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The public preoccupation with this news was such that no one seemed to care about the aggravation of the armistice conditions. The Social Democrats gained 35 per cent of the vote, which meant that they needed to enter a coalition government with two bourgeois parties, the Liberal Democrats and the Catholic Centre party. At the heart of the campaign was the issue of responsibility for the German defeat, and the legitimation of the post-revolutionary political system. In November , even die-hard monarchists had little choice but to accept the new situation.
Rightwing newspapers played a crucial role in the construction of this argument. German steel industrialists had allegedly refused to provide expert advice as long as Erzberger was banning the industrialist Hugo Stinnes from the German delegation. Readers of Social Democratic or liberal newspapers learned about this only if they perused the small print of the daily protocols of the National Assembly meetings.
Outward appearance played a role, too. The severity of the peace terms received in May shocked politicians and journalists in equal measures. Within the Reich cabinet and in his own party, Erzberger was the driving force arguing for a constructive approach towards the Allies.
However, the fact that Erzberger was somehow working against foreign minister Brockdorff-Rantzau, an ardent opponent of the Allied proposal, soon became public knowledge, not least through news on French press reports describing Erzberger as the German politician most willing to sign the peace treaty. Press commentators from Left to Right blamed Erzberger.
The person primarily responsible for this press campaign was Karl Helfferich, state secretary in the Treasury during the early years of the war, then interior minister and vice-chancellor until November His antagonism towards Erzberger reached back to —6, when the two had clashed during a campaign against colonial mismanagement directed by Erzberger.
As Helfferich was not a member of the National Assembly, the obvious forum for his assaults was the press. He knew his attacks would thus be carried into other newspapers and into parliament. It had been organized in full consultation with the then Reich government, and had not been initiated by Vienna. Over the next days and weeks, the two sides published numerous articles accusing the other of lying, misrepresenting facts, or obfuscating personal responsibility. The depth of the anti-Erzberger feeling at the convention was not lost on other senior DNVP politicians.
They were also taken up in the National Assembly when the German Nationalist Count Graefe launched a furious attack on the revolution and on Erzberger, whom he accused of having acted as if paid by the enemy. The German collapse was not the result of the revolution, Erzberger proclaimed, but the outcome of the incompetence in foreign and domestic policy of the Conservatives and the Supreme Army Command. But depending on the political orientation of their newspapers, readers in Berlin and in the rest of Germany were given completely different interpretations. The liberal press which had previously been highly sceptical of Erzberger now realized that right-wing attacks on his person were inextricably linked to a wholesale condemnation of the new republic.
In reality, the British peace initiative was nothing but the British reply to the failed papal peace initiative of August He announced that through his personal attacks he was hoping to trigger a court case by which Erzberger would be forced to give evidence under oath.
Helfferich increased the pressure by having his entire article series collected in a brochure entitled Fort mit Erzberger! Many caricatures visualized Erzberger as the villain in the story. The right-wing satirical magazine Kladderadatsch was at the forefront of the press campaign against Erzberger. Erzberger was the negative symbol of integration for an imagined community of nationalist newspaper readers convinced that defeat in war had not been inevitable.
Indeed, when the court convened in January , the popular view was that it was not Helfferich but Erzberger who was on trial, a view which right-wing newspapers tried to encourage through their choice of headlines. To some extent, this media preoccupation was 56 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic the result of a long press tradition which had taken shape over the course of the nineteenth century. At a time of limited parliamentary representation, law courts had emerged as one of the main constituents of the public sphere.
More compromising still, Helfferich presented evidence that in July , when Erzberger had initiated the anti-annexationist peace resolution, he was at the same time organizing—still an employee of Thyssen—a press campaign calling for the annexation of the Belgian iron ore basin of LongwyBriey. Erzberger was lucky to survive: She only regretted the fact that he had survived. Erzberger had been working against the welfare of the people, Hirschfeld declared, he had participated in stabbing the German Front in the back, and he was corrupt.
The outcome of the Hirschfeld trial in late February was overshadowed by a new anti-Erzberger initiative. It caused a major sensation: Two days later, Erzberger took the only possible action left to him: The judge summarized his view of Erzberger in a widely quoted statement: Not surprisingly, right-wing journalists were jubilant. In fact, Erzberger immediately set out to rehabilitate himself. His reputation was thoroughly ruined by the press coverage of the Helfferich trial. Public opinion concerning Erzberger after this trial is unfavourable, this much has to be openly admitted.
One Heinrich Schulz, member of a Free Corps unit during the right-wing Kapp putsch, described the mood of contempt in a statement made many years later. In our circles he was the best-hated person. However, public condemnation of Erzberger was far from unanimous. Catholic newspapers, like the Centre party organ, Germania, staunchly defended Erzberger against right-wing attacks, a fact repeatedly noted and criticized by journalists on the political Right.
The fact that the Catholic Centre party organ, Germania, kept defending Erzberger even after his resounding defeat at the Helfferich libel trial attracted a great deal of right-wing polemics. Grass-root support in his home region, Swabia, was equally strong. In May he received an overwhelming endorsement by delegates at the Wurttembergian Centre party convention to lead the regional party into the imminent Reichstag elections. At the elections in June , the Centre party in Wurttemberg managed to improve on its performance, against the Reich trend, to achieve its best result during the years of the Weimar Republic.
But for a considerable number of voters the nationalist depiction of Erzberger, the scapegoat, was plausible enough to opt for one of the right-wing parties. Killing of any national self-determination, total submission to France. Among republicans at the time, however, there was no doubt as to the cause of the murder. The Centre party organ, Germania, described Erzberger as a victim of the right-wing press campaign: Never before did anything similar happen in [the history of] the German Reich. It is no excuse, but from a historical perspective it is just natural that the judge Lynch appeared on the stage.
Many editors voiced their relief that Erzberger was now unable to cause further harm. To be dragged on a cow hide to the place of execution, there to be branded with a red-hot iron and hanged from the 62 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic highest gallows: Of course, these sentiments were far from universal.
With this law, republicans hoped to be able to reign in the destructive power of the press. Not only did this prove to be largely unsuccessful, it also established a dangerous precedent of press censorship which was to have bitter consequences in the early s. The stipulations of the Law for the Protection of the Republic regarding press publications make clear that the government was primarily worried about articles which might result in physical attacks on individual members of the cabinet.
Their solution was ultimately a return to an old instrument of state control, namely censorship. But outright press incitement to murder or to topple the current government by means of violence continued to be the exception rather than the rule. Partisan journalists had numerous ways in which politics and politicians could be framed and presented which allowed readers to draw their own, more radical, conclusions. As a tool of press politics, the Law for the Protection of the Republic was ultimately inadequate because it underestimated the complexity of press dynamics.
The press campaigns against Erzberger and later Rathenau convinced democrats that the primary task was to restrain individual journalists and editors. But excessive and violent polemics was not the main problem. Even if the Media Personalities, —24 63 Law for the Protection of the Republic had been in place from onwards, Erzberger would still have been turned into a negative symbol of integration for the nationalist Right. It was the collective partisan focus on certain aspects of his political activities, in a multitude of local and regional newspapers, which gave Erzberger the prominence—and the reputation—which was to cost him his life.
He probably thought that a ruling in his favour would forestall the worst excesses of press polemics regarding his personality. Instead, the trial proceedings allowed his opponent Helfferich to exploit the mechanisms inherent in the media machine. Media prominence gained through a political trial did not necessarily have to be of a negative nature.
The sudden concentration of press interest on one particular political player could equally well result in the creation of a new national appeal. Adolf Hitler is a good case in point. The press played a crucial role in transforming him into a right-wing celebrity. When and how did this extremist rise out of obscurity, and what was the public image constructed by the press? But outside Bavaria he was still completely unknown. In summer , he rejected a parliamentary strategy because he realized that the National Socialists stood not the slightest prospect of success at the Reichstag elections anywhere outside Munich.
In our case that is entirely impossible. News of the negotiations about reparations payments, the partition of Upper Silesia, the resignations of the French government under Briand in January, and of the British prime minister, Lloyd Media Personalities, —24 65 George, in October, all this was of considerably greater interest to the average German newspaper reader than the activities of an extremist Bavarian splinter party. Faced with this fascist uprising, the Italian king appointed Mussolini prime minister.
These events constituted front-page news and received extraordinary coverage in the German press. After their own experience of a failed right-wing coup in , German editors took a keen interest in these Italian developments. Certain parallels between fascists and National Socialists were immediately obvious even to the most cursory observer. National Socialists themselves began to recommend a fascist-style march on Berlin, and compared Hitler with Mussolini.
But right from the beginning, his public image was very controversial. Journalistic presentation of Hitler was decisively shaped by the partisan approach to politics which prevailed in the German press. The bestselling Berliner Morgenpost, for example, with its emphasis on local news and entertainment, paid little attention to Hitler.
In January the high drama of the French occupation of the Ruhr area dominated its political section. When the National Socialists were unexpectedly given permission to hold their rallies despite the state of emergency, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger concentrated its sparse coverage on the fact that the Nazi events took place without any incidents. Those newspapers which had covered the putsch rumours in mid-January also reported of Nazi provocations in mid-July and the subsequent debate about a pending civil war; those who had refrained from doing so in January also ignored the news in July.
In fact, most Germans, especially those reading provincial newspapers, knew very little about Hitler and probably cared even less. Throughout October, relations between Bavaria and the Reich became increasingly hostile and seemed on the brink of an armed confrontation at the end of the month. Over the preceding weeks, Hitler had completely receded into the background of Bavarian politics. By the time this newsless period was over, other events competed for attention, like the currency reform, the crisis and eventual downfall of the Stresemann government, and international developments regarding the reparation issue.
Already weeks before it started, expectations among journalists were very high. Media interest in the trial far exceeded the limited seating capacity in the courtroom, and thereby became a news item itself. As far as it is possible to tell, newspaper readers took a keen interest. Even a nationalist newspaper like the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung which was fundamentally sympathetic to Hitler condensed his four-hour testimony into just two columns.
The unintentional consequence was that Hitler appeared on the same footing as one of the greatest heroes of the nationalist right. Already by the end of the year, Hitler was 70 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic out of prison. Ludendorff was given an enthusiastic welcome outside the court building, and Hitler repeatedly had to show himself at a window to respond to the euphoric masses.
Nor was it simply the pragmatic lesson drawn from the failed putsch that he needed the greatest possible freedom from external dependencies to achieve his political aims. Reading his own name in all of the major German papers at the time undoubtedly gave him a new sense of importance and self-respect: Some journalists at the time were aware of the psychological impact that media coverage could have.
And Hitler could hardly fail to notice the impact that the extensive press coverage had on his national image. During the trial and after, he received an avalanche of letters and telegrams from all over Germany expressing support and encouragement. Two Media Personalities, —24 71 years previously, in summer , Hitler had still ruled out a parliamentary strategy because he thought that the National Socialists would stand no chance at elections in view of the deadly silence with which they were treated in the press.
Five days after the verdict, elections to the Bavarian state parliament saw landslide gains for the extremist Right. In certain regions, like in Middle Franconia, on the Baltic coast around Rostock, or in the border region of Posen-West Prussia, the Nazis even received more than 40 per cent of the popular vote. Although Hitler himself was still sceptical about pursuing a parliamentary strategy, he was not reluctant to take credit for the electoral upswing. He was well aware of the scathing comments in the left-wing and liberal press.
Even Bismarck had suffered from right-wing newspaper attacks in the mids. This particular discourse, however, was not the dominant one in Germany: The resulting polyphony of press discourses contributed decisively to the polarization of German politics. According to this contemporary observer, it was the newspaper that ultimately determined the political views of its readers.
But it was not just through agenda-setting that the right-wing press campaign affected the popular perception of politics. Even if these were extreme cases, the fact that many nationalist Germans were prepared to voice publicly the depth of their anti-Erzberger sentiments, calling him a criminial, using biological metaphors of disease when describing his role within the German polity, or indeed wishing him dead, seems to suggest that it was not just quantity of coverage which mattered but also quality. The presentation of Hitler and his followers in the nationalist press as youthful, idealistic, upright nationalists who had tragically 74 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic been betrayed by their wavering conservative co-conspirators allowed Hitler to take on a new gravitas in the eyes of right-wing Germans, and resulted in an outpouring of adulation during and after the trial.
Of course, his celebrity status did not automatically translate into electoral support: Yet the intensity of political struggle did not abate: How could this happen? How could a convinced monarchist, responsible for directing the German war effort that resulted in defeat and the deaths of nearly two million German soldiers, be a credible and even popular candidate for the presidency? In order to understand the choice of those who elected Hindenburg in April , it is crucial to delve into the hot-house of German politics in the months preceding the presidential elections.
These months were dominated by two major media events: At issue was the role of Social Democracy in the military defeat of , and the trustworthiness of representatives of the new democratic system. Partisan coverage of these events inspired political spitefulness both inside and outside parliament. More importantly, the unsavoury spectacle which unfolded on the pages of the daily press helped to discredit parliamentary democracy. The head of the political police in Berlin, Bartels, had just been arrested for corruption. He had been paid by a Russian businessman, Holzmann, to collect incriminating material against another Berlin-based Russian businessman, Iwan Kutisker.
Eighteen months later, Kutisker was to be sentenced to four years in prison for credit fraud. In late November , however, journalists were somewhat confused as to the identity of the villain in the piece. All that seemed clear was that there was suddenly a daily menu of corruption cases. Hence, when the Deutsche Zeitung singled out Kutisker, it really aimed at the post-revolutionary political system. The Russian Barmat brothers had also received Staatsbank loans, the paper declared.
One Reichstag deputy of the Centre party sat on their supervisory board, as did the leader of the Social Democratic faction in the Prussian Landtag, Ernst Heilmann. The Rote Fahne was convinced that the policy of slander was paying off. Ernst Heilmann wrote a lengthy declaration stating that he was a close friend of Julius Barmat, that he had accepted membership on various boards within the business out of friendship without deriving material advantages from them, and that he had no knowledge of any loans whatsoever. Do we need ever new scandals and trials to open the eyes of Social Democratic workers, too?
Can he [the worker] cast his vote for these men, who are striking deals with these dirty upstarts who stick at nothing? Only some of it was true, most of it was grossly exaggerated, and none of it amounted to an illegal action, but it served well as a target for polemic. Never before has Germany experienced something as nasty and sordid like the methods of our jointly operating opponents from left and right in this [election] struggle.
In Berlin, which had provided the major part of the Barmat Competing Stories, —5 79 news readership, the SPD gains were most impressive: In early December, the Berlin public at large was not aware of the alleged Barmat scandal. While the Rote Fahne considered the Barmats proof of the corruption of Social Democracy by bourgeois society, most editors seemed not to be convinced that the Barmats could be convicted of any wrongdoing. For the great majority of the Berlin and Prussian newspaper readership, however, the Barmats did not become an issue.
Politicians, however, were avid newspaper readers, and consumed particularly those partisan political papers that gave coverage to the Barmats. In fact, these papers were an important source of substantiation for political attacks, and many parties and political pressure groups had their own newspaper-clipping collections to supply functionaries with an archive of politically relevant material. After the stabilization of the currency in , the Barmats repeatedly needed big loans to keep solvent.
By early September , they owed the Staatsbank over eight million RM. After some management anxiety over these large sums, the bank scrutinized the economic viability of these loans, and prolonged them until mid-December , with a promise to extend the deadline a further three months. The question of whether the Barmats would have managed to save their business if the loans had been prolonged is open to speculation: Other stories dominated the news in December Papers were claiming electoral victory or disguising defeat, and devoted their pages to the incipient cabinet crisis and ensuing coalition negotiations.
With a government crisis as a backdrop and presidential elections looming on the political horizon, the Magdeburg trial provided ample propagandistic potential. One photo became particularly notorious. Taken in summer , it showed Ebert and the then Reichswehr minister Noske standing in the Baltic Sea, in bathing trunks. There it was published on the front cover on 24 August —three days after the swearing-in of Ebert as Reich president in Weimar. The liberal-democratic Ullstein publishing house had probably not intended to ridicule Ebert. It had simply used the occasion of the new Reich constitution to present the new president tongue-in-cheek as a normal citizen, presenting an entertaining photo that combined two popular magazine themes: The photo, however, turned into a sensation: The photo soon became part of the anti-republican iconography: Over the next years, opponents of the new Republic continued to use, and refer to, the bathing photo to denigrate Ebert and democracy.
Still, the trial went ahead, and when the Munich court subpoenaed Ebert, it became clear that the trial was to be exploited politically. Go on, Herr Ebert, and prove that you are not a traitor. You need not be afraid of the red bathing trunks which will greet you upon your arrival in Munich. Rothard, 28 years old at this point, was a provincial lightweight with a criminal record. Rothard was subdued, repentant, and intimidated.
He now insisted that he would prove that Ebert had committed treason. The support that he received from the DNVP was probably the crucial factor in this change of heart. Thus, the Magdeburg trial offered an ideal opportunity for nationalists to substantiate their interpretation of and to smear the Reich president well in advance of the presidential elections due in spring Newspapers tried to sell their particular political interpretation of events, with headlines a focal point of political polemic.
One witness statement particularly damaging to Ebert may serve as an example of the competing accounts of the trial proceedings. The question of how to deal with the draft notices that all strikers received was of particular importance. For the right-wing Deutsche Zeitung, it was most important to highlight this statement: Someone gave him a note. Upon this, Herr Ebert said: Strike only serves to shorten the war. He who receives his induction orders ought not present himself.
Are you not erring in this statement? Impossible, I have heard it entirely clearly. Rothardt has employed someone who has received considerable funds to organize witnesses against Herr Ebert. One cannot after all refuse the defendant to search for witnesses. I can here provide the intelligence that the witness has been ordered by his past regimental commander. Although Syrig denied having received money, doubts about him remained. The media war fought over Magdeburg also affected the court proceedings.
The lawyers were very aware of the news value of their position. This served only as an incentive to editors to reinforce their attacks. However, one witness by the name of Lehnhoff stated that Ebert had indeed made an ambiguous appeal. Not least because his speech had met with so very little approval, Ebert had allegedly proclaimed towards the end: This was what the right-wing press had been waiting for: The genius of truth is right in the middle of the room.
More importantly, Nachtausgabe readers were kept ignorant of the discrediting of Syrig, the main witness against Ebert so far. A worker named Gobert claimed that it was he who had asked Ebert about draft orders at the rally, upon which Ebert had clearly proclaimed 86 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic that the orders were to be ignored.
Apart from Syrig, he was thus the only witness to claim Ebert had encouraged workers to refuse the drafting, contradicting the statements of at least a dozen other witnesses. Coincidentally, he was also the last witness to be heard. Thus, for the right-wing press the hearing ended on a high note.
All Berlin newspapers ran the judgement as front-page news. Over the course of the trial it had devoted a total of sixteen out of twenty-six front pages to the story. Throughout the trial the presentation of the news was determined by the competition between right-wing and left-liberal interpretations of the events of The pending judgement here is—at least seen politically—no longer relevant. But his original article that had started the trial was a symptom of the low-level hostility that parliamentary democracy was continuously exposed to through the media: Rothardt had just picked up the rampant anti-republican rhetoric of his time.
Liberal observers blamed the DNVP and its press for this poisoning of political culture, and pointed at the similarities to the hate-campaigns of the past which had resulted in the murders of Erzberger and Rathenau. Ernst Feder, deputy chief-editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, highlighted in his comment on the judgement the dangerous synthesis of partisan politics, a manipulated legal system, and nationalist press coverage.
A week after the Magdeburg judgement, another synthesis of deutschnational press campaign and anti-republican judiciary spawned a further leitmotiv: Hugenberg, in comparison, sat on the boards of forty-seven companies without this being considered scandalous. For the owner of an export—import business, this must have seemed a natural means of extending his international contacts.
But when recounted by right-wing papers prior to the elections in December , it certainly seemed so. And this press coverage proved consequential. It also impressed the judiciary, which formed a large part of the 90 Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic readership of right-wing newspapers. It was a young state prosecutor from the unit working on the Kutisker case, Kussmann, who turned the press allegations against Barmat into what subsequently became the Barmat scandal.
As intended, this highly theatrical coup made front-page news in almost all the papers in Berlin. Editors all over Berlin knew—or had heard rumours—of the allegations made in the run-up to the December elections. They were, therefore, aware of the politically explosive potential of this affair, and their need to take a position in the wider spectrum of possible viewpoints. The identity of the villain of the piece and the question of political responsibility became hotly contested issues.
The right-wing Nationalpost believed this to be a service to the readership: Already now it has reached such dimensions and is constantly expanding further, that the startled newspaper reader is completely Competing Stories, —5 93 at a loss faced with the impact of the daily revelation avalanche. So what is the issue in essence? In a few words the following: Whilst the attacks had mostly been led by the Communist Rote Fahne before the December elections, the Social Democrats now perceived themselves as victims of a distinctly right-wing attack.
It was an openly bourgeois coalition of the Right. In Prussia, the situation was different. This left Otto Braun with a minority government. The subsequent government crisis lasted until April What has been claimed in the press, in the public at large, has to be investigated, in order to cleanse the atmosphere completely.
The willingness of politicians to let the press dominate the agenda was remarkable, particularly considering the many complaints individual members made about their treatment at its hands. Their relationship came to an end in late , when Bauer and Barmat fell out over the amount of money that Bauer was to receive for that deal. On 29 January —the same day that saw Bauer give testimony to the investigation committee—Nuschke tabled a motion to broaden the investigation to include events at the Prussian Landespfandbriefanstalt where the director had just resigned: As the Social Democrats now pointed out, there had been no law authorizing the government to take such action, nor had the government made the decision public.
The fact that the money had not even been accounted for in the Reich budget constituted a clear violation of parliamentary budgetary obligations. According to the Tag, the whole affair was without public interest. News coverage was neither balanced nor complete. The Barmat affair was excellent news material not only because of the constant stream of revelations that it provided but also because its consequences were so spectacular. On Friday 6 February, Bauer resigned his parliamentary seat because of the Barmat letter published by the Lokal-Anzeiger.
His statement to the investigating committee in early February revealed no compromising information, and gave the right-wing press only little further ammunition: Although many commentators did consider this intervention questionable, Heilmann could not be accused of any improper acts. While he was bending over with pain, he talked with deep bitterness how he was suffering from the baiting that had been organized against him for years. He died on 28 February The right-wing parties eventually nominated the former Reich interior minister and mayor of Duisburg, Karl Jarres, as their candidate.
In his description of a rally in the Berlin Sportpalast, Carl von Ossietzky emphasized the importance of the Barmat affair as a common rhetorical denomination that united the Reichsblock in its opposition to Social Democracy: Braun withdrew from the presidental election and was elected in Prussia with the support of the Catholic Centre on 3 April; in return, the SPD supported Marx, who also received the support of the liberals, for the presidency.
The vote for the president looked likely to turn into a vote on the Republic. The SPD executive saw the republic in danger, and pointed in particular at the efforts of its political opponents to mobilize non-voters: It became a hotly contested issue within the investigating committee on 4 April, when the committee voted to distance itself publicly from the publication. The fact that nothing incriminating was revealed by questioning Barmat was withheld from the public.
The Catholic Centre party, unnerved by the constant barrage of propaganda against its presidential candidate, Marx, reacted strongly. On its front page, Germania raged against the political opponents: They hoped to hit a political system, and they only hit a poor ill human. The damage done to the credibility of SPD and Centre party Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic was such that Hindenburg was elected president, with a small majority of just , votes over Marx. On the contrary, the media response to these revelations was indicative of the partisan coverage that had accompanied the Barmat affair from the beginning.
Ironically, however, before the court could reach a verdict, his case was dropped under the general amnesty that Hindenburg declared on political offenders late in Ebert, the committee explicitly stated, had maintained a spotless reputation. While Stresemann performed his balancing act in the limelight of public attention, the Barmats faded out of view. The impression was created that the reputation of parliamentarism had seriously suffered.
One Austrian correspondent in Berlin considered it more dangerous than previous military coups: Friedrich Ebert was destroyed: Gustav Bauer died, too, if only politically. He struggled long to re-establish his reputation; it took him until May to be readmitted to his party. There are numerous levels of audiences. Here, circumstancial evidence for the effects of newspaper coverage can be found in the terminology of parliamentary discourse. Politicians who were exposed to this press coverage over several weeks and months reacted to the strong language that they encountered in the papers, either by picking it up or by dismissing it in equally strong terms, which again gave the press something to report on.
It was not really surprising that there was genuine dissatisfaction with the way the investigating committee functioned. In view of the opprobrious discourse accompanying all the scandalizing, observers could not help feeling that an era of scandals was indeed being ushered in. The media exploitation of the Magdeburg trial and the Barmat scandal did not pay off for one particular party: However, the moment the right-wing parties could present, in Hindenburg, a candidate who could be credibly presented to be standing above democratic partisan politics, the majority of the electorate responded.
There were sharp contradictions in the Christmas mood. The construction and maintenance of Jewish identity depended not just on theology or formal religious observance. Their choices resonated with particular emphasis during Jewish and Christian holidays alike, and the Jewish response to Christmas reflected the religious, political, regional, and social differences that divided the Jewish community. For the approximately 80 percent of liberal middle-class German Jews who might support the integrative ideology of Reform Judaism, the reactions were complex.
For both German Jews and Protestants, formal religious celebrations evolved into family holidays in the nineteenth century, and the cult of domestic piety associated with Christmas became a key component of family identity. For German Jews, the decision to observe some sort of hybrid Jewish-Christian holiday — now known by the ironic name Weihnukka, a combination of the German words for Christmas Weihnachten and Hanukkah Chanukka — cast issues of Jewish acculturation and assimilation in high relief.
The reinvigoration of Hanukkah itself in the late nineteenth century further complicated matters. Resurrected from relative obscurity by the Zionist movement, Hanukkah and so-called Maccabee celebrations appropriated many of the sentimental symbols and rituals of the Christian holiday. Hanukkah looked a lot like Christmas, even as it expressed a determined Jewish or Zionist identity and offered a concrete alternative to Christian observances. Social Democratic counternarratives and alternative practices in lowerclass milieus further contested the meaning of German Christmas.
Proletarian festivities observed under the star of socialism rather than the star of Bethlehem called attention to the realities of poverty and class exploitation that lay behind the rhetoric of material abundance and social harmony. Emerging working-class cultures of leisure and mass entertainment offered a spectrum of holiday activities that cut across socialist and bourgeois forms of celebration and reinforced the deep divisions that segmented everyday life by class and milieu in Imperial Germany.
Instead, they spent the holidays in the taverns, dance halls, and club rooms frequented by the lower classes. For some, Christmas played out as a Sauferei, a bout of heavy drinking frowned on by government and clerical authorities. Others made the best Christmas they could, given relatively limited resources.
Working-class celebration both ignored and adopted bourgeois niceties, merging with and going beyond Social Democratic attempts to shape a distinct working-class festive culture. By the Gentle Glow of the Hanukkah Candles Though Jewish salon hostess Fanny von Arnstein reportedly set up the first Christmas tree in Vienna on Christmas Eve in , celebrations of this most Christian holiday, however secular, rarely occurred in Jewish households until much later in the century.
Yet Jewishness was a category subject to multiple and competing definitions, and Christmas underscored the situational aspects of ethnic identity. Rooted in the Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskala, liberal Jews favored national and cultural adaptation rather than strict adherence to Judaic law and messianic hopes for a return to the Holy Land. The childhood experience of Social Democratic theorist Eduard Bernstein, born in , exemplifies the way the pressures of mainstream culture encouraged hybrid celebrations in lower-class Jewish families.
The family did not observe dietary rules at home but did attend formal services on major Jewish holidays. The celebration of the birth of the Christian savior was not entirely sanguine, however. After Scholem converted to Zionism, however, he found such celebrations so disturbing that he fled the house on Christmas Eve. Even this rather timid concession evoked an angry response in a subsequent edition of the paper: The address on Tiergarten Street only twisted the knife: Contradictions in the Christmas Mood 71 Figure 2. Hanukkah, which commemorates the bce liberation of Jerusalem from Syrians by the Jewish Maccabees, declined in importance during the first half of the nineteenth century, a result of the assimilationist tendencies associated with the Jewish Enlightenment.
Like Christmas, Hanukkah evoked the intimate links between family, faith, and nation, but in a specifically Jewish mode. Only those, whose race he was, would rather observe Hanukkah. Just as Christmas gave historical depth to the notion of Germanness, Hanukkah proved that the Jews had a noble and ancient collective history linked to the homeland in Palestine.
American-Jewish newspapers, like the socialist Vorverts sic and the religious daily Tageblatt, castigated errant Jews who still celebrated Christmas. In an era in which succeeding generations observed fewer formal religious rituals, domestic celebration preserved a sense of ethnic identity and religious stability. Jewish piety was thus feminized, sentimentalized, and commercialized in ways that paralleled the trajectories of Christian religious culture; yet the differences mattered.
Private celebration was crucial for maintaining a sense of Jewishness in a hostile public environment. The symbols and rituals of the Jewish holiday — such as lighting candles at the peak moment of family celebration — paralleled Christmas customs centered on family, children, domesticity, and gift giving. You light the candles for the children today And find joy in the quiet glow of the holiday. Through the window falls a soft evening light — Today you will reveal our miracle to them; Today brings the night, when all the enchanted Dreams of our childhood rise again, With light steps go through the room, Today brings the fairy tales of our twilight hours.
Orthodox leaders clung to the religious aspects of the holiday and fought to preserve the deep spiritual meaning of the miracle of the temple oil. The Hanukkah celebration in a Jewish kindergarten in Berlin, organized by the Israelitische Heimathaus and funded by charity donations, was typical. Celebrants gathered around long tables laden with presents of toys, sweets, and practical objects.
Before opening their gifts, the children had to recite a poem memorized in advance. The Joyful Tidings of Socialism For Adelheid Popp born , the noted socialist author and feminist agitator who grew up in a working-class family in Vienna, Christmas brought domestic strife and social envy instead of joy and harmony. In her mother pinched pennies until she could buy a tree and some modest gifts. He was very late, and the children went to bed. Though they rejected or redefined the central symbols and practices of the holiday, particularly its Christian aspects, Social Democrats readily appropriated the sentimental mood of bourgeois festivity and the familiar ideals of social harmony — now cast as the promise of revolutionary brotherhood.
Mainstream, middle-class Christmas stories about family joy and social harmony around the Christmas tree were repetitive and generic; so, too, were the Social Democratic counter narratives. For socialists, the idealized view of social harmony promoted by church and state during the holiday season masked working-class exploitation and the bankruptcy of Western capitalism. The old world clings to its weapons, tens of millions of people armed for mass murder with all the devilish arts that barbarism with its prostituted civilization can prepare, ready in an instant to fall on each other and start a horrific bloodbath.
The ruling classes dance in wild turns around the golden calf — work exploited, squeezed dry, repressed like never before. Below misery, above staggering luxury and extensive decadence. Even staunch Social Democrats could honor Jesus as a secular being who spoke of freedom from social and political injustice. Jesus, the friend of the poor, honors people in all walks of life, and love of humanity is the core of his teaching. We who preach for and enlist all the passions in the struggle against society joyfully greet the Christian Christmas message with this new meaning, a belief deeply rooted in the earthly world of reality.
But no God can give us this peace. The results of their anti- Christianization campaigns indeed appear mixed. Swayed by the rhetoric of the Church Withdrawal Movement or Kirchenaustrittsbewegung , sponsored by the Social Democrats and other freethinking groups, some 20, Protestant parishioners per year resigned their church membership in the decades before World War I.
In Berlin, for example, about 8, Protestants resigned in and again in , and over 12, resigned 78 Contradictions in the Christmas Mood in and The use of the solstice had distinct tactical advantages in the struggle to remake the holiday. For proletarians and bourgeoisie alike, the connections between Christmas and the pagan winter solstice inspired pride in the deep history of the Germany community.
Light conquered darkness in the immutable cycles of nature, just as the proletariat would conquer their class enemy according to the natural laws of dialectical materialism. Scores of proletarian Christmas stories, as generic as their mainstream counterparts, offered socialist readers a different way to imagine class relaContradictions in the Christmas Mood 79 tions during the holiday season.
Stock characters like aging widows, honest working women, and begging street children reappeared in socialist fairy tales that reversed the familiar happy endings of middle-class stories. In the typical bourgeois fable, set in a nostalgic and timeless past, a simple gift of a golden coin or Christmas tree could bring joy to an entire family of poor but honest and orderly handworkers. Socialist stories on the contrary were staged in contemporary settings, in gritty urban street scenes or modern factories.
They played out themes of abuse, exploitation, and grinding poverty. Unemployed, she will not be able to pay rent or buy medicine for her sick mother, much less celebrate the holiday. The daughter gives the boy a penny in what seems, at first, a classic moment of holiday charity. But the boy is accused of stealing and taken off by the police. The daughter begins to weep — such is the innocence of youth. The real problem with Christmas was poverty, not the holiday itself. Socialist writers pandered to the sentimentalism associated with Christmas in terms as maudlin as those used by the most bourgeois writer.
Social Democrats matched critical rhetoric with an alternative set of practices that appropriated bourgeois celebrations in both private and public spheres. Meant to be read aloud around the Christmas tree, they promoted ideas about the winter solstice and the revolutionary nature of Jesus familiar from the socialist press. Revised carols, such as the popular Weihnachtsmarseillaise Christmas-Marseillaise , dated from the last third of the nineteenth century and had deep roots in working-class culture.
It could have been both: It exemplifies an entire genre of revised proletarian carols: Silent night, sorrowful night, All around, splendid light. In the hovels just torment and need, Cold and waste, no light and no bread. The poor are sleeping on straw. Repeat Silent Night, sorrowful night, The hungry babe cries out his plight, Did you bring us home some bread? Advertisements for proletarian Christmas parties sponsored by a variety of working-class groups surfaced in the socialist press in the late s in urban areas such as Hannover, Kiel, and Flensburg.
Doors opened at 4: Donations from local SPD offices, trade associations, tavern and theater owners, and individuals subsidized charity parties and showed that workers could establish their own alternative socialist support networks. In Berlin in , for example, over 5, children of striking metalworkers, carpenters, upholsterers, and machine workers attended a free party that featured large Christmas trees with electric lights, a concert, puppet shows, and gifts.
Year after year, Christmas lent poignancy to contemporary struggles for social justice. Reports in the Christmas issues of the socialist press reminded readers about the Berlin beer boycott of , demonstrated solidarity with the revolutionary proletariat in Russia, or attacked the hypocrisy of celebrating Christmas in the atmosphere of increasing militarism before World War I.
When 8, textile workers went out on strike for a ten-hour working day in Crimmitschau, a mill town in Saxony, in the winter of —, the holiday season brought an unprecedented opportunity for pointed agitation. In response to campaigns organized by the SPD, holiday donations for the strikers poured in from Berlin, Leipzig, and other towns. Entire depots full of holiday sweets, toys, and more-practical gifts reportedly stood ready for the workers, but the local authorities cancelled all public Christmas parties. The textile workers were proud that they had observed Christmas despite state oppression.
Yet the SPD counter-Christmas hardly dominated working-class celebration. German workers enjoyed a lively holiday culture that cut across the goals of the SPD and bourgeois proprieties alike. Working-class festivity was shaped by rowdy popular tradition, the expansion of commercial leisure opportunities, and changing attitudes toward family and private life.
The holiday helped build a national culture shared tentatively across social strata, with common familial values that could transcend politics or class allegiance. The appeal of Christmas was milieu dependent. Working-class lifestyles varied widely around , when pockets of industrialized, high-density urbanization coexisted with rural areas far less touched by industrial development.
Poorer Germans had similar interactions with employers, landlords, and the state. Christmas connected in many ways to the world of labor. Perhaps most importantly for workers themselves, the holiday meant time off and a possible Weihnachtsgratifikation, or Christmas bonus. Both were valuable commodities around , when the typical factory worker worked six days a week for eleven hours a day and spent most of his or her pay on basic necessities. By the s in Prussia, the largest German state, sumptuary law generally forbade work on Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and sometimes 26 December, the so-called second day of Christmas.
Yet employers only sporadically followed the exacting regulations that mandated free time on religious and other annual holidays, and numerous codified exceptions kept workers on the job in the holiday season. Workers, for their part, viewed the annual bonus not as a gift but as a right, and struggles over its amount and terms of payment could lead to friction between employers and employees. In any case, this moment of ritualized exchange reinforced the symbolic and official contracts that defined working conditions and social status.
The size of the bonus depended on position, length of service, and place of employment. The Christmas bonuses given to domestic servants varied greatly and depended in large part on the status of the family offering employment. According to economist and social reformer Oskar Stillich, servants in the best Berlin households usually negotiated a holiday bonus as part of their working contract. The bonus averaged 15 percent of wages and could be as 86 Contradictions in the Christmas Mood high as 25 percent — clearly a significant part of an annual salary that ranged between and 1, marks two-thirds of which was generally paid in room and board.
For the domestic servant who did most of the work, the holidays meant special demands, longer hours, and little time for visiting their own families. The basic facts clearly contradicted this notion of interclass harmony: Vierbeck makes it clear that if employers kept to their side of the bargain — offered the right gifts and showed at least some concern for the wellbeing of their servants — the social contract was acceptable. For Christmas , working in a different household, Vierbeck received clothes, linens, and an expensive watch and chain.
The Kiel editorialist, one feels, would find this an appropriate exchange. Doris Vierbeck may have resented having to prepare Christmas for someone else, but she shared the sentimental feelings that made the holiday an appealing celebration of wholesome family life. How many joyful Christmas songs we sang, and how great and true was the joy with the modest presents under the glowing Tannenbaum! Both groups were apparently compelled by what was almost a moral imperative to celebrate the sentimental ties of domesticity during the holiday season.
They saved or sometimes borrowed money so they could afford holiday food, decorations, and gifts. Well into the twentieth century, numerous German children received presents fashioned from cigar boxes, kindling, and scraps of cloth. By mumming parades and the visits of proto—Father Christmases such as Knecht Ruprecht were for the most part a play-acted remnant of a once-vibrant artisan culture. Christmas Eve was a Sauftag [a day for a drunk] par excellence. He recovered from his hangover three days later. To counter such threats, government officials and merchants, teachers, and clergy used Christmas to promote the virtues of middle-class, Christian morality: Emergency exceptions were allowed by application to the police authorities.
Continued debates over Christmas sumptuary laws — which persisted well into the s — suggest that popular celebration consistently evaded state control. In any case, by the turn of the century, it seems safe to assume that statutes outlawing popular entertainment were rarely enforced. New commercial forms of holiday observance had appropriated, merged with, and begun to replace more traditional customs, whether religious, bourgeois, or working-class. Prussian officials used sumptuary law in attempts to meet church demands for time off during the holiday so workers would attend holiday mass.
Entire depots full of holiday sweets, toys, and more-practical gifts reportedly stood ready for the workers, but the local authorities cancelled all public Christmas parties. Public opinion concerning Erzberger after this trial is unfavourable, this much has to be openly admitted. The Christmas tree glittering with candles and decorations, a trip to the Christmas market, the mysterious Christmas Eve visit of Father Christmas, feasts of roast goose with red cabbage, the uncanny scent of pine boughs indoors; all were tokens of a specifically national festival that thrilled and fascinated Germans and non-Germans alike. All political journalists were acutely aware of this multiplier effect and struggled to confront in their own articles each hostile statement in the various papers. Later in the evening, a roving group of acquaintances stop in for a brief visit. The Berlin Press, —32 29 Let us leave out the political racket from the unpolitical section of our newspaper.
The Contradictions in the Christmas Mood 91 effect of regulation may have been somewhat counterproductive, however, since more time off created more time for rowdy behavior. He divided his parishioners into two types: Weihnukka, Hanukkah, proletarian counterholidays, and the diverse celebratory practices of the lower classes reveal that Christmas could absorb and mediate conflicting interests. There were sharp differences between celebrations observed by Germans on the margins and those in the mainstream, yet German Jews, Social Democrats, and workers all found the sentimental mood at the core of the bourgeois holiday indispensable.
In short, by , German Christmas anchored a shared national culture while simultaneously revealing the fractures in that culture. The political resonance of this dialectic would appear in full illumination when the nation went to war and Christmas became a celebration of Germans united against a common enemy. They shook hands, buried their dead, played soccer, and exchanged token gifts of tobacco, chocolate, schnapps, and unit badges.
Indeed the observance of what Germans called War Christmas Kriegsweihnachten would become all too familiar in the first half of the twentieth century. Between and , Germans celebrated one out of every five Christmases while the nation was at war. War Christmas forced soldiers and civilians to endure experiences that were hardly Christmaslike. Bang, a shell, a few men dead, a number of wounded. For a Christmas present, a burial with music. War Christmas reshaped long-standing customs in tenuous attempts to resolve the tensions between war and peace, home and front, public duties and private observances.
War Christmas was a hybrid holiday, an unstable amalgam of official and vernacular practices. The dominant institutions of German society drew on memories of the chauvinist holiday celebrated during the Franco-Prussian War —71 and the militarism and Prussian-Protestant nationalism that already defined the late nineteenth-century middle-class holiday to cast War Christmas in Enemy Territory 95 Christmas as a celebration of seamless national harmony, appropriate for a Christian nation at war with its enemies.
Civic leaders and propagandists claimed that the sentimental bonds of the Christmas mood, fraught with heightened emotion during the crisis of war, dissolved the class, confessional, and regional differences that ordinarily divided Germans from one another. Protestant court chaplain D. Celebration nonetheless made room for private needs in practical and symbolic ways. Germans gravitated to familiar holiday traditions in attempts to come to terms with the dislocation and trauma of the war. Just as the celebrations organized by military authorities 96 Christmas in Enemy Territory and civic elites evoked and appropriated family rituals and individual feelings, so the more private rituals of soldiers in the ranks incorporated official discourse.
Nonetheless, Germans at home and at the front joined leading institutions to construct a self-mobilizing myth of national solidarity centered on the holiday. Celebrate Like German Warriors! The history of German War Christmas really starts with the Siege of Paris in December , when German troops reportedly celebrated a particularly chauvinist holiday in occupied France. This first War Christmas did more than nationalize the holiday or popularize the Christmas tree, as historian Ingeborg Weber-Kellermann argues in an often-cited passage from her social history of German Christmas.
The myth of War Christmas had its origins in reports about the bombastic celebrations of soldiers at the front during the war itself; it was further codified in the war-memoir literature written in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Emonts and Carl Tanera, dominated public discourse. Recollections of Christmas in conveyed a utopian vision of German integration at a time when the affective bonds of national community were taking shape. According to the stories, soldiers proudly celebrated confessional and regional particularities at military Christmas parties.
But they also cherished traditional German Christmas customs that evoked a common cultural heritage, which presumably made other social differences intangible or inconsequential. Bourgeois family magazines featured drawings of soldiers outside Paris celebrating around a Christmas tree, sometimes with caricatures of Christmas in Enemy Territory 97 the enemy hanging from its branches, and newspaper reports included glowing descriptions of the wartime holiday.
Calls for Christmas charity spoke of a common purpose in the new language of national solidarity. For soldiers at the front, Christmas was hardly as joyous as the sanitized accounts in the press at home reported. Grinding work, bad food, and violence continued during the holiday season. On Christmas Day, his regiment had to storm several towns to hold off the French and suffered sixty casualties.
Friedrich Graf von Frankenberg, an adjutant with the German Third Army assigned to the Voluntary Hospital Corps at Versailles, attended a party with the military elite. Despite the fine presents distributed by lottery and the presence of Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who put on a show of merriment, Frankenberg noted in his diary that none of the participants were truly happy.
The burdens of war made recollections of childhood celebrations particularly poignant. In a letter to his wife in December , General Hans von Kretschmann described the effects of the tree during a religious service: Soldiers repeatedly described wartime celebration as an unforgettable experience, one in which the intensified desire for wholeness and comfort inspired feelings of close comradeship and national fraternity. Firsthand accounts, however idealized, nonetheless reveal the existence of a rich celebratory culture within the lower ranks of the German army.
As the memoirs of Bavarian rifleman J. Emonts show, the war and the postwar cult of war memory lent a distinct Christmas in Enemy Territory 99 military cast to the celebration of Christmas peace. As the holiday approached, Emonts wrote, the soldiers were overcome with waves of nostalgia. According to Emonts, the excitement began weeks before 25 December, as the soldiers in his unit organized the necessary food, drink, and decorations. Much of this was makeshift and expressed the manliness of military life: The unit band struck up a military march, and the men, singing, paraded back and forth across the hall.
Barracks rituals turned the traditional Christmas Vortrag, recited by children eagerly waiting for presents, to racist and militarist purposes. The poet received an excited round of applause and was hugged and kissed by his compatriots. The party lasted until dawn. Readers of this large, handsome book imagined the glories of war with the aid of color plates and numerous pen-and-ink sketches. Simple commemorative pamphlets or Christmas issues of the Bier Zeitungen beer newspapers , written by enlisted men and printed in short runs on military or local presses, commemorated unit celebrations.
Their contents typically included hand-drawn caricatures of favorite comrades and original stories, poems, and jokes about Christmas in the military; they provided servicemen and their families a lasting token of an unusual event. The disagreement between Selma and her father over her beloved suitor, Fritz, is a battle between intimate desire and national duty, fought on the terrain of gender and generation.
Acting out clearly defined gender roles, Selma finds her feminine need for love overruled by her father, who places the needs of the state above domestic concerns. Yet she hardly resists. The loyalties of woman to man, daughter to father, and family to nation are never in doubt, and they are rewarded in the end. Such works must have contributed to popular mobilization for Christmas during World War I, particularly in December , when many Germans tried to revive the familiar melodramatic myths that made War Christmas a meaningful celebration of German community.
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A German patriot and an enthusiastic soldier-priest who volunteered to serve as a chaplain and army medic during the opening days of the war in August , Ebner would receive the Iron Cross for his work with the wounded. Chaplains like Ebner transmitted this dogma to soldiers at the front; they also shared news with their personal and professional contacts at home and so shaped public perceptions about life at the front and the course of the war. Perhaps most importantly, Ebner kept a detailed war diary, now in the Archive of the Archbishop of Freiburg. Ebner in fact described his Christmas experience in two versions — one modest and straightforward, the other embellished with sentimental excess and probably intended for publication in a home-front newspaper my account below draws on both.
The priest may have been a mouthpiece for official versions of War Christmas, but he was well aware of the emotions and private needs of the men in his charge. It also illustrates the formal and informal networks and the ritual practices at the front that helped turn Christmas into a national myth. Though clergymen were not official propagandists, Christmas in their hands was an important conduit for ideological indoctrination.
Holiday sermons Christmas in Enemy Territory compared the German soldier to Christ, who willingly sacrificed himself for the good of Christendom, and contrasted the spiritual and cultural accomplishments of the German Volk with the bestiality and baseness of the enemy. Germany was an innocent victim attacked by envious neighbors, clergymen explained, calling on the pious depths of the Christmas mood to inspire loyalty to family and fatherland. Since the institutions of the Catholic Church were to some extent less willing to promote historicist or nationalist themes than their Protestant counterparts, the discourse of war theology was potentially more nuanced for Father Ebner.
Pope Benedict XV took a neutral stand on the war and ministered to combatants on both sides, though his repeated calls for an end to hostilities — including his plea for a Christmas truce in — were consistently ignored by patriotic Catholic citizens in both France and Germany. On the national level, Catholic clergy and laity could be profoundly patriotic. Protestant and Jewish institutions and clergy likewise appropriated the holiday to reach the faithful under arms. By early summer , for example, the district of Posen in East Prussia, with fourteen separate Protestant dioceses, had sent over 57, single copies of various publications to troops at the front.
It brought more personal greetings as well. A statement written by the parish pastor of this small Saxon village reminded soldiers of their links to home with local news, information about community events and charity drives, and casualty lists. Yet communications between front and Heimat flowed in both directions. Perhaps most important were his contacts with newspaper editors in the Karlsruhe area.
He also exchanged letters with a number of other middleclass professionals, including a lawyer, a gymnasium teacher, a veterinarian, other priests, soldiers, and his father. Father Ebner had much to tell his home-front audiences about the resonant qualities of War Christmas. On the morning of 24 December, Ebner received his Christmas orders — he would have an exhausting holiday. On 25 December at 2: Gathered around the tree, he wrote, the soldiers became an ersatz family, united by a powerful feeling of community.
The difficulty of officiating in the open air, so close to the violence of the front, lent the scene an intense emotional charge. For Ebner, the effect was electrifying: The bell for transubstantiation rang out, the troops bowed down on their knees and prayed to Jesus. The army chaplain held up the Body of the Lord and spoke: New groups of soldiers pushed continually out of the darkness of the night and into the candlelight of the altar, towards Bethlehem, to the House of Bread, to receive the heavenly Host. After the artillerymen from the nearby guns of the Kohler Battery, the brave troops came out of the trenches.
His vivid evocation nonetheless portrayed the strange atmosphere created by the juxtaposition of familiar religious rituals and the burdens of war. Perhaps with his homefront audience in mind, the priest made the most of it: Stars and silver ribbons hung on the Christmas trees that lined the nave; the largest, behind the altar, was thirty feet high. Donations from enthusiastic soldiers billeted in the area paid for the numerous trees and the plus candles that illuminated the church. Around troops received Communion, many with weapon in hand, and the results were again overwhelming.
Will it soon be peace? When will I go home? The chaplain certainly officiated at many subsequent military services, but as the war dragged on, his Christmas sermons — like other memoirs, letters, and even the public press — increasingly showed less enthusiasm for the heroic aspects of the holiday and indeed the war itself. In , he wrote twenty pages about his holiday activities; in , Christmas received only three terse paragraphs.
Like Ebner, official sources described Christmas as a national holiday that unified all Germans, beyond differences of religion, military rank, or class. They cast the holiday as a golden bridge that linked front and Heimat, and soldiers and their families, with unbreakable bonds of loving affection. The propagandists, clergymen, teachers, journalists, writers, and artists who composed the holiday texts that circulated in the public sphere readily took up these themes, as they reached for the stability of tradition in the crisis of total war.
At the front, War Christmas was more nuanced and contradictory. In smallscale celebrations with officers and fellow servicemen, soldiers grappled with the ironies of the wartime holiday. Familiar scripts evoked broadly shared emotions but at the same time exposed fractures in the ranks.
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