Rationality in Action (Jean Nicod Lectures)

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The problems start to arise when he argues what his conception of rationality entails. For example, he claims that it entails a non-Humean notion of the self that is, some irreducible construct as opposed to a bundle of emotions, states, memories, etc. Now, maybe upon closer scrutiny that really would be the case, that his conception of rationality does indeed entail an irreducible notion of the self, and it could not be made sense of without that entailment.

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Now, if that should be the case then I would be more hesitant to accept it. However, Searle doesn't seem to give adequate consideration or make any serious attempt at integrating the Humean self with his own notion of rationality presumably because, prima facie, it appears as if it would pose great difficulty.

Rationality in Action (Jean Nicod Lectures) by John R. Searle

Still, I think, the attempt should have been made. Furthermore, I think Searle uncritically accepts the "phenomenology" of rational choice, most notably the element of supposed free will and "the gap.

The argument is, briefly, that thoughts simply come and go, and we are no more free to think what we will think next than we are free to do what we will do next as a result of the former. I think taking this position seriously--as ought to be done--severely complicates the picture Searle gives us. Finally, I found the last chapter of this work, where the focus is specifically on neurobiology and free will, to be especially poor.

Two accounts are given as to the way in which free will and neurobiology may interact: Psychological libertarianism with neurobiological determinism no free will and system causation with consciousness and indeterminacy free will. The latter is described pretty vaguely, and I'm not sure how it could ever possibly work, neurobiologically speaking. The former, which I think is actually the more probable, is rejected by Searle. He rejects it because it would turn rational decision-making into an epiphenomenon, and that, he argues, doesn't make sense.

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It doesn't make sense, he goes on, because of the high biological cost it imposes, and in the context of evolution there is therefore no reason why it should have been selected for. That's about the extent of his argument against it, and the discussion is about as superficial as I've presented it here.

One may ultimately conclude that, pace Searle, it really does not make sense, biologically speaking, but his discussion of how it could fit into evolutionary theory is distressingly shallow. But I don't want to come off as too critical of this book.

As a whole, I think it succeeds in showing the weaknesses of what Searle calls the Classical Model of Rationality, and he presents a viable, though at times problematic, alternative of the concept of rationality. Jul 26, Shawn rated it liked it. Are there external reasons for action?

Do we have free will? Searle answers the first question affirmatively but fails to provide justification that doesn't rely on question begging and intuition mongering and he doesn't provide an answer to the second question at all. He needs both external reasons and free will for the account of practical reason he defends in this book, but because he doesn't really have them the whole thing stands on rather shaky ground.

Searle's version of practical reason Are there external reasons for action? Searle's version of practical reason is intuitively appealing but I cannot see how it could be right. One of Searle's primary errors is this: Rather, he assumes that a rational action can only be a rational action if it is preceded by a rational decision.

Decisions are decisions because they occur in situations where it is open to us to choose between a set of actions we could potentially perform. Thus, he comes to the conclusion that we cannot act rationally unless there is a Self to do the deciding and unless we have the free will to decide how to act. While this is probably true of decisions—that is, for a decision to be a decision there probably needs to be genuine options available, which would not exist without free will—there is no reason to think that an action cannot be an action without free will and we have no reason to assume that such an action cannot be judged to be a rational action given the circumstances under which it is performed, even if the action was not performed "freely".

Apr 15, Bill Lalonde rated it it was amazing. An excellent, well-reasoned book. Searle won me over on desire-independent reasons, although I'm not entirely convinced of his reasoning when he talks of how ought can derive from is. Anyhow, if you have an interest in a sharp mind dissecting how we think of rationality, intentions, and free will, this book is a must-read.

Bewhy rated it it was amazing Aug 23, Alice rated it liked it Dec 08, Charles rated it liked it Jan 27, Matt rated it really liked it Jan 22, Ryan Soucy rated it really liked it Feb 09, Elliot rated it really liked it Feb 23, Jennifer rated it it was ok Feb 06, Les Johnson rated it really liked it Feb 27, Ian Greener rated it really liked it Apr 01, Zombiouscrustacean rated it it was amazing Apr 27, Ed rated it liked it Aug 05, Michael rated it really liked it Jun 26, Tony Giorgi rated it liked it Jul 09, Gene rated it really liked it Jul 16, Coraggio Parole controtempo Italian Edition.

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Rationality in Action

Di questo ci parla il libro: Los angeles presente obra ha sido elaborada a partir de las lecciones de Eugen Fink sobre l. Adam Anderson's feelings keep an eye on the elements, developing the unusual traditional failures plaguing an differently idyllic the United States.

With a vast funds, Adam has only one rule—he needs to be chuffed. Searle The learn of rationality and functional cause, or rationality in motion, has been vital to Western highbrow tradition.

He then offers an alternate conception of the position of rationality in idea and action. A critical element of Searle's conception is that in basic terms irrational activities are at once as a result of ideals and wishes -- for instance, the activities of an individual within the grip of an obsession or dependancy. For rationality is feasible basically the place one has a call between numerous rational in addition to irrational options.

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