No Treason No. I, 2 and 6 (With Active Table of Contents)

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It has no authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and man. And it does not so much as even purport to be a contract between persons now existing. It purports, at most, to be only a contract between persons living eighty years ago. And it can be supposed to have been a contract then only between persons who had already come to years of discretion, so as to be competent to make reasonable and obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know, historically, that only a small portion even of the people then existing were consulted on the subject, or asked, or permitted to express either their consent or dissent in any formal manner.

Those persons, if any, who did give their consent formally, are all dead now. Most of them have been dead forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years. And the Constitution, so far as it was their contract, died with them. They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their children. It is not only plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they could bind their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. It is plain, in the first place, that this language, as an agreement, purports to be only what it at most really was, viz: It only says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by promoting their union, safety, tranquillity, liberty, etc.

This agreement, as an agreement, would clearly bind nobody but the people then existing. It would only indicate that the supposed welfare of their posterity was one of the motives that induced the original parties to enter into the agreement. When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of binding them, nor is it to be inferred that he Edition: So far as they are concerned, he only means to be understood as saying that his hopes and motives, in building it, are that they, or at least some of them, may find it for their happiness to live in it.

So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of compelling them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a simpleton as to imagine that he has any right or power to compel them, to eat the fruit.

So far as they are concerned, he only means to say that his hopes and motives, in planting the tree, are that its fruit may be agreeable to them. So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution. Moreover, no body of men, existing at any one time, have the power to create a perpetual corporation. A corporation can become practically perpetual only by the voluntary accession of new members, as the old ones die off. But for this voluntary accession of new members, the corporation necessarily dies with the death of those who originally composed it.

If, then, those who established the Constitution, had no power to bind, and did not attempt to bind, their posterity, the question arises, whether their posterity have bound themselves? If they have done so, they can have done so in only one or both of these two ways, viz. Let us consider these two matters, voting and tax paying, separately.

And first of voting. All the voting that has ever taken place under the Constitution, has been of such a kind that it not only did not pledge the whole people to support the Constitution, but it did not even pledge any one of them to do so, as the following considerations show. In the very nature of things, the act of voting could bind nobody but the actual voters. But owing to the property qualifications required, it is probable that, during the first twenty or thirty years under the Constitution, not more than one tenth, fifteenth, or perhaps twentieth of the whole population black and white, men, women, and minors were permitted to vote.

Consequently, so far as voting was concerned, not more than one tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth of those then existing, could have incurred any obligation to support the Constitution. At the present time, it is probable that not more than one sixth of the whole population are permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting is concerned, the other five-sixths can have given no pledge that they will support the Constitution.

Of the one-sixth that are permitted to vote, probably not more than two-thirds about one-ninth of the whole population have usually voted. Many never vote at all. Many vote only once in two, three, five, or ten years, in periods of great excitement. No one, by voting, can be said to pledge himself for any longer period than that for which he votes.

If, for example, I vote for an officer who is to hold his office for only a year, I cannot be said to have thereby pledged myself to support the government beyond that term. Therefore, on the ground of actual voting, it probably cannot be said that more than one-ninth, or one-eighth, of the whole population are usually under any pledge to support the Constitution. It cannot be said that, by voting, a man pledges himself to support the Constitution, unless the act of voting be a perfectly voluntary one on his part. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a voluntary one on the part of any very large number of those who do vote.

It is rather a measure of necessity imposed upon them by others, than one of their own choice. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money, render service, and forego the exercise of many of his natural rights, under peril of weighty punishments.

He sees, too, that other men practise this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot Edition: In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he use the ballot, he may become a master; if he does not use it, he must become a slave. And he has no other alternative than these two. In self-defence, he attempts the former. His case is analogous to that of a man who has been forced into battle, where he must either kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to save his own life in battle, a man attempts to take the lives of his opponents, it is not to be inferred that the battle is one of his own choosing.

Neither in contests with the ballot—which is a mere substitute for a bullet—because, as his only chance of self-preservation, a man uses a ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one into which he voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his own natural rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the mere power of numbers. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, in an exigency into which he had been forced by others, and in which no other means of self-defence offered, he, as a matter of necessity, used the only one that was left to him.

But it would not, therefore, be a legitimate inference that the government itself, that crushes them, was one which they had voluntarily set up, or ever consented to. Consequently we have no proof that any very large portion, even of the actual voters of the United States, ever really and voluntarily consented to the Constitution, even for the time being.

Nor can we ever have such proof, until every man is left perfectly free to consent, or not, without thereby subjecting himself or his property to be disturbed or injured by others. As we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from the necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal knowledge, as to any particular individual, that he voted from choice; or, consequently, that by voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to support the government.

It utterly fails to prove that the government rests upon the voluntary support of any body. On general principles of law and reason, it cannot be said that the government has any voluntary supporters at all, until it can be distinctly shown who its voluntary supporters are. As taxation is made compulsory on all, whether they vote or not, a large proportion of those who vote, no doubt do so to prevent their own money being used against themselves; when, in fact, they would have gladly abstained from voting, if they could thereby have saved themselves from taxation alone, to say nothing of being saved from all the other usurpations and tyrannies of the government.

It is, in fact, no proof at all. And as we can have no legal knowledge as to who the particular individuals are, if there are any, who are willing to be taxed for the sake of voting, or who would prefer freedom from taxation to the privilege of voting, we can have no legal knowledge that any particular individual consents to be taxed for the sake of voting; or, consequently, consents to support the Constitution.

At nearly all elections, votes are given for various candidates for the same office. Those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates cannot properly be said to have voted to sustain the Constitution. They may, with more reason, be supposed to have voted, not to support the Constitution, but specially to prevent the tyranny which they anticipate the successful candidate intends to practise upon them under color of the Constitution; and therefore may reasonably be supposed to have voted against the Constitution itself.

This supposition is the more reasonable, inasmuch as such voting is the only mode allowed to them of expressing their dissent to the Constitution. Many votes are usually given for candidates who have no prospect of success. Those who give such votes may reasonably be supposed to have voted as they did, with a special intention, not to support, but to obstruct the execution of, the Constitution; and, therefore, against the Constitution itself. As all the different votes are given secretly by secret ballot , there is no legal means of knowing, from the votes themselves, who votes for, and who against, the Constitution.

Therefore voting affords no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the Constitution. And where there can be no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the Constitution, it cannot legally be said that anybody supports it. It is clearly impossible to have any legal proof of the intentions of large numbers of men, where there can be no legal proof of the intentions of any particular one of them. As a conjecture, it is probable that a very large proportion of those who vote, do so on this principle, viz.

As every body who supports the Constitution by voting if there are any such does so secretly by secret ballot , and in a way to avoid all personal responsibility for the acts of his agents or representatives, it cannot legally or reasonably be Edition: No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as to assent to, or support, the Constitution, unless he does it openly, and in a way to make himself personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act within the limits of the power he delegates to them.

As all voting is secret, by secret ballot, and as all secret governments are necessarily only secret bands of robbers, tyrants, and murderers, the general fact that our government is practically carried on by means of such voting, only proves that there is among us a secret band of robbers, tyrants and murderers, whose purpose is to rob, enslave, and, so far as necessary to accomplish their purposes, murder, the rest of the people.

For all the reasons that have now been given, voting furnishes no legal evidence as to who the particular individuals are if there are any , who voluntarily support the Constitution. It therefore furnishes no legal evidence that any body supports it voluntarily. So far, therefore, as voting is concerned, the Constitution, legally speaking, has no supporters at all. And, as matter of fact, there is not the slightest probability that the Constitution has a single bona fide supporter in the country.

That is to say, there is not the slightest probability that there is a single man in the country, who both understands what the Constitution really is, and sincerely supports it for what it really is. The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.: Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the government an instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth.

Dupes—a large class, no Edition: A class who have some appreciation of the evils of government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not choose to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves seriously and earnestly to the work of making a change. The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no evidence that any one voluntarily supports the Constitution.

It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay any tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: Your money, or your life. And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat. The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the road side, and, holding a pistol Edition: But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act.

He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY.

He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave. In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves individually known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally the responsibility of their acts.

On the contrary, they secretly by secret ballot designate some one of their number Edition: They say to the person thus designated:.

If he presumes to say that he has never contracted with us to protect him, and that he wants none of our protection, say to him that that is our business, and not his; that we choose to protect him, whether he desires us to do so or not; and that we demand pay, too, for protecting him. If he refuses to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not only our demands, but all your own expenses and trouble beside.

If he resists the seizure of his property, call upon the bystanders to help you doubtless some of them will prove to be members of our band. If, in defending his property, he should kill any of our band who are assisting you, capture him at all hazards; charge him in one of our courts with murder, convict him, and hang him. Tell him to kill all who resist, though they should be hundreds of thousands; Edition: See that the work of murder is thoroughly done, that we may have no further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors shall have thus been taught our strength and our determination, they will be good loyal citizens for many years, and pay their taxes without a why or a wherefore.

It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid. He knows it only through its pretended agents. He knows indeed, by common report, that certain persons, of a certain age, are permitted to vote; and thus to make themselves parts of, or if they choose opponents of, the government, for the time being. But who of them do thus vote, and especially how each one votes whether so as to aid or oppose the government , he does not know; the voting being all done secretly by secret ballot.

Of course he can make no contract with them, give them no consent, and make them no pledge. All he knows is that a man comes to Edition: To save his life, he gives up his money to this agent. To say, therefore, that by giving up his money to their agent, he entered into a voluntary contract with them, that he pledges himself to obey them, to support them, and to give them whatever money they should demand of him in the future, is simply ridiculous. All political power, as it is called, rests practically upon this matter of money.

So these villains, who call themselves governments, well understand that their power rests primarily upon money. With money they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. And, when their authority is denied, the first use they always make of money, is to hire soldiers to kill or subdue all who refuse them more money. For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these vital facts, viz.: That those who will take his money, without his consent, Edition: To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to suppose that they would take his money without his consent, for the purpose of buying food or clothing for him, when he did not want it.

That the only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in their keeping their money in their own pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for their benefit, and not for their injury. That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.

Consequently we have no evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it. And nobody is under any obligation to support it. The Constitution not only binas nobody now, but it never did bind anybody. It never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by any body in such a manner as to make it, on general principles of law and reason, binding upon him. It is a general principle of law and reason, that a written instrument binds no one until he has signed it.

This custom was established ages ago, when few men could write their names; when a clerk—that is, a man who could write—was so rare and valuable a person, that even if he were guilty of high crimes, he was entitled to pardon, on the ground that the public could not afford to lose his services. Hence the custom of affixing seals, that has continued to this time. The law holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is not signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it, did not choose to sign it, or to bind himself by it. And law and reason both give him until the last moment, in which to decide whether he will sign it, or not.

Neither law nor reason requires or expects a man to agree to an instrument, until it is written; for until it is written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it is written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its precise legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before, whether he will agree to it or not. And if he do not then sign it, his reason is supposed to be, that he does not choose to enter into such a contract. The fact that the instrument was written for him to sign, or with the hope that he would sign it, goes for nothing.

Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could bring into court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim to have it enforced, upon the ground that it was written for another man to sign? Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not only be signed, but must also be delivered to the party or to some one for him , in whose favor it is made, before it can bind the party making it. The signing is of no effect, unless the instrument be also delivered.

And a party is at perfect liberty to refuse to deliver a written instrument, after he has signed it. He is as free to refuse to deliver it, as he is to refuse to sign it. It can therefore be of no more validity as a contract, than can any other instrument, that was never signed or delivered. For nearly two hundred years—that is, since —there has been on the statute book of England, and the same, in substance, if not precisely in letter, has been re-enacted, and is now in force, in nearly or quite all the States of this Union, a statute, the general object of which is to declare that no action shall be brought to enforce contracts of the more important class, unless they are put in writing, and signed by the parties to be held chargeable upon them.

The principle of the statute, be it observed, is, not merely that written contracts shall be signed, but also that all contracts, Edition: The reason of the statute, on this point, is, that it is now so easy a thing for men to put their contracts in writing, and sign them, and their failure to do so opens the door to so much doubt, fraud, and litigation, that men who neglect to have their contracts—of any considerable importance—written and signed, ought not to have the benefit of courts of justice to enforce them.

And this reason is a wise one; and that experience has confirmed its wisdom and necessity, is demonstrated by the fact that it has been acted upon in England for nearly two hundred years, and has been so nearly universally adopted in this country, and that nobody thinks of repealing it. We all know, too, how careful most men are to have their contracts written and signed, even when this statute does not require it.

For example, most men, if they have money due them, of no larger amount than five or ten dollars, are careful to take a note for it. If they buy even a small bill of goods, paying for it at the time of delivery, they take a receipted bill for it. If they pay a small balance of a book account, or any other small debt previously contracted, they take a written receipt for it. Furthermore, the law everywhere probably in our country, as well as in England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills, deeds, etc. And in the case of married women conveying their rights in real estate, the law, in many States, requires that the women shall be examined separate and apart from their husbands, and declare that they sign their contracts free of any fear or compulsion of their husbands.

And yet we have what purports, or professes, or is claimed, to be a contract—the Constitution—made eighty years ago, by men who are now all dead, and who never had any power to bind us, but which it is claimed has nevertheless bound three generations of men, consisting of many millions, and which it is claimed will be binding upon all the millions that are to come; but which nobody ever signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or acknowledged; and which few persons, compared with the whole number that are claimed to be bound by it, have ever read, or even seen, or ever will read, or see.

And of those who ever have read it, or ever will read it, scarcely any two, perhaps no two, have ever agreed, or ever will agree, as to what it means. Moreover, this supposed contract, which would not be received in any court of justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a debt of five dollars, owing by one man to another, is one by which— as it is generally interpreted by those who pretend to administer it —all men, women and children throughout the country, and through all time, surrender not only all their property, but also their liberties, and even lives, into the hands of men who by this supposed contract, are expressly made wholly irresponsible for their disposal of them.

And we are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy property and lives without limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfil a supposed contract, which, inasmuch as it has never been signed by anybody, is, on general principles of law and reason—such principles as we are all governed by in regard to other contracts—the merest waste paper, binding upon nobody, fit only to be thrown into the fire; or, if preserved, preserved only to serve as a witness and a warning of the folly and wickedness of mankind.

It is no exaggeration, but a literal truth, to say that, by the Constitution— not as I interpret it, but as it is interpreted by those Edition: Thus the Constitution Art. The Constitution also enables them to secure the execution of all their laws, by giving them power to withhold the salaries of, and to impeach and remove, all judicial and executive officers, who refuse to execute them.

Thus the whole power of the government is in their hands, and they are made utterly irresponsible for the use they make of it. What is this but absolute, irresponsible power? Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the particular individuals holding this power can be changed once in two or six years; for the power of each set of men is absolute during the term for which they hold it; and when they can hold it no longer, they are succeeded only by men whose power will be equally absolute and irresponsible. Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men holding this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the people or portions of them to hold it.

A man is none the less a slave because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of years. Neither are a people any the less slaves because permitted periodically to choose new masters. What makes them slaves is the fact that they now are, and are always hereafter to be, in the hands of men whose power over them is, and always is to be, absolute and irresponsible.

The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offense consists in betraying to the enemy anything concerning the condition, safety, operations, or plans of the troops holding or occupying the place or district, his punishment is death. If the citizen or subject of a country or place invaded or conquered gives information to his own government, from which he is separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his government, he is a war-traitor, and death is the penalty of his offense. All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them if they cannot obtain them otherwise.

If a citizen of a hostile and invaded district voluntarily serves as a guide to the enemy, or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-traitor, and shall suffer death. A citizen serving voluntarily as a guide against his own country commits treason, and will be dealt with according to the law of his country. An unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy is considered treasonable by the law of war. Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory, or foreign visitors in the same, can claim no immunity from this law. They may communicate with foreign parts, or with the inhabitants of the hostile country, so far as the military authority permits, but no further.

Instant expulsion from the occupied territory would be the very least punishment for the infraction of this rule. A messenger carrying written dispatches or verbal messages from one portion of the army, or from a besieged place, to another portion of the same army, or its government, if armed, and in the uniform of his army, and if captured, while doing so, in the territory occupied by the enemy, is treated by the captor as a prisoner of war.

If not in uniform, nor a soldier, the circumstances connected with his capture must determine the disposition that shall be made of him. A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by the enemy, to further, in any manner, the interests of the enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to guard against them.

The law of war, like the criminal law regarding other offenses, makes no difference on account of the difference of sexes, concerning the spy, the war-traitor, or the war-rebel. Spies, war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged according to the common law of war. The exchange of such persons would require a special cartel, authorized by the government, or, at a great distance from it, by the chief commander of the army in the field.

A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, and afterwards captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in closer custody as a person individually dangerous. Exchanges of prisoners take place - number for number - rank for rank wounded for wounded - with added condition for added condition - such, for instance, as not to serve for a certain period.

In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of persons of inferior rank may be substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may be agreed upon by cartel, which requires the sanction of the government, or of the commander of the army in the field. A prisoner of war is in honor bound truly to state to the captor his rank; and he is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to cause a more advantageous exchange, nor a higher rank, for the purpose of obtaining better treatment.

Offenses to the contrary have been justly punished by the commanders of released prisoners, and may be good cause for refusing to release such prisoners. The surplus number of prisoners of war remaining after an exchange has taken place is sometimes released either for the payment of a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of provision, clothing, or other necessaries.

The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of convenience to both belligerents. If no general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be demanded by either of them. No belligerent is obliged to exchange prisoners of war. No exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete capture, and after an accurate account of them, and a list of the captured officers, has been taken. The bearer of a flag of truce cannot insist upon being admitted. He must always be admitted with great caution. Unnecessary frequency is carefully to be avoided. If the bearer of a flag of truce offer himself during an engagement, he can be admitted as a very rare exception only.

It is no breach of good faith to retain such flag of truce, if admitted during the engagement. Firing is not required to cease on the appearance of a flag of truce in battle. If the bearer of a flag of truce, presenting himself during an engagement, is killed or wounded, it furnishes no ground of complaint whatever. If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been abused for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer of the flag thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its sacredness, that while its abuse is an especially heinous offense, great caution is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting the bearer of a flag of truce as a spy. It is customary to designate by certain flags usually yellow the hospitals in places which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may avoid firing on them.

The same has been done in battles, when hospitals are situated within the field of the engagement. Honorable belligerents often request that the hospitals within the territory of the enemy may be designated, so that they may be spared. An honorable belligerent allows himself to be guided by flags or signals of protection as much as the contingencies and the necessities of the fight will permit.

It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the enemy by flags of protection. Such act of bad faith may be good cause for refusing to respect such flags. The besieging belligerent has sometimes requested the besieged to designate the buildings containing collections of works of art, scientific museums, astronomical observatories, or precious libraries, so that their destruction may be avoided as much as possible.

Prisoners of war may be released from captivity by exchange, and, under certain circumstances, also by parole. The term Parole designates the pledge of individual good faith and honor to do, or to omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his parole shall have been dismissed, wholly or partially, from the power of the captor.

The parole applies chiefly to prisoners of war whom the captor allows to return to their country, or to live in greater freedom within the captor's country or territory, on conditions stated in the parole. Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again. When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange of two written documents, in which the name and rank of the paroled individuals are accurately and truthfully stated.

Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and they can give it only with the permission of their superior, as long as a superior in rank is within reach. No noncommissioned officer or private can give his parole except through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not only void, but subject the individuals giving them to the punishment of death as deserters.

The only admissible exception is where individuals, properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement without the possibility of being paroled through an officer. No paroling on the battlefield; no paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle; and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are paroled, is permitted, or of any value. In capitulations for the surrender of strong places or fortified camps the commanding officer, in cases of urgent necessity, may agree that the troops under his command shall not fight again during the war, unless exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active service in the field, against the paroling belligerent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. These cases of breaking the parole are patent acts, and can be visited with the punishment of death; but the pledge does not refer to internal service, such as recruiting or drilling the recruits, fortifying places not besieged, quelling civil commotions, fighting against belligerents unconnected with the paroling belligerents, or to civil or diplomatic service for which the paroled officer may be employed.

If the government does not approve of the parole, the paroled officer must return into captivity, and should the enemy refuse to receive him, he is free of his parole. A belligerent government may declare, by a general order, whether it will allow paroling, and on what conditions it will allow it. Such order is communicated to the enemy. No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to parole himself, and no government is obliged to parole prisoners of war, or to parole all captured officers, if it paroles any.

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As the pledging of the parole is an individual act, so is paroling, on the other hand, an act of choice on the part of the belligerent. The commander of an occupying army may require of the civil officers of the enemy, and of its citizens, any pledge he may consider necessary for the safety or security of his army, and upon their failure to give it he may arrest, confine, or detain them. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period agreed between belligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing, and duly ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties.

If an armistice be declared, without conditions, it extends no further than to require a total cessation of hostilities along the front of both belligerents. If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and must be rigidly adhered to by both parties. If either party violates any express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of the belligerents, or special, that is, referring to certain troops or certain localities only. An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for an indefinite time, during which either belligerent may resume hostilities on giving the notice agreed upon to the other.

The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, whether it be expected to be preliminary to a treaty of peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, does in no way affect the character of the armistice itself. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the agreed commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible from the day only when they receive official information of its existence.

Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district over which their command extends, but such armistice is subject to the ratification of the superior authority, and ceases so soon as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not ratified, even if a certain time for the elapsing between giving notice of cessation and the resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to stipulate what intercourse of persons or traffic between the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.

An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the extent agreed upon by the parties. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the army besieging it, it is agreed by all the authorities on this subject that the besieger must cease all extension, perfection, or advance of his attacking works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists, whether the besieged have the right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defense within the place during an armistice, this point should be determined by express agreement between the parties. So soon as a capitulation is signed, the capitulator has no right to demolish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammunition, in his possession, during the time which elapses between the signing and the execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in the same.

When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties, the other party is released from all obligation to observe it. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be treated as prisoners of war, the officer alone being responsible who gives the order for such a violation of an armistice.

The highest authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an armistice. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace; but plenipotentiaries may meet without a preliminary armistice; in the latter case, the war is carried on without any abatement. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such intentional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage.

The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in view. Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government.

The term is also sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government. The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and portions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their own. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war to ward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgement of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent and sovereign power.

Right to Peaceful Assembly and Association 7. Right to Equal Opportunity for Work and Employment 7. Right not to be Subject to Military Law 8. Right to Appeal 8. Prohibition of Retroactive Law, Bill of Attainder and. Ex Post Facto Law 8. Prohibition Against Illegal Search or Seizure 8. Right to be Informed of Charges and.

Right to Remain Silent 9. Right to Bail 9. Prohibition Against Torture or Inhumane Treatment 9. Right to be Presented before Court 9. Right to Writ of Habeas Corpus Right to an Indictment by a Grand Jury when Charged with. Infamous or Capital Offense Inviolability of Right to Counsel Service of Penalty or Upon Pardon Right to Own Property Scope of Right to Own Property Right of Non-Citizen Missionary, Educational and. Benevolent Institutions to Own Real Property Right of Republic to Convey Real Property.

To Foreign Government Property Right of Spouse in or After Marriage Legislative Enactment of Laws on Devolution of Estates Right of Republic to Expropriate Private Property Forfeiture of Property Right by Denaturalized Citizens Prohibition Against Inclusion of Forfeiture of Right of. Inheritance in Punishment for Crime Prohibition Against Impairment of Right to Contract Right to Sue the Republic or other Persons for Fundamental.

Citizenship on Coming info Force of Constitution Eligibility for Citizenship by Birth and Naturalization. Restricted to Negroes Legislature to Prescribe Standard for Citizenship Article 28 Right to Citizenship Establishment of Legislature Qualifications for Membership of Legislature Oath of Members Sessions of Legislature Right of President to Extend Session for Emergency Powers of Legislature Veto of Proposed Legislation by President Remuneration for Members of Legislature By-Election to Fill Vacancy Power of Legislature to Adopt Own Rules Legislature to Authorize Census Adjournment of Legislature Languages to Conduct Business Immunity of Members of Legislature Impeachment Power of Legislature Contempt of the Legislature Term of Office of Senators Staggering of Senatorial Terms Election of Officers of Senate Term of Office of Members of House of Representatives Election of Officers of House of Representatives Establishment of the Office of President and Tenure of.

Office of President Establishment of the Office of Vice President and. Prescribing Term of Office Qualifications for Election to Office of President and. Oath of President and Vice President Appointment Power of Vice President Appointment Power of President of Notaries Public. And Justices of the Peace Removal Power of the President Elections and Removal of Chiefs Presidential Power to Conduct Foreign Affairs President to Present Annual Legislative Programs Power of President to Pardon Compensation for President and Vice President Immunity of President Removal of President and Vice President from Office Accession to Presidency by Vice President-Elect.

After Death or Inability of President-Elect Guidelines and Procedures to Declare the President Incapable to. Carry out the Duties of His Office Power of President to Nominate a Vice President The President and the Vice President Vesting of Judicial Powers in the Supreme Court Composition of Supreme Court Qualifications for Appointment as Justices of Supreme Court Qualifications for Appointment as Judges of Subordinate Courts Oaths of Justices and Judges Tenure and Impeachment of Justices and Judges Salaries and Allowance of Justices and Judges Retirement Age of Justices and Judges Immunity of Justices and Judges Contempt Power of Courts Code of Conduct for Lawyers Definition of Treason Legislature to Prescribe Punishment for Treason Establishment of Political Parties Conduct of Elections and Eligibility Criteria for.

The Exercise of the Right to Vote And Independent Candidate Or Independent Candidate Party or Independent Candidate Right of Citizen to Vote and Change Constituency Creation and Limitation of Constituency Right of Elections Commission to Reapportion Constituencies Political Party or Independent Candidate Prohibition on Possession of Funds Outside the Republic or.

Political Parties or Independent Candidates Time for Conducting General Elections Furtherance of Constitution Power of President to Declare State of Emergency Conditions Under which State of Emergency may be Declared Limitations on Use of Emergency Powers Legislature to Enact Laws for their Governance Prohibition Against Conflict of Interest Perquisites for Duties Legally Required Conflict of Interest Initiation and Process of Amendment Publication of Proposal for Amendment and Separately Itemizing. Limitation of Presidential Terms of Office Persons Elected Prior to Promulgation of Constitution to be.

Considered Duly Elected Under Constitution Swearing in of Newly Elected President on April 12, and. Coming into Force of Constitution Convening of Newly Elected Legislature Position of Persons Appointed Prior to Coming into. Force of the Constitution Abrogation of Constitution of July 26, Status of Foreign and Domestic Debts Concluded by. Constitution and Power of President to Appoint Legal Proceedings Concluded not to be Commenced Anew Taken by or in the Name of People's Redemption Council Change of Government on April 12, or any Other Act by.

People's Redemption Council Schedule to Form Integral Part of Constitution. Oaths for Public Officials. We the People of the Republic of Liberia: Acknowledging our devout gratitude to God for our existence as a Free, Sovereign. Realizing from many experiences during the course of our national existence.

July 26, was suspended, that all of our people, irrespective of history,. Exercising our natural, inherent and inalienable rights to establish a framework. Having resolved to live in harmony, to practice fraternal love, tolerance and. African unity and international peace and cooperation,. Do hereby solemnly make, establish, proclaim and publish this Constitution for. All power is inherent in the people. All free governments are instituted by. In order to ensure. This Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of Liberia and its.

Any laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs and regulations found to be. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its power of judicial review, is. Liberia is a unitary sovereign state divided into counties for administrative. The form of government is Republican with three separate coordinate. The principles contained in this Chapter shall be fundamental in the governance. Liberia, regardless of ethnic, regional or other differences, into one body. The Republic shall, because of the vital role assigned to the individual citizen. Liberia, provide equal access to educational opportunities and facilities for.

Emphasis shall be placed on. The Republic shall, consistent with the principles of individual freedom and. The Republic shall direct its policy towards ensuring for all citizens, without. The Republic shall encourage the promotion of bilateral and regional cooperation. The Republic shall ensure the publication and dissemination of this Constitution. No person shall be held in slavery or forced labor within the Republic, nor. Liberian citizens and non-Liberian residents may be extradited to a. Non-Liberian residents may be expelled from the Republic of Liberia.

All persons shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and. All persons who, in the practice of their. Consistent with the principle of separation of religion and state, the. Republic shall establish no state religion. This right shall not be curtailed, restricted.

It includes freedom of speech and of the press, academic. It includes non-interference with. It likewise includes the right to. Denial of such access may be challenged in. No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family,. All persons, at all times, in an orderly and peaceable manner, shall have the. All Liberian citizens shall have equal opportunity for work and employment.

No person other than members of the Armed Forces of Liberia or of the militia in. Justice shall be done without sale, denial. The Legislature shall prescribe rules and procedures for the easy,. Such person shall be entitled to counsel at every stage of the. Any admission or other statements made by the accused in. The Legislature shall make it a criminal. There shall be no preventive detention. In all criminal cases, the accused shall have. He shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself and he shall be.

There shall be absolute immunity from any government sanctions or interference. No lawyer shall be barred from practice for. All mineral resources in and under the seas and other waterways shall.

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