Contents:
In contrast the mundane can be negotiated. That is not to say that the notion of the Holy is not open to compromise. Margalit offers the example of the Christian loss of Jerusalem, where possessing an earthly Jerusalem transformed itself into a spiritual equivalent. While the Catholic Church believes that the ascetic life of a priest or a nun is an ideal, religion also recognizes human frailty is such that not everyone is suited. Per pp Muslims in the time of Ali and the Caliph Muawiyah, the Murjiites Postponers , argued that in key matters of religious dispute, one should wait until the next world for a ruling.
It's not an uncommon religious response. For a compromise to be rotten, the consequences be severe enough to violate the sacred rights of one of the parties involved. These, in Margalit's view, are so ethically suspect that they should be avoided "come what may", irrespective of consequence, but then he backs off a bit.
While never justifiable, they are understandable and perhaps forgivable, especially in cases where agreement was coerced, though this needed to be examined in more detail than it was. As case studies that were "rotten" he examines the iconic Munich agreement which sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided Poland, the Big 3 Agreement at Yalta which consigned Eastern Europe to two generations of Soviet rule, and "Operation Keelhaul", the unnecessary repatriation of Soviet POWs where on return they faced prison and execution.
Common to each is the parties agreeing did so over third parties who were adversely affected. Though one party is an evil actor, the other becomes, to a degree, complicit by the agreement. I would go further - not only is the agreement "rotten" - so is the situation. The final chapter tackles a problem that has bothered me since reading Timothy Snyder's Bloodlandsn , which was whether Stalin's Soviet Union of the s and Nazi Germany were equally evil. Synder equivocates, but then why partner with one vs the other?
Was the alliance between the western powers and the Soviets an example of a "rotten compromise" that should have been avoided, "come what may"? Margalit offers reasoned support for Churchill's "good word for the devil". The evils of Stalinism were certainly multiple. The Soviet apparatus created a state of fear which was ruthless, paranoid and self consuming but the ideological goal was that of an improved society for all.
It had large population transfers and widespread surveillance, cruelty and indifference and suppression of religion and lasted longer than Nazi Germany. If it's a contest for the number of dead, both Mao and Stalin win.
Yet the third Reich, which had most of the same flaws, was still more radically evil in that its ideology dismantled the very idea of morality by denying forever the humanity of its victims. Feb 20, Taka rated it really liked it Shelves: Not as good as his The Ethics of Memory , but this is still really, really good, full of insight delivered in clear and down-to-earth prose. If you're interested in phi Good! If you're interested in philosophy that's relevant and that can actually illuminate actual history, this is a book to read. Apr 10, Mike rated it really liked it Shelves: Margalit's book is ostensibly political philosophy but there is much more than a hint of moral philosophy embedded in the framework he creates for assessing the merits of compromise.
His focus is on international politics and it seems to me the framework he creates cannot be localized in all circumstances. The stakes in the central example he uses are incredibly high. And his discussion demands answers to profound questions of morality. Specifically, the main question examined is whether a lousy Margalit's book is ostensibly political philosophy but there is much more than a hint of moral philosophy embedded in the framework he creates for assessing the merits of compromise.
Specifically, the main question examined is whether a lousy compromise with Stalin was justified during the latter part of the war to defeat Hitler's Nazi Germany. Whether or not Republicans and Democrats can work out a budget compromise is unlikely to demand the level of contemplation undertaken here.
However, Margalit's digressions on the merits of compromise, generally, are interesting and should be considered by politicians of every stripe.
As a writer, Margalit is quite good. He is able to clearly express complex ideas while still keeping the tone almost conversational. As a bonus, he also explains the basics of philosophy to ground his more high-flown arguments.
Hardcover , pages. No fee was paid by the author for this review. Andrew Gustafson rated it did not like it Feb 01, To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. I hope the president has made the correct bet and that the Iranians respond in kind. Value Theory, Miscellaneous categorize this paper.
Nov 23, Kitty Red-Eye marked it as to-read Shelves: Margalits sondring er ikke kvantitativ, den inddrager ikke antallet af ofre, men kategorisk: Ved at anse det meste af menneskearten som undermennesker afviste nazismen derimod moralen selv. Feb 28, Bill Lalonde rated it it was amazing. This book is a beautiful and seamless blend of storytelling and argumentation on the topic of political compromise, and in particular what makes a compromise rotten and therefore never justified.
Avishai Margalit. When is political compromise acceptable--and when is it fundamentally rotten, something we should never accept, come what may? But, as Avishai Margalit argues, there are moral limits to acceptable compromise even for peace. When is political compromise acceptable--and when is it fundamentally rotten, something we should never accept, come what may? What if a rotten compromise.
Andrew Gustafson rated it did not like it Feb 01, Madison rated it liked it Apr 02, Amid rated it really liked it Jul 18, Christel Verbouw rated it liked it Feb 09, Virginia rated it it was ok Dec 04, Kirk rated it liked it Sep 15, Frank Delaere rated it really liked it Nov 07, Alina rated it liked it Sep 05, Jeff rated it liked it Mar 25, Compromises become rotten only when certain provisions sour the whole arrangement. You know an agreement is rotten when, as Margalit says, it is like a cockroach in a bowl of soup rather than a fly in the ointment.
You can pick a fly out of the ointment; but just one cockroach will spoil an entire bowl of soup. In his book Margalit gives us two historical examples of cockroaches: The Great Compromise of the American Constitutional Convention , which counted African-American slaves as three-fifths of a person for electoral purposes, was one such case; so too was the forced repatriation of Soviet prisoners and refugees as part of the Yalta Agreement of Both provisions perpetuated and legitimized cruel and inhuman actions.
Neither should have been agreed to. Is there a cockroach in the nuclear deal? There is no obvious one.
But the potential is there. It is in the structure of the deal itself rather than in any single provision. For an ethicist, one question lingers. Why did the American-led negotiators de-link the nuclear issue from every other issue? Freezing Iran at the threshold of nuclear acquisition may matter less to peace and security in the region than Iran's non-nuclear activities. If the agreement enables Iran to pursue its most malign policies by other means, the deal may prove rotten after all.
In his testimony to Congress, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin Dempsey mentioned "five malign activities which give us and our regional partners concern. These run the gamut from ballistic missile technology to weapons trafficking, to the use of surrogates and proxies to naval mines and undersea activity, and last but not least to malicious activity in cyberspace. Here is where things can go sour.
And here is where there could have been a better deal. Contrary to what President Obama has argued, the alternative to the deal is not necessarily war. The alternative could have been a better deal that addresses at least some of the malignancies the general listed above. The alternative could have also been no deal, leaving the general with the same threats, including the problematic nuclear infrastructure that has been outlined in detail—an infrastructure that will require vigilant monitoring and deterrent capabilities with or without the agreement. The agreement says nothing about curtailing support for terrorism or respecting even the most basic interests of our allies.
There is nothing about shipments of rockets to Hamas.
There is nothing about relief for American prisoners held in Iran. There is not even a perfunctory statement of non-aggression in the region. The failure to use any semblance of linkage may ultimately be the cockroach in the soup. The result of the agreement will be increased military attention in the region, not less.