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bahana-line.com: Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe (Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy). Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe - CRC Series: Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.
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Audible Download Audio Books. Shopbop Designer Fashion Brands. Questions of perspective come to a head in one of the most interesting papers in the volume, Thomas Lennon's study of the nature of Cartesian doubt. Much analytic philosophy over the past fifty years has agonized over the scope and coherence of Descartes's method of doubt, but this piece focuses on the rather different issue of its seriousness or sincerity.
Descartes himself 'seemed to want it both ways', Lennon reminds us. He described his First Meditation argument about the possibility of wholesale divinely-induced deception as 'not flippant or ill-considered' but 'based on powerful and well thought-out reasons'; but on the other hand he described the doubt so induced as 'hyperbolical', and remarked in the Synopsis to the Meditations that 'no sane person' has ever doubted that there is an external world, or that people have bodies. Pierre-Daniel Huet's Censura philosophiae Cartesiana of 'the most comprehensive, unrelenting and devastating reception Descartes's philosophy ever received' fastened on this ambivalence and elaborated it into a destructive dilemma: Lennon raises the question of whether the dilemma might be evaded by construing the doubt simply as a premise in the reductio of scepticism; this would make the doubt a genuine theoretical supposition, but would not, as it were, endorse or advocate it as such.
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Whether Huet has the resources to respond to this move is something Lennon does not adjudicate in this paper. But the issue of sincerity is nonetheless a fascinating one, which seems to carry important lessons for the conduct of present-day epistemology, whose practitioners cheerfully construct intricate arguments attributed to 'the sceptic' or 'the anti-sceptic', with what seems like a cavalier insouciance as to whether the positions so elaborated have ever been real options for human beings outside the seminar room.
Despite all the painstaking scholarly scrutiny that is lavished on them, most of the figures discussed in this volume are, for good reason, not in the 'canon' of great philosophers: Nadler opts for the latter construal, taking Spinoza's rejection of Descartes's mind-body dualism as his focus. Other commentators have seen the reasons for this rejection as having to do with intractable problems about the interaction of mind and body in Descartes, or problems about how he can account for the unity of the person.
Nadler, however, puts the primary weight on the question of the immortality of the soul. Descartes claimed his dualistic arguments supported the Christian doctrine of immortality, but it is 'absolutely clear' according to Nadler, that Spinoza intends to deny the personal immortality of the soul.
Spinoza's parallelism between the attributes of extension and thought, and their respective modes, means that 'when the body goes, there are no more sensory states. This seems to me correct -- but pace Nadler not enough to decide the question of whether Spinoza's philosophy 'completes' or 'destroys' that of Descartes. For Descartes himself had attributed sensory states not to the incorporeal mind, but to the 'substantial union' of mind and body; so in the Cartesian system too what remains after the destruction of the body will not be sensory ideas, but only intellectual ones -- yet there is a serious problem about how the latter could be sufficient for personal individuation.
The fact that Descartes did not confront this problem but on the contrary tried to insist that his own system bolstered belief in individual immortality does not alter the fact that the philosophical resources of his system turn out under scrutiny to be inadequate to underwrite a future for the individual mind after death.