free to opt for specific balancing and bandwagoning on a case-by-case basis. Third, the destructive power of nuclear weapons allows the states possessing 18 Explaining security strategy: The international system continues as a self-help system in which every state is ultimately responsible for its own security. For nuclear powers and their rivals, however, the potential cost of military conflict has risen sharply. As explained by Waltz: This has important consequences for security strategy, because [a] nation will be deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate.
Uncertainty of response, not certainty, is required for deterrence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing all. Nuclear powers are more secure and less affected by the security problems resulting from the anarchic structure of the international system than other states , This has two consequences for security strategy. The first is that nuclear states are able to divert more resources to non-military sectors, because their nuclear arsenal allows them to spend less on conventional deterrence and continue to deter potential aggressors successfully.
The second consequence is that domestic politics are allowed to play a greater role in the determination of security strategy than for other states, because the effects of the anarchic structure on state strategy are blunted by nuclear deterrence. Relative ideology It was noted in the above that states face a collective action problem in international anarchy: While no state is likely to produce these goods to all other states, great powers have an interest in supplying some collective goods to some states in order to manage their sphere of interest, i.
As noted above, the unipole thus directly influences the relative security of the other states in the system. In addition to a highly asymmetric distribution of power in the international system leaving one state significantly stronger than the rest, a unipolar world order also consists of the political project of the unipole. In the contemporary world order, key aspects are the American model for market economy, liberal democracy, human rights, and the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Hansen a: In this manner, ideology functions as an amplifier of the effects of relative security.
Relative security provides the main incentives for choosing either balancing or bandwagoning strategies, but ideology provides the major incentives for whether balancing or bandwagoning is hard or soft. Three factors are of particular importance cf. Mouritzen and Wivel First, the ideological distance between the governing elites of the unipole and those of other states is of central importance, because — as noted by John M. Thus, we expect states to be more likely to employ a strategy of hard balancing against a unipole with a rival ideology than a unipole with an ideology similar to its own.
There are two reasons for this, both linked to relative security. The first reason is that conflict is more likely between two states with rival ideologies, because they tend to disagree on more issues than states with similar ideologies and because misperceptions are more likely between two states with rival ideologies than between two states with similar ideologies, because they present their interests in language tied to their ideological point of departure, which may inadvertently lead states with rival ideologies to perceive them as a threat, i.
The second reason is that the potential consequences of conflict are much worse for a state with a rival ideology than for a state with a similar ideology, because losing the conflict may force it to give up core values and possibly result in regime change. Conversely, we expect states to be more willing to employ a strategy of hard bandwagoning with a pole with an ideology similar to its own than with a pole with rival ideology, because there are fewer points of contention, ideological language is generally perceived as non-threatening for the states agreeing with it, and the consequences of conflict are less severe for states already committed to the same values as the unipole.
The intensity may vary from a minimalist position ascribing little or no value to ideology as a guide for security policy to a maximalist position arguing that ideology should form the basis of policy choices. The importance of ideological distance varies with ideological intensity, thereby increasing and decreasing the effects on state strategy. Third, the ideological substance of the order promoted by the unipole is important, because the core values of this order influence the use of positive and negative sanctions likely to be used against other actors Mouritzen and Wivel Two aspects of ideological substance are of importance, both concerning the incentive to employ a strategy of hard balancing vs.
Pluralist states tend to be less centralized than authoritarian states.
Representatives of other states can therefore influence the decisions of a pluralist pole more easily through lobbying various interest groups and actors in the political system. This may be tied to actions of soft balancing, such as diplomatic declarations, voting in international organizations such as the UN , or public diplomacy. We expect this to dampen the incentive to hard balancing, because the most damaging effects of policy decisions for other states may actually be modified through this political process cf.
Furthermore, a pluralist ideology is likely to be more permissive than an authoritarian ideology. These soft polices from the pole are likely to only provoke soft balancing. Our analysis is limited to strategies of the American world order. The ideological substance thus remains constant when comparing within and between case studies. We focus on general security strategies. Thus, ideological intensity is less relevant than it would be if we investigated a single case, e. Consequently, the focus of this study is on the effect of ideological distance on security strategy. Explaining strategic choices in the American world order Based on the discussions in this chapter, it becomes possible to forward a simple model of strategic choice in the American world order.
Anarchy creates strong incentives for states to focus on power capabilities and to evaluate their policy options in terms of potential costs and benefits. Thus, we expect state strategies to be significantly affected by the highly asymmetric distribution of power in a unipolar world order and states to evaluate potential strategies in terms of their expected costs and benefits.
Unipolarity creates a strong incentive for states to balance the unipole; at the same time, however, unipolarity makes the potential costs of balancing very high. From this starting point in international structure, we can now add the expectations following when combining relative power with relative security and relative ideology.
Following the logic of the argument above, we expect the variations in our dependent variable, i. Each strategy is a function of the combination of relative power, relative ideology and relative security.
States experiencing a high probability of conflict tend to use balancing strategies. This is because balancing offers the ultimate means of playing it safe in international relations. However, whether states opt for soft or hard balancing depends on relative ideology. We expect states experiencing a high probability of conflict and a long ideological distance to the unipole in the current world order to choose a strategy of hard balancing.
To these states, the unipole constitutes a major threat to their security. While the costs of balancing are high, so are the costs of the unipolar order. Bandwagoning is counterproductive, because adapting to the interests of the most powerful or threatening state may place the security and survival of the states at risk. And soft balancing, although typically cheaper than hard balancing, only offers ineffective means in a security environment with a high probability of conflict due to the lower costs associated with diplomatic and institutional means compared to military means.
We expect states experiencing a high probability of conflict but a short ideological distance to the unipole in the current world order to choose a soft balancing strategy. Such states benefit from the unipolar world order and can often rely on the support of the unipole if their security interests are threatened. Engaging in costly efforts involving hard balancing would therefore only serve to undermine their security interests by wasting money on unnecessary military developments.
Nevertheless, these states do not have a security guarantee allowing them to bandwagon and will choose to play it safe by balancing, although softly.
States experiencing a low probability of conflict tend to use bandwagoning strategies. This is because bandwagoning allows the state to obtain gains, which can be used for strengthening their latent power capabilities and future military capabilities. As the probability of conflict diminishes, the focus of rational states will shift from the short-term to the long-term. However, whether states opt for soft or hard bandwagoning depends on relative ideology. States are likely to bandwagon hard with the unipole if there is only a short ideological distance between the two states.
In this case, as explained above, communication is made 22 Explaining security strategy: States facing a low probability of conflict are likely to employ a strategy of soft bandwagoning with the unipole if there is considerable ideological distance between the two states. The state serves its interests by obtaining the gains of bandwagoning, but it is reluctant to make a military commitment to the unipole because of the ideological distance, which renders communication difficult and the consequences of conflict more severe.
As noted above, the importance and effects of relative ideology will vary according to the extent to which the unipole and other states stress the importance of ideology for strategic choice, i. For most states, however, the tendency towards hard balancing is dampened by the ideological substance of the unipolar world order allowing them to influence American policy making and to follow different politico-economic strategies in domestic society.
Case selection, analytical procedure and the scope of the analysis Based on our theoretical discussion, we are now able to specify our analytical scope, case selection and the analytical procedure. The scope of the analysis The geographical scope of our analysis is the three regions at the centre of the Cold War: This allows us to investigate three areas of continuing importance for order and security in international relations; at the same time, however, we say little about the consequences of the end of the Cold War and the shift to unipolarity for the security strategies of states located at the margins of the Cold War.
The temporal scope of our analysis is the time period to , i. Adaptation processes take time, and we are looking for trends, not only for events. Thus, 18 years is sufficient for our purposes of identifying and explaining security strategy. Focusing exclusively on the unipolar world order has its pros and cons. A focus on the unipolar order allows us to analyse the strategies of states which suffered from loss of power related to a systemic change. This will contribute to our knowledge of unipolarity in general and at the same time provide specific knowledge about the losers and their strategic choices.
At the same time, the specifics of unipolarity impose limitations on possible generalizations and prevent cross-polarity comparative analyses.
Our theoretical scope is realist. This allows us to construct and apply a systematic and theoretical coherent model; at the same time, however, it prevents us from exploring the importance of a variety of non-realist variables e. Nevertheless, by analysing three different categories of losers, we aim at producing new knowledge about states that suffer relative losses related to systemic change — in the case of unipolarity — and which security strategies they choose.
The selection of cases and the procedural steps Our cases are selected in order to provide variation regarding the independent variable: The types of cases also differ significantly: Furthermore, the EU states are well integrated, while the Middle Eastern states have little mutual cooperation. Because of the very different nature of our cases, our empirical analyses cannot be identical in their set-up.
However, they can be subjected to the same procedure to allow for comparison and the accumulation of knowledge when compared to the theoretical expectations. The first step describes the loss: This step provides us with the baseline for the empirical analyses, and it provides us with a profile of the losses following from the end of bipolarity. To some states, a loss may prove devastating, because the state is generally weak in capabilities and unable to compensate for the loss or rebuild strength by other means.
To other states, losing relative power or a powerful ally may turn out to be a bearable loss, because the losing state itself is relatively powerful and located in a relatively secure geopolitical environment. On the other hand, the loss of a powerful ally may corner a weak state in a hostile environment. Not all losses are related to the systemic change. Some states may be suffering losses as a consequence of other international developments, e. It is therefore important to specify the extent to which and how the losses in question are related to the end of the Cold War.
In order to do this, we analyse the position of the state on international security issues, state behaviour regarding important interstate dimensions, and policies regarding areas of strategic interest to the state. These are conventional criteria for assessing the abilities and commitment of the states when analysing state behaviour from a realist point of departure. In accordance with our rationalist analytical framework, we assume the adoption of costly strategies, in particular the use of armed force, to provide the most reliable indicators of state intentions.
Some indicators are more relevant to some cases than to others. Institutions are particularly important in the case of European states, some of which have a long-time institutionalized cooperation with the US, but other forms also matter. Geopolitics is of special importance to Russia, which has managed a collapsing empire, but also in the Middle East, and even in Europe as the states faced the wars resulting from the collapse of Yugoslavia.
The third step identifies the patterns of the strategic response and discusses which combinations of strategic choices match the explanatory expectations. In effect, the strategies identified in the case studies are matched with the expectations summarized in Figure 2. Do relative security and relative ideology explain the security strategies? To what extent do they do so? And what remains unaccounted for? In summary, each case study is subjected to the same four-step analytical procedure: This is measured in terms of the loss of powerful allies, military and economic support, political representation and influence and followed by a description of the character and the degree of the relative decline.
Furthermore, the extent to which the loss was related to the systemic change of is also discussed. How did the actors choose to adapt? Did the strategies of the case actors make up any patterns? The strategies are compared to features attributed to the case actors as well as to each other in order to search for similarities, differences and obvious patterns.
Why did the case actors choose to adapt as they did? While we cannot provide the full explanation in any of the cases, we are able to point to the predominance of factors over others and to assess the explanatory value of our variables. The Russian empire had been among the great powers since the seventeenth century; in its Soviet incarnation, it was one of the two superpowers in the Cold War era. But by the mids, Russia was no longer a superpower. This decline was both absolute and relative. The decline in relative power position fundamentally altered the basis upon which Russia could pursue its national security strategy and its interests abroad in the new post-Cold War and unipolar American world order.
Steep relative decline put Russia in a real dilemma. On the one hand, Russia could attempt to refuse to accept American power and dominance and seek to oppose it vigorously with whatever means left at its disposal. However, this risked leaving it isolated and on a confrontational and dangerous course towards the unipole.
Moreover, integration into the American-led world economic system would in many ways be both beneficial and necessary for Russia. Joining the American world economic system would allow it to rebuild its socio-economic and military-industrial base — a necessary prerequisite should Russia retain any hope of regaining a position among the leading global powers. However, unconditionally accepting the new international state of play was also risky, as it by no means ensured that the United States, facing little resistance, would be unable to seal its hold on the number one position and turn the international system into an American empire with Russia occupying an inferior position on the margins.
The content of an optimal strategy to deal with this dilemma is by no means self-evident. And, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has struggled to strike a balance between discord and collaboration in the American world order. This chapter reveals that Russia adjusted to its new reduced international position by pursuing a bandwagoning strategy in the very early post-Cold War years.
Russian cooperated closely with America in the early years after the end Russia 27 of the Cold War and agreed to settle into a new European and global security architecture largely defined by Washington. Since the mids, however, Russia increasingly moved towards soft balancing. Russia increasingly used diplomacy and international institutions to place bumps in the road to impede American plans. Russian defiance towards the US-led intervention in Bosnia, NATO expansion, the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, coupled with growing diplomatic coordination and cooperation with China and other key global players, may be viewed as evidence of this kind of balancing behaviour.
However, the knockout blow to Russian claims to superpower status came with the implosion of the USSR itself in In the inner Soviet Empire covered By early , Russian territory was reduced to its proportions in the seventeenth century Hosking at approximately 17 million sq km.
After , Russia still covered a vast territory but was now 24 per cent smaller than in its Soviet heyday Encyclopedia Britannica This territorial loss was problematic; with it, key strategic, industrial and agricultural regions Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Belarus in addition to key resources in Central Asia disappeared. As a consequence of this territorial loss, Russia also lost important human capital, i.
The Soviet population totalled approximately million in Following the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian population dropped to approximately million in the early s, amounting to a decline of some 46 per cent, pushing Russia far behind the most populous countries in the world see Table 3.
Population decline not only reflected the disintegration of the Soviet empire, it also demonstrated a serious long-term decline in general health standards in Russia. In the late s, Soviet-Russia became the first industrialized country to record a drop in life expectancy Feshbach and Friendly Nonetheless, the other major powers were far ahead. In terms of the economy, Russia ranked dead last among the seven major world powers by , down from third in the s. However, the ailing economy implied that the Russian military capability was decaying due to lack of funding.
Lack of funding for weapons research, investments and maintenance further undermined the Russian armed services, as did poor training Lambeth ; Menon On top of material decline, the relative power of Russia also suffered from social instability due to the chaotic Soviet break-up and tumultuous democratic transition. Cross-country separatism, organized crime and corruption were rampant and threatened the political cohesion of the country. The political situation stabilized after the parliamentary elections and the implementation of the new Russian constitution.
However, political instability persisted in pockets of the country, particularly in Chechnya. Against the backdrop of this staggering decline in relative international position, how did Russia adjust its grand strategy in the post-Cold War unipolar period from until ? And why did it make the grand strategic choices that it did? To answer these questions, we first develop an explanatory hypothesis below concerning Russian behaviour based on our theoretical model.
We then analyse the extent to which our expectations were borne out. The model and Russia: Our model Russia 29 Table 3. The figures on nuclear warheads are provided by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Population figures for and are compiled by the United Nations Statistics Division http: Note The figures are listed in the following units: The figures in parenthesis for nuclear warheads in denote active arsenals. As argued in Chapter 2, when carrying out cost-benefit analyses, states make a fundamental strategic choice between balancing and bandwagoning when faced by a potentially threatening situation.
They also have a choice of whether to pursue each strategy in a soft or hard version. As explained in Chapter 2, the structural incentives, i. This is because, as explained by structural balance of power theory, the highly asymmetric global configuration of power in unipolarity creates a basic incentive to balance the unipole for all the major second-ranked states.
Conversely, effective balancing is extremely difficult to achieve under unipolarity due to the massive power gap between the unipole and the second-ranked great powers. However, bandwagoning is potentially fraught with dangers of subjugation. As explained in Chapter 2, a high level of relative security provides incentives to bandwagon, while low relative security levels provide incentives to balance. Relative ideology works as an amplifier, determining whether a state opts for hard or soft versions of balancing or bandwagoning. The greater the distance, the more likely it becomes that ideological conflict may antagonize relations between the unipole and other states, because different ideologies tend to prescribe distinctly different views on world order and relations among states, e.
Based on this model, what would be our expectation in the Russian case? As explained above, Russia underwent a severe relative loss of relative power in the s and s. Although weakened, it nevertheless remained a considerable power factor in world politics and retained a formidable nuclear deterrent.
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Moreover, in the early s, Russia faced no serious geopolitical rivals that posed threats to its key security and economic interests. We therefore expect Russia to bandwagon, because this was the more cost-efficient response in a situation in which state survival and key interests were not at risk. By the mids, however, the relative security of Russia began to decline. More disturbingly, the Russian nuclear arsenal was slowly being undermined by a lack of funding, while the US modernized its capacity and proceeded with national missile defence programs.
Accordingly, we expect that Russia would move away from bandwagoning and towards balancing from the latter part of the s, because the decline in relative security raised the stakes associated with continued bandwagoning and made the costs of balancing more reasonable.
Continued bandwagoning would be counterproductive, because unqualified acceptance of US supremacy would now leave Russia vulnerable and perhaps jeopardize its security interests. But should we expect Russia to pursue soft or hard strategies? In the early s, Russia had only just begun to implement democratic and market economic reform that would adapt its domestic politics to the American liberal democratic project. The ideological distance to the American world order was therefore initially quite high. This ideological distance declined during the s, as Russia democratized. Against this backdrop, we should expect soft bandwagoning in the early s.
At this time, ideological differences remained significant between Russia and the United States, spurring disagreement on many issues. Furthermore, Russia would likely face reprisals if the United States did not condone the outcome of the domestic reform process. Before turning to the analysis, however, a brief outline of the general development in our two key variables — relative security and relative ideology — Relative ideological distance Low Relative security High Low High Soft bandwagoning Russia early s until mids Soft balancing Russia mids until Figure 3.
Relative security As recalled from Chapter 2, we argue that relative security in the contemporary unipolar era is primarily a product of two elements: Nuclear weapons Russia inherited a formidable nuclear arsenal with a secure second-strike capability from its Soviet predecessor. This implied a sharp downsizing in the numbers of operational weapons and launch vehicles. At the same time, the United States improved and modernized its own nuclear systems, thus edging it closer to virtual nuclear supremacy Lieber and Press ; Moscow Times a.
However, the prospects of the development of missile defences could have long-term implications, since an operative system could render the Russian second-strike capability obsolete. This is especially the case in the unthinkable situation that the missile defence system be used in combination with an offensive US nuclear attack. Goldgeier and Mcfaul By the mids, this was about to change. US actions increasingly challenged the Russian monopoly as the dominant power in its post-Soviet backyard as America committed to promoting and pursuing a certain regional order in Europe and Central Asia as part of its grand vision for a new world order after the Cold War.
After a few years of deliberations and uncertainty, the Clinton administration embraced a Wilsonian foreign policy strategy of spreading democracy and capitalism across the globe and with it an expanded American role to assist this development. Additionally, other regional powers such as China, Turkey and Iran vied for influence in the Central Asian region Kleveman Moscow perceived this area to be off-limits to third states, i. Moreover, the Russian leadership preferred a neutral Eastern Europe Aron However, it was the American war on terror in Afghanistan, launched in the autumn of , that particularly heralded a distinct rise in US influence in Central Asia.
As part of the war against Afghanistan, the United States established military bases in Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan. The United States also actively began championing new strategic pipeline projects for transporting oil and gas from the Caspian energy reserves that would bypass the extensive Russian monopoly pipeline network Kleveman Washington also actively sought to influence developments in the southern Caucasus by pursuing economic and military cooperation with Georgia Kuzio and Azerbaijan Eurasia Insight , Washington therefore came to pose a challenge to the traditional dominant role of Russia in the post-Soviet space.
This raised the stakes for conflicts of interest to erupt between Russia and the US unipole. In terms of our theoretical model, the initial high level of Russian relative security leads us to expect Russian bandwagoning. However, as Russian relative security declined towards the end of the s thanks to its diminishing nuclear deterrent and growing geopolitical challenges, Russian incentives to balance were growing.
A comprehensive assessment of the state of Russian democracy is beyond the scope of this chapter. During the immediate post-Cold War phase, however, Russia was in a state of transition away from the Soviet one-party planned economic system towards pluralist democracy and a market economy. Boris Yeltsin initiated reforms aimed at introducing multiparty rule, free and fair elections, civil liberties and a market economy after his liberal reform team assumed power in The constitution codified the basic principles of democracy Freedom House and introduced a federal two-chamber system with a directly elected president whose government must have the confidence of the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma.
Moreover, the constitution divided political power at the federal level between the executive, legislative and judicial organs Remington By the mids, Russia had the formal structures in place for a democratic state. However, the Russian transition to a functioning democracy was slow and uneven.
While Duma elections in , and the presidential election were generally deemed free and fair Freedom House , a civil society was slow to emerge and there were signs that the governing elites in Russia, especially under President Putin, sought to restrict the growth of a thriving civil society Mcfaul ; Moscow Times b; Urban Moreover, while the freedom of the press and an active political opposition grew under President Yeltsin, civil liberties appeared to be receding under Putin, as federal- Russia 35 ism and the freedom of the press appeared to be waning Freedom House, , a.
Moreover, Russian politics under both Yeltsin and Putin continued to be less than transparent and running along informal and shady personalized relationships rather than via an open and transparent democratic process Lo , and political corruption continued to be widespread Transparency International The heavy-handed handling of Chechen separatism also raises questions concerning Russian respect for human rights.
America, the EU and Strategic Culture
When the high level of Russian relative security in the early s is combined with relatively great ideological distance at that time, we conclude that this gave incentives for Russian soft bandwagoning. When the relative security of Russia began to decline in the mids and this is combined with the fact that it approached being a liberal democratic society around the same time, this leads us to expect a Russian strategy of soft balancing. This is because the ideological distance to the US world order became relatively narrow.
As our period of investigation ends in , however, we refrain from evaluating this claim here. This will help us evaluate our theoretical expectations. From balancing to bandwagoning: Soviet strategy —91 By , Soviet-Russian security strategy had been undergoing a remarkable although gradual change for a couple of years. Since the late s, Russia had pursued a hard balancing strategy against the United States.
Moreover, Moscow maintained high troop levels in East Central Europe and pursued a nuclear and conventional arms race with the United States Rich By the late s, however, it became evident that the inefficient Soviet planned economy could not sustain the arms race with the United States over the long run. However, this did not imply that the Soviet hard balancing strategy against the United States was totally abandoned. Wohlforth ; Rich Russian troops left Afghanistan by 2 February Rich Moscow also strongly supported the efforts to conclude the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks START I with the United States in order to reduce the vast number of strategic nuclear weapons piled up between the two countries.
Importantly, these moves did not indicate bandwagoning, since military parity remained at the heart of Soviet policy; but they were the forerunners of later Russian bandwagoning. Other elements in Soviet policy in the late s indicated a number of key revisions and concessions that can possibly be viewed as intimations of soft bandwagoning. Abandoning Soviet balancing against the United States and changing to soft bandwagoning became evident in , as the USSR began making key revisions in its security strategy in line with American priorities.
In doing so, the Soviet Union surrendered its longtime goal of nuclear parity with the United States, since Moscow accepted that the United States could possess nuclear defence systems that were beyond the reach of the Soviet Union Hansen c: Elements of soft bandwagoning became even more evident in Soviet strategy in terms of the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in November Rich In , however, Soviet troops remained in the barracks and looked on as the German Democratic Republic GDR regime was swept from power, thus clearing the path for German re-unification.
A long-time precondition for Moscow to accept German unification had been German neutrality Rich, Abandoning this condition meant the massive revision of Soviet security strategy. Equally astonishing was the Soviet acceptance of the US leadership in the international coalition to expel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in January Rich, Moreover, to help build mutual trust after years of bitter rivalry and to manage the transition to a new security landscape after the Cold War, the Soviet government was positive towards proposals from NATO concerning the establishment of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council NACC in November In short, in terms of balancing and bandwagoning, Soviet-Russian strategy changed from balancing to bandwagoning around — As the Soviet Empire was beginning to unravel in and , the USSR had thus switched to a grand strategy in line with the major American policy preferences Goldgeier and Mcfaul Soviet bandwagoning was of a soft variety, because although Soviet-Russia made key revisions in its security strategy in line with Western priorities, Moscow did not seek any close military relationship or alliances with the United States.
Russian relations with the major powers after During the — period, the Russian strategy towards the US world order may best be described as shifting from one of soft- and almost hard bandwagoning in the very early s to one of soft balancing from the mids until In the following pages, we substantiate this conclusion by analysing key issues and trends in the interactions of Russia with the dominant states in the post-Soviet — period: Western advisors were thus invited to assist Russia in its difficult economic and democratic transition from a planned economy and one-party state towards a democratic country with a market economy Goldgeier and Mcfaul In terms of bandwagoning and balancing, there is little question that this strategy may be branded bandwagoning, as Russia aligned itself closely with the foreign policy positions of the United States and its NATO allies.
Moreover, because the Russian government was contemplating forging a military alliance with the United States not seriously considered in Washington, however Russian bandwagoning even had traces of hard bandwagoning. By , Russia had abandoned its unqualified support for US objectives and began opposing US policies on a number of issues.
Disagreement was rooted in the question about whether to exercise mil- Russia 39 itary might to bring the civil war in Bosnia to an end. In tandem with NATO enlargement, that was becoming ever more real at the same time disagreement over Bosnia reflected a shift in the Russian strategy of bandwagoning towards balancing.
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The longest fighting took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU and UN attempted to negotiate a peace plan, but this was rejected by the warring parties. Russia supported all of the key UN resolutions, e. At this point, the United States decided to become more actively involved. The betterarmed Bosnian Serbs were especially singled out as the main aggressor Hansen But Resolution mandated the use of force under specified conditions, rendering the exercise of its veto in the Security Council impossible.
When NATO decided — despite Russian dissent — to carry out a series of air strikes against Serb positions around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo in the spring of in line with Resolution , this resulted in very angry misgivings from Russian President Yeltsin Ballance Yet, these are issues which have not been studied in depth until now. This is one of the strengths of this densely researched and densely written book, which I also found to be one of the few enjoyable reads on the subject of European security in recent years.
At a time when ESDP appears to be taking off in a number of autonomous directions, Toje reminds us with case studies of Kosovo, NATO enlargement and the Iraq crisis of the continuing influence of the US over the underlying orientation of European security policy. Understanding Transatlantic Relations 2. The Transatlantic Bargain 3. The Kosovo War 4. Towards a Bipolar West. Learn More about VitalSource Bookshelf. An eBook version of this title already exists in your shopping cart.
If you would like to replace it with a different purchasing option please remove the current eBook option from your cart. Add to Wish List. Description This book provides a provocative analysis of relations between Europe and America during the tempestuous years